Predicting ageist and sexist attitudes and the conditions for their existence by Chabot, Heather Frasier
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Doctoral Dissertations Student Scholarship
Winter 1999
Predicting ageist and sexist attitudes and the
conditions for their existence
Heather Frasier Chabot
University of New Hampshire, Durham
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more
information, please contact nicole.hentz@unh.edu.
Recommended Citation




This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the 
text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and 
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of 
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
subm itted. Broken or indistinct print colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment 
can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a  complete manuscript and 
there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright 
material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning 
the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to 
right in equal sections with small overlaps.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic 
prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for 
an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
Bell & Howell Information and Learning 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA
UMI
800-521-0600
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.




B.A. Colby College, 1986 
M.S. Miami University, 1992 
M.A. University of New Hampshire, 1996
DISSERTATION
Submitted to the University of New Hampshire 
in Partial Fulfillment of 
the Requirements for the Degree of








Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
This dissertation has been examined and approved.
J . _____
Dissertation Director, Ellen S. Cohn 
Professor o f Psychology
S liL O J U lh  U l f i J L H U  ---------------------------------------------
Elizabeth T. Crepeau




Dean of'Healtn and Human Services
leen M. McCartnev
Professor o f Psychology
Rebecca M. Warner 
Professor o f Psychology
gfo \°w
Date
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
To my family, from the youngest (two months) to the eldest (96 years), and especially to 
the one who shares my birthday. Your love and encouragement helped me to complete this
work and enjoy life.
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many people aided me in the completion o f this project and I am grateful for their 
assistance. My dissertation committee members guided me to create and conduct a better 
study than I would have on my own. Ellen Cohn, my advisor and dissertation chair, was a 
source o f information and social support. She was always willing to meet me anyplace and 
anytime to discuss my work. She also taught me to always look for the "possibilities" in 
my work and the rest o f my life. My other dissertation committee members also helped 
immensely. Rebecca Warner’s statistical knowledge was a godsend as was the fact that she 
always gave my "minute" questions all the time that they required. Kathleen McCartney's 
methodological purism pushed me to generate a better sample o f participants than I would 
have done on my own. I also relied on Raymond Coward's experience of conducting 
research on older adults and Elizabeth Crepeau's recent dissertation experience and 
enthusiasm to complete these studies.
I am also thankful to many other faculty members who helped me begin and 
complete my graduate work. Thelma Horn and David Zehr encouraged me to study 
psychology at the graduate level. Jack Mayer engaged me in his work while also allowing 
me the freedom to pursue my interests in social psychology. Victor Benassi, Ken Fuld, Lee 
Seidel, and Harry Richards helped me to develop as a teacher and a future faculty member. 
Elizabeth Stine-Morrow was like a sixth committee member who shared her expertise on 
aging and Beta testing with me; she saved me many hours of hand calculations! Kathy 
Gibney was always willing to listen to my dissertation woes and helped me to recruit a 
large number of older participants. Wendy Palmquist aided me in the creation o f two 
knowledge questionnaires for Study 2. Also, Edward O'Brien and John Limber helped me 
to secure a large number o f participants from the University o f New Hampshire subject 
pool.
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
My graduate work was greatly supported and made more entertaining by my 
classmates Christy Porter, Phyllis Wentworth, Josh Burk, and Lisa Parsons. My work 
was made easier by watching and learning from Drs. Kimberly Smirles, Kathleen Bauman, 
Glenn Geher, John Kraft, Katherine Black, Dennis Mitchell, and Rebecca Regreth. 
Kimberly cheered me on and reminded me o f my talents. I am also thankful for the ideas 
and encouragement I received from the following current graduate students: Le'Ann 
Millinder, Anne Cook, Michael Mangan, Eric Dearing, Tara Tayyabkhan, Lindsey 
LaPlante, Jennifer Feenstra, Russell Kosits, Tracey Martin, and Donna Perkins.
My data collection and data entry were made more reasonable because of the 
assistance of five undergraduate students. Michelle Dumoulin, Danielle Dixon, Sandra 
Rodrigue, and Kathleen Malvey aided me in the Pilot Study. Megan Malia did an 
incredible job entering data for Studies 1,2, and 3 which allowed me to finish this work in 
1999!
This dissertation was supported by funding from three sources. I received a 
Dissertation Year Fellowship from the University of New Hampshire Graduate School. 
This fellowship allowed me to dedicate the 1998-1999 academic year to complete my 
research. I received a Grants-In-Aid dissertation award from the Society for the 
Psychological Study o f Social Issues (SPSSI). I also received a grant from the Institute for 
Policy and Social Science headed by Dennis Meadows at the University of New 
Hampshire. I am grateful for the financial support I received from these organizations. 
Their support enabled me to survey more participants and to complete my dissertation in a 
timely fashion.
I am also thankful for the large number of participants who volunteered to complete 
my surveys. My thanks go out to the members of the University o f New Hampshire 
subject pool as well as their families and friends who agreed to help them and myself 
generate data for my studies. I also want to thank Cissy VanLoon, the director at the 
Plymouth Senior Citizen's Center, and the members of the center for assisting in the
v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
generation o f items for Study 3. Without the help and time o f these people I would not 
have any findings to report!
Finally, I especially want to thank my family for all their support and 
encouragement throughout my education. My husband, Christopher Chabot, made this 
work possible and worthwhile through his reassurance, sacrifice, and "enduring love”. I 
am very fortunate to have such a wonderful livelong partner. My parents, Joyce and 
Francis Frasier, lovingly took me (and my family!) back into their home over for the past 
five years. They took care of us with everything from sandwiches to baby-sitting. My 
siblings, John Frasier, Chris Frasier, Hilary Hayes, and Courtney Frasier (and their 
families) also helped me to maintain enthusiasm for my education with their many words of 
encouragement. My grandparents, John Lematowitz, Hilda Frasier and Harry Rosenblad, 
inspired me to examine issues of older adults. My grandparents and my in-laws, Maurice 
and Meredyth Chabot, also rallied me on in the process. Last, I want to thank my children, 
Delaney and Andrew Chabot, for their smiles and the joy that they have brought to my life.
I am ever grateful to you all.
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
D E D IC A T IO N ................................................................................................................................iii
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S ..........................................................................................................iv
L IS T  O F T A B L E S ..................................................................................................................vii
A B S T R A C T .................................................................................................................................... xi
CHAPTER PAGE
I. G EN ER A L IN T R O D U C TIO N ............................................................................... 1
A tti tu d e s .................................................................................................................. 2
D efinition/Com ponents o f  A ttitudes...............................................2
Bases o f  A ttitu d es .............................................................................. 2
A ffective-C ognitive C onsistency ..................................................... 4
A ttitude S tren g th ................................................................................. 6
P redictors o f A ttitu d es.................................................................... 10
P re ju d ic e ................................................................................................................15
D e fin it io n ................................................................................................ 15
Sources/Theories o f  P rejud ice.......................................................15
Prejudice and other Consequences of the Categorization of In
G roup and O ut-Group M em bers..........................................23
Groups based on Age and Sex as Quasi-M inorities.....................28
A g e ism ..................................................................................................... 29
Sexism ....................................................................................32
G enera l P u rp o se .............................................................................................. 34
II. P ILO T ST U D Y ..................................................................................................35
M e th o d ................................................................................................................... 37
vii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
P a rtic ip a n ts ............................................................................................ 37
M e asu re s   ...................................................................................... 37
P ro c e d u re ................................................................................................ 39
R e s u lts ...................................................................................................................40
D isc u ss io n ............................................................................................................44
III. STU D Y  1...........................................................................................................47
M e th o d ...................................................................................................................48
P a rtic ip a n ts ............................................................................................ 48
M easu re s ................................................................................................ 48
P ro c e d u re ................................................................................................ 50
R e s u lts ...................................................................................................................50
D isc u s s io n ............................................................................................................52
IV . STU D Y  2........................................................................................................... 54
M e th o d ...................................................................................................................56
P a r tic ip a n ts ............................................................................................ 56
M e a su re s ................................................................................................ 59
P ro c e d u re ................................................................................................ 65
R e s u lts ...................................................................................................................65
Descriptive Statistics and R eliabilities..........................................66
Analyses Testing Prim ary H ypotheses........................................77
D isc u ss io n ......................................................................................................... 100
V. STU D Y  3 ............................................................................................................107
M e th o d ................................................................................................................ 109
P a r tic ip a n ts ..........................................................................................109
M easu re s ............................................................................................... 109
P ro c e d u re ..............................................................................................1 12
R e s u lts ...............................................................................................................1 13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
D isc u ss io n ........................................................................................................120
VI. G EN ERA L D ISC U SSIO N ........................................................................124
F indings and Im plications...................................................................... 124
The Prevalence o f Ageist and Sexist A ttitudes..........................124
Predictors of Attitudes toward In-Group and Out-group
M em b ers ................................................................................. 125
In-g roup  B ia s ....................................................................................127
O ut-group H om ogeneity ............................................................... 128
A ttitude S tru c tu re ........................................................................... 129
Contributions to the Stereotype and Attitude Literature..............129
Lim itations o f the S tud ies.......................................................................130
Suggestions for Future R esearch .......................................................... 132
C o n c lu s io n ........................................................................................................ 134
L IST  O F R E FE R E N C E S ....................................................................................................135
A P P E N D IC E S ............................................................................................................................148
Appendix A: B rief Mood Introspection Scale ................................................... 149
Appendix B: Facts On Aging Q uiz.................................................................... 150
A ppendix C: Self-E steem ....................................................................................151
Appendix D: Erikson’s Psychosocial Stage Inventory.................................... 152
Appendix E: The Interpersonal Reactivity Index .......................................... 154
Appendix F: Attitudes Statements Used In Pilot Study................................ 156
A ppendix G: Sem antic D ifferential...................................................................158
Appendix H: The M ultiresponse Checklist.......................................................160
A ppendix I: Social D esirab ility .......................................................................... 164
A ppendix J: Experience M easures......................................................................165
Appendix K: Revised Facts On Aging Quiz 2................................................ 166
Appendix L: Facts On Younger Adults Q uiz...................................................167
ix
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A ppendix M: Facts On M ales And Females Q uiz............................................ 168
A ppendix  N: C onsent Form s.............................................................................. 169
A ppendix O: D em ographic Inform ation..............................................................171
A ppendix  P: D ebriefing S tatem ent......................................................................172
A ppendix Q: R ecruitm ent L etter...........................................................................173
A ppendix R: New Items For Attributes Scale..................................................174
Appendix S: Institutional Review Board Approval for Pilot Study.................... 177
A ppendix T: Institutional Review Board Approval for Study 1.........................178
Appendix U: Institutional Review Board Approval for Studies 1 & 2 ............... 179
x
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
T a b le ......1...........................................................................................................................................41
Factors, Loading, and Reliabilities of Principai-Components Factor Analysis (Pilot Study)
T ab le .....2 ...........................................................................................................................................43
Forward Regression of Attitude Predictor Variables on Negative/Positive Aspects o f Older 
People Attitude Factor and Forward Regression o f Attitude Predictor Variables on Different 
but Competent Factor (Pilot Study)
T ab le  3 ...........................................................................................................................................49
Items loading on Rosencranz & McNevin’s (1969) factors and their reliabilities (Study 1)
T ab le  4 .......................................................................................................................................... 51
Cell means for Ratings of Attitudinal Factors by Participants’ Sex, Target Age and Target 
Sex (Study 1)
T ab le  5 .............................................................................................................................................57
Frequencies for Participant Characteristics (Study 2)
T ab le  6 ............................................................................................................................................ 67
Descriptive Statistics and Scale Reliabilities o f Predictor Variables (Study 2)
T ab le  7 ............................................................................................................................................ 70
Descriptive Statistics and Scale Reliabilities o f Dependent Variables (Study 2)
T a b le  8 ............................................................................................................................................ 72
Intercorrelations among Predictor Variables for All Participants (Study 2)
T a b le  9 ............................................................................................................................................ 75
Correlations between Predictor and Dependent Variables for All Participants (Study 2)
T a b le  10........................................................................................................................................80
Standard Multiple Regression of Predictor Variables on the Instrumental-Ineffective Factor 
by In-group Category (Study 2)
T a b le  11........................................................................................................................................82
Standard Multiple Regression of Predictor Variables on the Autonomous-Dependent Factor 
by In-group Category (Study 2)
T ab le  12 ......................................................................................................................................85
Standard Multiple Regression of Predictor Variables on the Personal Acceptability- 
Unacceptability Factor by In-group Category (Study 2)
T a b le  13........................................................................................................................................88
Z-scores for Tests of Significance o f Regression Coefficients for Significant Predictors of 
Instrumental-Ineffective Factor by In-group Category (Study 2)
xi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT
PREDICTING AGEIST AND SEXIST ATTITUDES AND THE CONDITIONS FOR
THEIR EXISTENCE 
by
Heather Frasier Chabot 
University o f New Hampshire, December, 1999
Prejudice and discrimination are pervasive and problematic and affect intergroup relations 
(Allport, 1954). The purpose o f the current research was to expand our understanding of 
ageist and sexist attitudes. The Pilot Study indicated some of the significant predictors of 
ageist attitudes among college students. The results of Study 1 indicated that college 
students view younger adults as more instrumental than older adults but they do not 
differentiate between older adults who are 65 to 74 years of age, 75 to 84 years of age, and 
85 years or older. Study 2 indicated that intergroup distinctions among younger (17-28 
years of age) and older (60-79 years o f age) participants rating older or younger male or 
female targets exist. Differences in the importance o f attitude strength variables, self­
esteem, and participants’ age in the prediction o f ageist and sexist attitudes were noted. In 
addition, in-group bias and in-group homogeneity were demonstrated but no evidence of 
attitude structure differences based on in-group classification were found. In Study 3, 
conditions for in-group bias and in-group homogeneity and evidence indicating intergroup 
difference for physical, cognitive, and personal-expressive attributes were found. The 
implications o f these findings are discussed as they supplement current knowledge of 
attitudes and stereotypes as well as their relation to the creation o f more effective attitude 
change programs for combating ageism and sexism.
xii
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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Prejudice and discrimination based on age and sex have long been part of our society but 
concerted research efforts examining these phenomena are relatively new. Terms and 
stereotypes such as "Baby Boomers" and "Generation Xers" based on age have been 
produced to separate generations from each other. The term "ageism" has now been coined 
to depict negative stereotypes and discrimination specifically toward older adults (Butler, 
1995) and more generally by age (Bytheway, 1995). Sexism, assumptions and negative 
attitudes toward a person based solely on sex, is also common and omnipresent (Deaux & 
Kite, 1993; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Unger & Saundra, 1993; Williams & Best, 1990). 
Furthermore, these negative stereotypes about age and sex have been shown to have 
detrimental effects. Effects such as reduced performance on various capacities, including 
memory among older adults (Levy & Langer, 1994) and women's task choices (Skrypnek 
& Snyder, 1982) have been demonstrated. It is possible that such stereotypes affect 
behavior through self-fulfilling prophecies (Darley & Fazio, 1980).
It is important to study prejudice (i.e., negative attitudes toward individuals based 
solely on their membership in a group) in order to better understand the nature of prejudice 
so that programs designed to reduce prejudice may be better implemented. Given the 
current demographics of the our country, there are more salient reasons for studying these 
prejudices, especially ageism. An important reason for studying attitudes towards older 
adults is that the number of people over 65 years of age in our population is increasing and 
the majority o f these older adults will be female (Schick & Schick, 1994). Rosenthal 
(1990) has suggested that women may be viewed even more negadvely than men because 
o f the interaction of ageism and sexism. This means that problems associated with negative 
stereotypes as described above will probably become more problematic, especially for older 
women. Within the field of social psychology, Michael Strube, the editor of the journal
I
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Basic and Applied Social Psychology , made a plea to examine issues of aging. He 
suggested that social psychologists should become more involved in examining the 
implications surrounding aging and is editing a special forthcoming edition to examine such 
issues. Thus, it is clear that ageist and sexist attitudes are important not only for 
psychologists to study but also o f importance to the general public.
Most of the studies examining ageism and sexism have been conducted with 
younger adults as participants. Younger adults, however, are not members of the target 
population o f older people and as such can be considered out-group members. Because the 
demographics of the United States and world populations are rapidly changing (Schick & 
Schick, 1994) and research on prejudice and group membership (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978: 
Taylor, 1981; Wilder, 1986) has indicated that attitudes toward various target groups vary 
by group membership, it is important to expand studies of ageism and sexism to include 
older men and women (i.e.. 65 years of age and older). Before examining ageism and 
sexism, some general findings and understandings regarding attitudes, prejudice, and 
group membership distinctions, should be discussed.
Attitudes
Definition/Components of Attitudes 
Social psychologists have been interested in the study of attitudes as well as the 
variables that lead to attitude change since the inception of the discipline (Hovland, Janis. 
Kelly, 1953). Attitudes have been described as positive or negative evaluations that are 
manifested in affections, cognitions, and behavior toward an attitude object (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993). Emphasizing the evaluative component. Kogan (1979) has described an 
attitude as containing a pro or con element toward an object. It is further believed that an 
attitude is a fairly stable, evaluative disposition that makes a  person think, feel, or behave 
positively or negatively toward some person, group, o r social issue (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993). The tripartite view of attitudes suggests that a given attitude has an affective or 
emotional aspect, a cognitive or thought-based component, and a  behavioral component
i
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(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). The affective component is judgment: a like or dislike of an 
object (e.g., If I believe that all people over the age of 65 are senile, then I can evaluate 
positively or negatively: "It is great that all people over the age of 65 are free from the 
worries o f everyday life" or "It is awful that all people over the age of 65 have no idea what 
is going on in the world."). The cognitive component is a set of beliefs (e.g., the belief that 
ail people over the age of 65 are senile). The behavioral component is a way of acting 
(e.g.. If I believe that all people over the age of 65 are senile and I am happy about that, I 
may visit with more people over the age of 65).
Now that an attitude and its components have been described, I shall discuss 
attitude bases. Although there is general acceptance o f the components of an attitude, there 
are differing theories as to how attitudes are formed and the resultant basis of an attitude.
Bases of Attitudes: The Cognitive and Affective Foundations of Attitudes 
The study of attitude formation is of major importance in understanding attitudes 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). It seems clear that without a firm comprehension of how or 
why attitudes are created and maintained, it is futile to attempt to permanently manipulate or 
persuade a person from his/her attitudes.
There is general acceptance among researchers that attitudes are based on affective, 
cognitive, and behavioral components either solely or in some combination (Breckler,
1984; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). In general, attitude formation is thought to occur as 
information regarding an attitude object is obtained and processed (Eagly & Chaiken,
1993). Many researchers argue that in information processing, cognition precedes affect, 
i.e., feelings are based upon knowing (Lazarus, 1982, 1984); while others propose that 
affect is an organism’s first response to information (Zajonc, 1980, 1984). It has been 
suggested that affect and cognition are independent of each other and that both systems are 
involved in information processing (Zajonc, 1980).
Currently there exist two major explanations or routes of attitude formation. Many 
researchers argue strongly for the primary role o f cognitive processes leading to an attitude
3
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(Eagly, Mladinic & Otto, 1994; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Smith & Clark, 1973). Other 
researchers (Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989) are more in favor of 
affective processing as the major mode of processing stimuli that result in an attitude. The 
affect proponents suggest that attitudes are formed and based upon the emotional response 
o f a person, whereas those in the cognitive camp favor the notion that a person's cognitive 
response to or thoughts about a stimulus are responsible for creating the subsequent 
attitude. These two discrepant explanations, however, both result in the formation of new 
attitudes. Though the majority of researchers support the notion that beliefs or cognition 
are the primary determinants of attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Edwards, & von Hippel, 
1995), it is not clear that this is the case. It has been shown that both mere exposure 
(Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc, 1968) and classical conditioning (Bowers, 1984) 
are sufficient to enhance participants’ liking of a stimulus.
The primacy issue will be examined in this study. The basis of each participant's 
attitude will be measured. Edwards (1990) suggests that people’s attitudes vary along a 
continuum consisting of both affective and cognitive antecedents. Attitudes may be 
cognitively based, affectively based, or somewhere in the middle. Crites, Fabrigar. and 
Petty (1994) have devised a scale which differentiates between people whose attitudes are 
primarily based on cognitive or affective responses. By administering checklists of 
feelings, traits, and general evaluations of an attitude object, they were able to determine 
whether participants' attitudes were more affectively or cognitively based. The next section 
addresses a  related phenomenon of affective-cognitive consistency.
Affective-Cognitive Consistency
Affective-cognitive consistency is an important structural dimension of attitudes and 
refers to the degree of agreement between participants’ feelings and thoughts toward an 
attitude object (Rosenberg, 1956, 1968). Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, and 
Camot (1993) found that it was one of the attributes o f stable attitudes. Consistent 
attitudes, those resistant to change, have been associated with more agreement between the
4
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affective and cognitive dimensions (Crites et al., 1994; Norman, 1975; Petty & Krosnick, 
1995; Rosenberg, 1968). However, incongruency, or inconsistency, among affective and 
cognitive dimensions does occur (Crites et al., 1994; Simon & Carey, 1998). This can be 
understood by reiterating that affective and cognitive components are derived from different 
types o f experience, or information, and that they manifest themselves via different 
response modes (Ajzen, 1989; Breckler & Wiggins, 1989, Crites et al., 1994; Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993).
The affective component is believed to be derived from emotional experiences with 
the attitude object (Breckler & Wiggins, 1993; Crites et al., 1994) and to be strengthened 
by direct experience with object. The cognitive component, however, is thought to be 
derived from traits or attributes that represent the attitude object (Breckler & Wiggins,
1993; Crites et al., 1994). The cognitive component may develop with less proximal 
experiences than the affective component, including information gained from the media, 
friends, or school among other sources.
Differences in intra-attitudinal structure among participants with direct versus 
indirect experience with drugs have been documented. Simon and Carey (1998) found that 
the attitude structure o f participants who had not used alcohol or marijuana differed from 
those who had used these drugs. They found that users’ affective responses were based on 
experience while abstainers' affective responses were not based on experience but, rather, 
were mediated by cognition. Simon and Carey argued that researchers should continue to 
examine the attitude structure o f other attitude objects to further enhance our understanding 
of attitude structure and formation. In heeding their advice, I will examine the affective and 
cognitive attitude structure of the attitude objects of sex and age and make comparisons 
among those with more or less experience (i.e., in-group and out-group members).
Another important aspect o f attitude research to discuss is the relatively new domain 
of attitude strength. Although researchers have generally assessed the degree o f agreement
5
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people have toward a given attitude object, only recently have psychologists started to 
incorporate other dimensions of attitude strength.
Attitude Strength
Recently, the notion of attitude strength as a single entity has come under attack 
(Krosnick et al., 1993). Both Krosnick et al. (1993) and Radan (1985) describe attitude 
strength as a multi-dimensional concept. The four major features o f strength, according to 
Petty and Krosnick (1995), are persistence, resistance, impact on cognition, and impact on 
behavior. More specifically, the two aspects o f persistence and resistance are 
manifestations of durability (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). The persistence or stability o f an 
attitude refers to the degree to which an attitude is consistent over time. Resistance is 
defined as how likely an attitude is to withstand persuasive arguments or attacks. 
According to Petty and Krosnick (1995), an attitude is considered strong if it is both 
persistent and resistant. The impact which an attitude can have is comprised of both the 
extent to which an attitude can influence information processing and judgments as well the 
extent to which it can guide behavior. Attitudes influence cognition when they enhance 
one's chances of remembering information or impact judgments. Likewise, attitudes may 
play a role in deciding which behaviors a person will perform. Attitudes which are strong 
will influence both thought and behavior more than weak attitudes (Petty & Krosnick, 
1995). Thus, strong attitudes are persistent over time, resistant to change, and influence 
thought and behavior (Krosnick. et al.. 1993).
It has been suggested by multitrait-multimethod confirmatory factor analysis 
(Krosnick, et al., 1993) that attitude strength is comprised of 10 dimensions including 
extremity, certainty, importance, knowledge, intensity, latitude o f rejection and 
noncommitment, interest, direct experience, accessibility, and affective-cognitive 
consistency. In three separate factor analyses, Krosnick et al. (1993) confirmed the 
hypothesis that attitude strength is not a singular entity by finding multiple factors. Given
6
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that attitude strength is not a single measure, it becomes important to examine specific 
aspects of it for clarity.
In the present study, the following aspects of attitude strength will be studied: 
extremity, certainty, knowledge, direct experience, and affective-cognitive consistency. 
Extremity is the extent to which an attitude deviates from the midpoint in terms of 
favorability-unfavorability. The further a participant's attitude extremity is from neutrality, 
the more extreme his/her attitude. Certainty is the degree to which a person is sure or 
confident of his/her attitude. Knowledge is described as the amount of information one has 
about the object. Direct experience is associated with the amount of direct contact that a 
person has had with an object. Affective-cognitive consistency, as previously described, is 
the match between feelings and attributes of a given attitude object. Generally, stronger 
attitudes are those which are more extreme, are associated with a higher certainty, are based 
on more knowledge and direct experience, and have a higher degree of agreement among 
the affective and cognitive components.
These five dimensions of attitude strength were selected for methodological and 
theoretical reasons. Methodologically, these dimensions can all be readily measured by a 
paper and pencil task. Attitude statements toward the attitude object of age and sex can be 
generated and participants can specify the extremity of their attitudes by choosing the 
number that best represents their agreement. Certainty is measured by having participants 
state how confident they are of their agreement to statements from 0% to 100%.
Knowledge and experience are also quickly assessed by having participants complete a 
true/false questionnaire o f facts of aging and sex differences and objective questions 
regarding experience. Affective-cognitive consistency is assessed using Crites et al. (1994) 
semantic differential scales to assess cognitive, affective, and global attitude components. 
These procedures are all straight forward and familiar to participants as they have been used 
widely in psychological research.
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The theoretical rationale for measuring these five measures of attitude strength is 
based on current and past research. Attitude extremity is important to study because it is 
the foundation of attitude research. Historically and currently, attitudes have been assessed 
by asking participants to choose the number that corresponds best to their overall rating of 
agreeableness to the object and noting how different it is from neutrality (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993; Likert, 1932). Another reason for assessing attitude extremity is that attitude 
extremity has been shown to differ based on the rater’s reference group (Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 1993; Linville, 1982). Thus, attitude extremity appears to be a key measure to 
determine if group differences in attitude structure exist.
Attitude certainty has been associated with attitude stability, range, and reliability 
(Petty & Krosnick, 1995) and linked to information seeking (Swann & Ely. 1984) among 
other behavior (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). The more certain a person is, the less likely s/he 
is to seek out new information about the attitude object and the more consistent their 
behavior is toward the object. Given that the proximal goal of this research is to better 
understand attitudes toward various target groups with the distal goal of changing negative 
attitudes, it seems imperative to determine the commitment and confidence of raters' 
attitudes.
Measures of knowledge and experience have long been implicated in the prediction 
of attitudes and prejudice (Allport, 1954; Brown, 1996; Byrne, 1971; Hewstone & Brown, 
1986; Palmore. 1998);. Evidence, however, is mixed. In general, we tend to have more 
positive attitudes toward objects and people with whom we have had more experience and 
we classify those with whom we lack exposure as members of the out-group and rate them 
more negatively (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989). Contact with or information about a 
target group, however, is not always sufficient to improve attitudes toward the target 
group. Contact in the form of competition and other experiences have been shown to lead 
to more negative attitudes (see Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Thus, to
8
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
improve our understanding of attitudes toward various target groups, measures of 
knowledge and experience should be useful measures.
The last measure of attitude strength that will be assessed is affective-cognitive 
consistency. A general description of this measure has already been given so I will focus 
on its importance to the study of prejudice and intergroup attitudes. The study of the 
relation between affect and cognition in social psychology has been referred to as the "most 
challenging area(s) of research and theory in social psychology" and this challenge has 
been highlighted in the study of prejudice (Brewer, 1994, p. 320). The concern is that 
thoughts and emotions each comprise attitudes and have been widely examined but two 
separate processes generate these distinct components and, thus, affect and cognition have 
for the most part been studied independently (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Esses, Haddock. & 
Zanna, 1993). If a unified theory of attitudes and prejudice is desired, then researchers 
should embrace an approach that examines the interplay of affect and cognition in attitude 
structure, especially among intergroup attitudes (Esses, et al., 1993). Assessing 
participants’ affective-cognitive consistency will serve to meet this aim as it will assess or 
evaluate the relation among affective and cognitive components and provide overall 
information regarding the basis of attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
In summary, these aspects of attitude strength were selected because of their general 
theoretical importance. Furthermore, only five dimensions of attitude strength were 
assessed because Krosnick et al. (1993) stressed that researchers should seek to measure 
only a few attitude dimensions. They suggested that focusing on a few dimensions will 
shorten the number of items and will subsequently reduce the cognitive demands on 
participants. Fewer numbers o f questions allow participants to expend sufficient thought 
on each item and to give more accurate reports (Krosnick et al., 1993). Complying with 
this suggestion, the study will be conducted with the goal of better understanding these 
sources o f attitude strength and their relation to attitude structure.
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Next, I would like to discuss how personality variables (including social 
desirability, self-esteem, empathy, and identity), mood, and experience with the attitude 
object have been implicated as possible predictors of attitudes.
Predictors of Attitudes
Social Desirability
Kogan (1979) has suggested that attitudes may be related to impression 
management. He advocates using the Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Scale (1960) to 
measure its effect on attitudes, especially attitudes that may have a socially desirable 
component. Social desirability has also been positively associated with attitude ratings. 
Silverman, Ford, and Morganti (1966) found that more favorable attitudinal scores on a 
scale assessing attitudes toward Older Persons were me Jestly associated with social 
desirability.
Self-esteem
Self-esteem is the extent to which one likes or approves of oneself. Self-esteem is a 
subclass of self-concept but it is more global than evaluations of specific attributes such as 
attractiveness o r athletic ability (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1990). Self-esteem is important to 
examine because it affects how a person models him/herself in the world. For example, if 
one feels positive about herself, she is more likely to approach others in a positive fashion.
In a review o f the literature, Duckitt (1992) found a consistent relation between self 
evaluation and prejudice. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner. 1986) offers an 
intergroup explanation for this relationship and Wills’ (1981) downward social comparison 
theory presents an intrapersonal explanation. According to Wills, if a person is 
experiencing low self evaluation, s/he can increase his/her self assessment by comparing 
themselves to those worse off. Prejudice or negative assessment of a group may, thus, 
lead to enhanced self-esteem. Wills (1981) found that self-esteem was negatively 
correlated with prejudice. Individuals with low self-esteem tend to be more prejudiced. 
Recently, a more specific relation has been found when self-esteem and prejudice among
10
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ethnic majority and minority youth were compared. Verkutyen (1996) found that among 
youth in the majority, self-esteem was positively related to prejudice (i.e., higher self­
esteem was associated with more prejudiced attitudes) and that participants with lower self­
esteem gave lower in-group ratings than did participants with higher self-esteem. Among 
minority youth, however, the relation was negative, lower self-esteem was associated with 
greater prejudice and lower in-group assessments and participants with lower self-esteem 
had more negative assessment of in-group member than did participants with higher self­
esteem. It, thus, appears that the relation between self-esteem and prejudice is more 
complicated than once thought and that group membership of participants may affect this 
relation.
Empathy
Empathy is the ability to experience the feelings of another person by 
understanding and responding appropriately (Barnett, 1987). It should be noted that while 
empathy differs from perspective taking, it is intuitively related to it. A major reason for 
studying empathy has been because of its hypothesized relationship to prosocial behavior 
(Hoffman, 1982). It appears that prosocial behavior is related to empathy but not all 
measures of it (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). The relationship does, however, become 
stronger as age increases, i.e., measures of empathy are more strongly related to prosocial 
behavior in adults and older children than in younger children. Furthermore, empathy has 
been shown to be a significant predictor of college students' attitudes toward older adults 
(Chabot, Cohn, Dixon, Dumoulin, Malvey, & Rodrigue, 1998)
Identity
According to Erikson, during adolescence, one undergoes the psychosocial conflict 
of identity versus role confusion. Identity refers to the stable entity o f who one is and 
knowing one’s values and ideals; a melding of the internal private and the external public 
selves (Erikson. 1968). Identity or role confusion occurs when one cannot decide on a 
coherent and enduring sense o f self and/or commit to the various roles, values, or ideals
1 1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
associated with that choice. Erikson views this crisis as a critical step in later success and 
happiness in life. Erikson believed that identity formation began before adolescence and 
was marked by successful completion o f previous crises. Four identity statuses assessing 
progression to a mature identity have been identified (Marcia, 1966, 1980). The four 
statuses are identity achievement, moratorium, identity foreclosure, and identity diffusion. 
One is said to have attained identity achievement after have fully explored the options and 
made a decision to commit to specific goals and values. Moratorium defines the state of 
effortful exploration of options. Identity foreclosure is the identity status of an individual 
who has adopted goals and values that have been suggested or assigned by an authority 
figure without exploration. Lastly, identity diffusion refers to a person who has not 
selected goals or values and is not currently actively exploring. Identity achievement and 
moratorium are associated with positive characteristics such as self-esteem (Marcia, 1980), 
while identity foreclosure and identity diffusion have been found to be related to negative 
characteristics such as prejudice (Streitmatter, & Pate, 1989).
Mood
Currently there exist various models suggesting that mood, a transitory affective 
state (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), affects judgment and persuasibility. Some have suggested 
that the effect o f mood state on persuasion can be explained by classical conditioning. If a 
positive or negative mood is associated with the attitude object or argument, this leads to a 
more favorable or unfavorable attitude. For example, in one of the earliest studies, Razran 
(1940) found that college-aged participants agreed more with political slogans when they 
received free food (i.e., underwent a pleasant mood induction) than when they were 
subjected to a noxious odor (i.e., underwent an unpleasant mood induction). Other 
researchers suggest that the effect o f mood on persuasion is due to its effect on cognitive 
processing of the information. Petty and Cacioppo (1984) and Chaiken (1980) have put 
forth independent models of persuasion in which they suggest that people either engage in 
effortful thought (the central or systematic routes) in which they will be persuaded by
12
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
strong arguments or that they do not think intensely but, rather, are persuaded by 
superficial cues of the source or some other peripheral means (peripheral or heuristic 
route). It has been demonstrated that when participants are induced into a positive mood, 
there is a reduction in systematic processing (i.e., participants are equally persuaded by 
weak and strong arguments); whereas those in a negative mood are more likely to engage in 
systematic processing and be more persuaded by strong arguments than by weak ones 
(Bless, Mackie, Schwarz, 1992; Bohner & Apostolidou, 1994).
While dramatic effects have been found in studies examining the influence o f mood 
on judgment and attitude change, little research has been conducted on participants under 
conditions of naturally occurring mood. Even Razran (1940) used induction techniques to 
test the effects of mood on auitudes as did Isen in her classic work on the relation between 
mood and helping behavior (Isen & Levin, 1972). Recent studies have also relied heavily 
on mood induction procedures to test the influence of mood (Bless et al„ 1992; Bohner & 
Apostolidou, 1994; Bohner, Crow, Erb, & Schwarz, 1992; Sinclair, Mark, & Clore.
1994). In this current study, naturally occurring mood states (happiness, fear, anger, and 
sadness) will be examined.
Experience/Degree o f Contact with Target Group
Another important correlate of attitudes that has been examined is experience with 
the attitude object. Rosencranz and McNevin (1969) assessed the relation between contact 
with aged persons and attitudes toward the target group. They found that the amount and 
quality o f interactions that participants had with older adults affected their ratings of older 
adults. Those with close contact with grandparents rated older adults more positively. 
Those with at least one meaningful association with an older adult showed similar ratings 
but those participants with only hospital contact with older adults had lower ratings. It 
appears that the type and context o f contact are important. In general, they found that when 
participants had close or meaningful contact with older adults, as long as the contact was
13
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not in a  hospital setting, they were more likely to view older adults as effective and 
independent and rate them as acceptable.
Drake (1957) conducted a more intensive study of the type of interaction that 
participants had with older people. Participants completed three questions to assess the 
types of interactions they had with older adults and were also asked to think about the 
group of older people as a whole and state whether they agreed or disagreed with 
stereotyped statements. Drake found that the living arrangements, intimacy, and frequency 
of contacts influenced college students' attitudes toward older adults. The highest 
percentage of agreement to stereotypical statements was made by students currently living 
with older people who did not have frequent or intimate contact with them (38% agreement) 
and the lowest percent of agreement was among students who had never lived with an older 
person but who had frequent close contacts (28%). Also, those who had frequent contact 
of a causal or impersonal nature (28%) tended to have lower agreement to the stereotyped 
statements. Overall, he found no support for the idea that close contact alone would lead to 
less negative attitudes. He claimed instead that "Acceptance or rejection of these statements 
is determined by some circumstances other than the objectively determined fact of living 
with, having lived with, or never having lived with an old person, and the more 
subjectively determined frequency and intimacy of close contacts which these students have 
with old people." (p.271). Although this finding of an interaction between amount and 
type of contact is promising it seems that more examination is necessary to determine the 
overall influence of experience. Such intricacies of experience are necessary to examine 
especially because experience with an attitude object is one of the dimensions of attitudes 
strength that has been show to influence attitude change (Krosnick et al., 1993; Petty & 
Krosnick, 1995).
A specific type of attitude, prejudice and the related phenomenon of stereotypes, 
theorized causes, and group membership distinctions will be discussed next. The study of
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prejudice is an important one in social psychology because of the potentially beneficial 
ramifications of changing negative attitudes and reducing their detrimental effects.
Prejudice
Definition
Taken literally, a prejudice is a prejudgment of another person, class o f persons, or 
object. More specifically, prejudices are negative attitudes about people based solely upon 
their group membership (e.g., race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, profession, name, 
accent, age, experience, and education). Prejudice is a dynamic, not static, phenomenon. 
Distinctions such as symbolic prejudice (McConahay & Hough, 1976), subtle prejudice 
(Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), and aversive prejudice (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), all of 
which differentiate recent trends from old-fashioned prejudice, have been established. 
Because o f the dynamic nature of prejudice, it should come as no surprise that various 
theories describing its sources have been proposed.
Sources/Theories of Prejudice
Various sources and theories o f prejudice have been suggested. In general there are 
two major categories of hypothesized sources; those that reside within a given individual 
including psychological and cognitive sources and those that occur via social interactions 
with other individuals and groups.
Individual Sources
Psychological Sources. At the psychological level, three main sources have been 
cited: ego defense, scapegoating, and personality traits as possible producers o f prejudice. 
Prejudice has been viewed as a Freudian phenomenon. It has been suggested that 
prejudiced people employ a defense mechanism to handle anxiety about their own 
inadequacies by belittling other people (Ostow, 1991). More specifically prejudice was 
viewed as the displacement of a given individual’s anger onto another group. While ego 
defense is an intuitively reasonable source of prejudice, it has not been tested in research.
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Scapegoating, the placing of blame on another group of people for a negative event, 
has also received support as a possible mechanism for prejudice. Those who support the 
scapegoat theory of prejudice believe that prejudice is due to the build up of hostile tension 
that results from environmental sources (e.g., the weather, the economy) rather than actual 
intergroup tension, especially when there is no viable way to retaliate on the true source o f 
the hostility (Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, & Chein, 
1969; Hovland & Sears, 1940).
Another psychological explanation is that of personality traits. Various researchers 
have tried to identify a prejudiced personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & 
Stanford, 1950; Eysenck, 1954; Rokeach, 1960). Although such an endeavor has not led 
to a complete depiction of prejudice, it has led to an improved understanding of the role that 
personality traits may play in developing prejudice. It is more probable, however, that the 
mechanisms responsible for prejudices do not result from a given personality but rather 
from specific modes of thought and perception as well as situtational factors (Brown,
1996). Researchers have argued many theories that support cognitive sources of prejudice.
Cognitive Sources. The cognitive influence in social psychology research may 
provide some of the most parsimonious explanations for prejudice. According to such 
cognitive proponents (Devine, 1995), prejudices are the result of social cognition and social 
perception, that is the way we think about and assign meaning to our experiences. 
Prejudices are often thought of as cognitive heuristics or mental short cuts that affect our 
attitudes toward an object because of a tendency to focus on a few salient features (e.g., 
hair color, facial wrinkles, voice cues, and dress) to categorize people (Markus & Zajonc, 
1985; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Because we all are cognitive misers (Fiske & Taylor, 
1984) (i.e., we prefer to expend a  minimum o f cognitive energy) and make use of cognitive 
heuristics, prejudice may be a natural phenomenon. A cognitive mechanism that we make 
use of is stereotyping. Stereotyping and related cognitive heuristics allows us to respond 
quickly to other social surroundings.
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Walter Lippman (1922), a political journalist, is responsible for first using the term 
"stereotype" with its current meaning in social psychology. Over 75 years ago, he 
described how we carry "pictures [of people] in our heads" (p.4), because we have 
developed a cognitive mold that represents a group of people. A more general definition of 
a stereotype is a generalization about a group of people. Each member is assumed to have 
the same characteristics as all the members with no variation.
Stereotyping may take place because of cognitive heuristics that we often use. 
Perhaps two of the most extensively studied heuristics are the availability heuristic and the 
representativeness heuristic. The availability heuristic relies on our memory, i.e., ease of 
retrieval, in predicting the occurrence o f a given event. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) 
have demonstrated the use of this heuristic in a very simple task. They asked participants if 
they thought that there were more words that had the letter R as the first letter rather than 
the third letter. Participants believed that there were more words that had R as the first 
letter, when in reality there are many more that have R as the third letter. Tversky and 
Kahneman argued that participants answered this question incorrectly because they had an 
easier time generating words that started with R. For instance, if a person was asked to 
generate adjectives associated with an older adult, they would probably be more likely to 
derive the list: mellow, tired, useless, and stubborn than the list: vibrant, energetic, useful, 
and flexible because the former list are adjectives that are readily associated, although not 
accurately, with older adults in our society.
We may employ the representativeness heuristic when we have to decide if an 
object or person belongs to a given class. We make our decision based upon the 
resemblance o f the object/person in question to a prototype while disregarding baseline 
information. Thus, if an item resembles members o f a category, we believe that the item is 
also a member o f that category. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found that when 
participants were given a  description o f a person (e.g., he is shy, withdrawn, and helpful 
but meek), they relied on the representative heuristic. Participants were more likely to
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believe that the person was a librarian than a salesman, even if they were told that in the 
town in which the person lives there are 50 salesmen for every librarian. Relying on the 
representative heuristic, a person might be more likely to believe that a person described as 
mellow, tired, useless, and stubborn is a 85 year old person even though there are many 
more middle age people than adults over the age of 85 in the United States.
Another cognitive strategy we employ to simplify our world is social 
categorization. We have a natural tendency to categorize or place people into groups. 
According to Allport (1954), there are two major groups into which we cognitively place 
others: "us" and "them". We group people who we think are like us into the us or "in­
group". Those who we deem different from us are placed into the them or "out-group" 
category. Often these two groups are based on perceptual distortions or stereotypes. In 
stereotyping, we employ cognitive schemas that overgeneralize attributes to each member 
o f a given group; we attribute positive attributes to the people we place in the in-group and 
negative attributes to those in the out-group. These stereotypes can affect our perception 
and memory.
Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, and Tyler (1990) have demonstrated this cognitive 
schema by suggesting that there appears to be a more positive connotation to the word "we" 
than the word "they". In their study, they paired nonsense syllables such as "xeh" with the 
word "we" or "they". Participants assigned higher positive meaning to the syllables when 
they were paired with "we” than when paired with "they". They also found that 
participants’ response time was quicker for positive words that follow the word "we" than 
those that followed the word "they". They concluded that the word "we" appears to 
activate positive associations which in turn affect the way in which we respond. This 
categorization and activation may be the root o f disruptive behaviors associated with 
prejudice and discrimination. In a 1977 study of third grade students, Elliott (as cited in 
Westen, 1996) demonstrated just how readily this can occur. She told her students that 
children with blue eyes were superior to children with brown eyes. She noted that the
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blue-eyed children avoided playing with the brown-eyed children and that the brown-eyed 
children's work deteriorated. The next day she claimed that she had made an error and that 
brown-eyed children were actually superior. This announcement resulted in the opposite 
types o f behavior.
The fields of social cognition and perception have revealed that humans may form 
judgments of others based on very little information. Many biases in human judgment and 
inference have also been demonstrated. Unfortunately, while biases may serve a heuristic 
purpose by helping us process information quickly, some of these biases may lead to errors 
in thinking and perhaps result in prejudice. It is also possible that the origin o f prejudice 
lies not in individual sources but rather is due to social sources or the interaction of social 
and individual forces 
Social Sources
In reviewing the research on the influence of various social sources on the 
development of prejudice, it appears that there are two major categories of sources: 
interpersonal and intergroup sources. Interpersonal sources (i.e., individual experiences) 
via social learning or conformity to social norms may be responsible for prejudices. 
Likewise, it could be intergroup sources (i.e., actual interactions with other groups) that 
may be responsible.
Interpersonal Sources. Social learning (Bandura, 1977) may be a very viable 
source o f prejudice. In the process o f social learning, we may form attitudes based upon 
our interactions or observations of others without direct reinforcement. Such learning can 
occur without thought on the modelers' part. In social learning, social agents influence 
attitudes by modeling their own attitudes for observers. Social agents, such as parents, 
peers, or the media, may serve as models.
Conforming to normative rules or social norms may also lead to prejudice. 
Colloquially speaking, social norms are "rules o f the game" for a specific group of people. 
There are culturally based and are a property of the group; they reflect group consensus o f  a
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standard o f expected and acceptable behavior for group members (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967). The importance of adherence to social norms is elucidated in Festinger’s (1954) 
theory o f  social comparison. According to Festinger, we learn about and evaluate the 
accuracy o f our personal qualities by comparing ourselves to others. Social comparison 
helps us to define our social reality by clarifying the world around us and ensuring that our 
beliefs conform to social norms. Social comparison also allows us to self evaluate by 
comparing ourselves to others. Thus, by engaging in social comparison, we can identify 
social norms and determine whether or not we are meeting those norms. The resulting 
clarification of the rules and performance evaluation from social comparison may, 
therefore, lead us to yield to perceived group pressure via conformity and result in 
prejudicial attitudes (Duckitt. 1992).
The benefits of such conformity can be very strong. Conformity may allow for the 
gain of rewards such as approval and acceptance; maintaining the status quo may also lead 
to preferential treatment from other group members as well as the avoidance of any punitive 
damages such as exclusion, disapproval, or losses including respect, job, or friends 
(Pettigrew, 1958; Schacter, 1951). Allport (1954) clearly articulated this relation between 
prejudice and conformity: "About a half of all prejudiced attitudes are based only on the 
need to conform, to let well enough alone, to maintain the cultural pattern." (p.286).
Researchers have found certain personality characteristics that are typical of people 
who are conformists. Conformists are more likely to be high in need for approval, low in 
self-esteem, and inexperienced (Forsyth, 1995). It seems reasonable that individuals who 
engage in social comparison to comply with social norms are more likely to develop 
prejudices than those who do not engage in social comparison, especially when the group 
pressure is to denigrate another group.
Intergroup Sources. Another major source o f prejudice may be due to intergroup 
events. Various theories such as realist conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972) and
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social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) have been implicated as explanations for 
prejudice.
Realistic conflict theory proposed that prejudice may stem from economic 
competitions between social groups and may escalate if the competition continues. 
Campbell (1965), in a review o f studies of group conflicts since 1900, found some 
common themes among the cases. The main similarity he found was that most of the 
conflicting groups were in competition for resources. He theorized that it was this rational 
and realistic desire for resources ( i.e., a group interest) that was responsible for the 
negative intergroup attitudes and behavior o f a group. Barron (1953) has captured this 
competition between younger and older persons. He described negative feelings of those 
who were not aged toward t^e aged. Younger persons viewed the aged as a menace and 
they articulated the "’cradle to the grave' scheme whereby those close to the grave would 
fasten themselves on the pay-checks o f  those close to the cradle, and ride piggy-back (or 
piggy-bank) to the grave" (p. 478). He also described how older adults are discriminated 
in the work force similar to those in racial minorities. He discussed how "pigeon-holing’, 
premature generalizations, and unwarranted economizing of thought" (p. 479) by the none- 
aged was associated with premature retirement or not hiring older adults in the work force. 
In these cases involving older adults and younger adults, the resources are money and jobs. 
Both resources are limited and it becomes clear how the allocation o f money to the aged and 
jobs to younger adults is viewed negatively by the group who is not being allocated 
resources.
Prejudices are suggested to increase in negativity if the competition continues or 
intensifies. Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) recently suggested that blatant prejudice is a 
result of group threats to resources such as jobs and welfare among western Europeans. 
When such a situation arises, it is no longer the objective o f a given group to make sure that 
it can acquire resources but it also may become necessary to actively prevent another group 
from receiving any o f the resource (as seen in Sherif et al., 1961).
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Social identity theory offers another explanation as to why we may hold negative 
attitudes toward people outside of our group. Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggest that the 
distortion that goes with the bolstering of the in-group and the denigrating of the out-group 
(ethnocentrism) serve a self-enhancing function. By favoring one’s group, a person 
enhances his/her status. If a person believes that his/her group is the better group, s/he can 
deduce that s/he is a good person because s/he is a member of this group and this in turn 
increases self-esteem and may lead to feelings of superiority. Oakes and Turner (1980) 
found empirical support that people enhance the status of their in-group so as to increase 
their own self-esteem. They found that when participants were divided into two groups, 
based on their preference of two artists, that the group that assigned points to the in-group 
and out-group had higher scores on a measure of self-esteem than did control group 
members who did not focus on group differences. These findings suggest the potentially 
strong relation between self-identity, self-esteem, and prejudice.
Barron (1953) provided evidence of the in-group/out-group bias in regard to older 
people. While he agreed that sickness and disease are more common in adults over the age 
of 40 than among younger adults, he argued that we need to differentiate among older 
individuals, (i.e., such an assumption disregards the large amount o f variation among 
people over 40). He also demonstrated another case of out-group homogeneity. Older 
adults are discriminated against more frequently than are younger adults in the work force 
because they are thought to be resistant to change.
Research has, likewise, linked the pro in-group/anti out-group bias, known as 
ethnocentrism to personality correlates. Brodbeck and Perlmutter (1954) found that 
ethnocentrism correlated highly with xenophilic (anti in-group/pro out-group sentiments) 
when there was little information about the out-group. They believe that the noted relations 
support a self-dislike theory in which conflictual child-parent relationships affect in­
group/out-group perceptions.
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This line of research demonstrates the connections between the various theories of 
prejudice. It is most probable that a study testing both individual and social sources of 
prejudice will be more predictive and promising for understanding the intricacies of 
negative attitudes. Utilizing in-group and out-group classifications from Social 
categorization and Social identity theory should, thus, provide a useful research paradigm 
for examining ageism and sexism.
Prejudice and other Consequences o f the Categorization o f In-Group and Out-Group
Members
One of the first steps in the process of developing or expressing prejudice is the 
awareness that others are different, that is, they can be placed into a different class of 
people based on some physical, psychological, or social characteristics. This 
categorization leads to the grouping together of people with similar characteristics and the 
contrasting o f others based on their differences (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978; Taylor, 1981; 
Wilder, 1986). Such classification of people into groups based on categorization most 
often results in two groups: in-groups and out-groups. In-groups are comprised of 
members to whom a given classifier feels similar and with whom they identify. Out­
groups contain members with whom a given classifier does not identify. Various biases 
based on these two group classifications and the associated strong feelings and beliefs 
attached to these groups have been identified and studied in social psychology. Some 
common consequences of social categorization include overstating the positivity of in­
group members (in-group bias), overestimating the similarity o f out-group members 
(homogeneity bias), and making extreme judgments about out-group members (extremity 
bias).
In-Group Bias
The in-group bias is associated with positive feelings for and special treatment of 
in-group members. A related component o f the in-group bias is out-group rejection. Out­
group rejection consists o f negative feelings for and unfair treatment o f out-group members
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(Brewer, 1979). Ethnocentrism is a global case of in-group bias where members of a 
given culture, ethnic group, or nation believe that their own culture, ethnicity, or nation is 
superior to others (Sumner, 1906). Such ethnocentrism was seen among Hitler’s 
followers and is currently seen in the Kosovo conflicts.
A classic social psychology field study that demonstrated the generation of in-group 
bias is the Robbers’ Cave Study (Sherif et al., 1961). The researchers in this study created 
an atmosphere in a summer camp setting that lea to the creation o f two distinct groups of 
boys. Initially, boys were randomly assigned to one of two groups of campers. They 
were set apart from each other by separate buses and cabins. Soon they developed their 
own norms, leaders, flags, and names (Eagles and Rattlers). Competitions, including a 
baseball game, treasure hunt, and tug-of-war created hostility among the groups. What had 
started as an innocent venture to summer camp ensued in the development of two rival 
misbehaving gangs of 11-year old boys and resulted in the development of an in-group 
bias. Many aspects o f in-group bias were noted by the researchers. The boys demonstrated 
loyalty to in-group members and hostility toward out-group members. They viewed out­
group members in negative stereotypical ways and they tended to overvalue the 
performance of in-group members compared to out-group members. Also, the boys rated 
their own group members more favorably on six traits than they did the out-group 
members. In general, Sherif et al. (1961) were able to generate a micro-culture of 
ethnocentrism.
Although it may be easy to see how in-group bias and ethnocentrism can occur 
among warring factions and other larger groups of people competing for resources, 
ethnocentrism and in-group bias do not require competition for material goods; competition 
is not necessary for favoritism to occur among group members (Tajfel, 1982). Tajfel and 
his colleagues demonstrated that in-group bias can occur among recendy created groups 
based on very little information utilizing the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel 
& Billing, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In the minimal group paradigm, strangers are
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placed into groups based upon unimportant criteria such as a coin toss o r a random 
numbers table. In this paradigm, there is no interaction among participants during the 
study; thus, they do not become acquainted. Yet Tajfel and others have found that 
participants behaved as if they did know each other or had something in common like 
family or friends.
In a study employing the minimal group paradigm, Oakes and Turner (1980) 
empirically demonstrated that in-group bias and out-group rejection develop among 
incidentally created groups not in conflict with each other. Participants were randomly 
divided into two groups based upon their supposed (but not actual) preference or the work 
of one of two artists. These groups were formed on the basis of minimal information, i.e.. 
artist preference, and they remained minimal because the participants were not allowed to 
interact with any of the other participants. Participants were asked to allocate points to their 
own group and the out-group. Oakes and Turner found that participants assigned more 
points to in-group than out-group members and would often choose to allocate less to in­
group members and themselves so as to prevent out-group members from receiving any 
points. Thus, in general, participants assessed in this paradigm expressed more liking of 
in-group members, rated in-group members as having more positive personality 
characteristics, and claimed that in-group members did better work and awarded more 
rewards (such as money) to in-group members than to out-group members, despite the lack 
of competition (Brewer, 1979; Wilder, 1981).
It has been theorized that this apparent distortion serves to enhance one's status 
(Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). As previously discussed, social identity theory 
suggests that if people believe that the members of their group are superior to other groups 
o f people, then they can rationalize that they are superior as well. These feelings of 
superiority can subsequently increase self-esteem. Such increases in self-esteem have been 
noted among participants after they have identified with in-group members (Oakes & 
Turner, 1980). Even though people may treat an out-group unfairly to boost their own
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self-esteem, in-group favoritism is stronger than out-group rejection and out-group 
rejection may not always occur when in-group bias is noted (Brewer, 1979; Hinkle & 
Schopler, 1986).
Out-Group Homogeneity
Out-group homogeneity is the perception that out-group members are viewed as 
being more alike than in-group members (Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991; Lambert, 1995). 
More specifically, members of the out-group are more similar to other out-group members 
than they actually are and out-group members are more similar to each other than are 
members o f the in-group (Linville et al., 1989; Quattrone, 1986). This phenomenon has 
been shown to be true for various groups o f people. Members o f college campuses viewed 
members o f majors or sororities other than their own as being more similar than members 
of their own major or sorority (Juddet al., 1991; Park & Rothbart, 1982). Likewise, 
targets who were younger or older than a rater were seen as more similar in personality 
traits than were people the same age as the rater (Linville, et al, 1989). This perception of 
homogeneity among out-group members may be due to a lack of exposure to members of 
the out-group (Linville, et al, 1989).
Participants are also more likely to think of out-group members in a stereotypic 
fashion than in-group members (Juddet al., 1991). Quattrone and Jones (1980) compared 
participants from two rival schools: Princeton or Rutgers. Participants watched either an 
in-group member (a student from their school) or an out-group member (a student from 
another school) make a decision. Participants were ask to determine how likely it was thai 
the target person’s behavior was indicative of other students at the same school. They 
found that when participants rated an out-group member, they rated the person’s choice as 
more indicative of the behavior of other members of the out-group than when they rated the 
choice o f an in-group member.
Information about an in-group member is not as useful as information about an out­
group member because in-group members are seen as more diverse than out-group
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members (Judd & Park, 1988; Park & Rothbart, 1982). Linville and others (1989) have 
articulated the concept o f an in-group differentiation bias. Although out-group members 
are viewed as being more uniform, in-group members are seen as more complex and 
distinct. In two related studies, in-group differentiation was noted. Younger participants 
rated younger targets as having more complex personalities than older targets and similarly 
older participants rated older targets as being more complex than younger targets (Brewer 
& Liu, 1984; Linville, 1982). In general, participants use more concepts and qualities 
when describing in-group members than out-group members (Linville & Jones, 1980; Park 
& Rothbart, 1982; Quattrone, 1986). Specifically, people tend to generate more features 
regarding in-group members than out-group members (Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones.
1980) and form more subgroups for in-groups than for out-groups (Park, Ryan, & Judd, 
1992). In conclusion, it appears that our understanding of in-group members is more 
complex than is our understanding o f out-group members.
Extremity Bias
Another phenomenon that may occur when people are categorized into in-group and 
out-group members is a noted polarization of opinions. This polarization effect is called the 
extremity bias. When asked to make judgments about in-group versus out-group 
members, in-group members' responses often tend to be viewed as more neutral when 
compared to judgments regarding out-group members (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Linville, 
1982). For example, if a female is commenting on the behavior of a man and a woman in 
an argument, she may state that the woman is "upset" but that the man is "enraged”; 
whereas a  male observing the same scene might claim that the woman is "hysterical” and 
that the male is "unhappy". The extremity bias was noted by Linville (1982) in a study in 
which college men were asked to rate either an older or same-aged target after reading either 
a  favorable or unfavorable story about that person. The younger men’s ratings of the older 
target were more extreme regardless of the situation than were their ratings o f younger
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targets. The participants did, however, rate the older target more positively in the favorable 
story and more negatively in the unfavorable story.
It, thus, appears that classification o f people into in-group or out-group members 
affects the ways they may subsequently be viewed and can lead to prejudiced thoughts 
because people are associated with a specific group and not necessarily because they are a 
member of a minority. The specific prejudices of ageism and sexism that I examine are not 
based on minority status and, therefore, may be better examined by utilizing an in­
group/out-group research paradigm instead of examining attitudes of minority and majority 
participants. Also it should be noted that while research has been conducted investigating 
the aforementioned consequences of group categorization among groups based on a single 
dimension, (e.g., college major), little research has been conducted to examine the 
implications of multiple group memberships (Brewer, 1996). In Studies 2 and 3 , 1 
examine the effects among group membership of both age and sex.
Groups based on Age and Sex as Quasi-Minorities 
Barron (1953) argued that we should not think of minorities only in regard to race, 
religion, and nationality. Groups based on age and sex, specifically older adults and 
women, are not traditional minorities because they are both integrated in families that also 
include majorities. Also women and younger and older adults cannot be considered as 
traditional minorities because they are not in the minority.
Barron (1953) suggested that older adults, like women, should be viewed as a 
quasi-minority group. To be a quasi-minority, a group must demonstrate the same 
behaviors and/or traits as a traditional minority: marked self-consciousness, sensitivity, 
self-hatred, and defensiveness about their traits. To demonstrate that older adults do 
possess these quasi-minority qualities, Baron pointed to discrimination against older 
people, especially in the work force and legislation against discrimination being passed that 
includes elderly. In 1937, Massachusetts passed a law stating that employment 
discrimination against older workers violated public policy and then in 1950, they also
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passed the Fair Employment Practices Act which included age as social category by which 
an employee could not be discriminated. Enforcement o f such laws resembles those used 
in protecting ethnic minorities. Older adults also fulfill some of the guidelines for a 
minority. Older adults are viewed as a threat to the power of the out-group and prejudicial 
attitudes, stereotypes, and discrimination of older people have been noted that are similar to 
those of ethnic minorities. Similar parallels including anti-discriminatory legislation and 
prejudice have been noted for women (Unger & Saundra, 1993).
Others support Barron's distinction of old adults as a "quasi-minority” (Drake, 
1957; Kogan, 1961). Kogan (1961) concurs that they are similar to ethnic, racial, and 
religious minorities because stereotyping of and discrimination against older people by 
members of other age groups occurs. Likewise Drake (1957) agrees that older adults, like 
minorities, experience stereotypical attitudes towards them by the majority and that these 
attitudes, in turn, affect how the majority behaves toward them.
Unlike traditional minority groups, however, a given person is not bom into the 
group of older or younger adults but rather, over time, one becomes a member of these 
group. The group of older adults is a very special case. If one’s life is long enough, as 
Kogan (1961) has suggested, "most persons will eventually belong" to this group (p. 52). 
Furthermore, membership in an age-based group is possible regardless o f sex, race, or 
religion. It is this unique circumstance that makes the study of attitudes toward older and 
younger people so intriguing. Two specific stereotypes and prejudices will now be 
discussed: ageism and sexism.
Aeeism
While ageism or negative attitudes and stereotypes based on age are most often 
associated with older adults, ageism toward younger adults also exists (Bytheway, 1995). 
In this section, I will briefly describe both forms o f ageism.
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Ageism toward Older Adults
Tuckman and Lorge (1953) found substantial acceptance of misconceptions and 
stereotypes toward older adults among graduate students. They stated that "students look 
upon old age as a period characterized by economic insecurity, poor health, loneliness, 
resistance to change, and failing physical and mental powers" (p. 260). Tuckman and 
Lorge (1952, 1953, 1958) also found a substantial amount of agreement with stereotypical 
and incorrect statements regarding older adults. They found misconceptions of older adults 
among various groups of participants including junior high students, senior high students, 
college students, parents o f college students, and older adults.
Fifteen years later, Rosencranz and McNevin (1969) still found negative attitudes 
toward older adults among college students. They employed the semantic differential 
technique and had 287 college students rate 32 bipolar adjectives for one of three target 
groups: 20-30 year old males, 40-55 year old males, or 70-85 year old males. When they 
compared students' responses to three age groups, they found that older adults were 
always rated less desirably than the other two age groups.
Kogan’s work also supported the presence of negative attitudes toward older 
people. Kogan (1961) examined participants' attitudes toward four target groups: ethnic 
minorities, disabled people, people with mental illness, and older adults. He assessed three 
samples of college students with Likert scale items to assess attitudes toward the various 
groups. The participants responded more negatively toward older adults than they did 
toward mentally ill, physically disabled, or ethnic minorities.
Golde and Kogan (1959) argued that most people express some negativity in their 
attitudes towards older adults. They devised a way to tap into spontaneous feelings and 
responses that included experimental conditions In the experimental condition, participants 
were asked to complete the task with the target being "old people" and control condition 
participants responded to "most people". Fifty male and 50 female college students 
completed either the experimental or control version o f a 25-item sentence completion task
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that assessed emotional, physical, interpersonal attributions, and values of either most 
persons or older persons. Twenty-three pairs out of 25 were significantly different. They 
concluded that attitudes towards older people are different than attitudes toward most 
people. In general the attitudes were more negative toward older people than most people. 
They concluded that it would be beneficial to have a cross-sectional study o f their sentence 
completion task to assess how old people view their age group as different from most 
groups.
Today, there are still negative attitudes towards older adults (Kite, & Johnson, 
1988; Palmore, 1998). When compared with other age groups, older adults are viewed 
more negatively and are stereotyped as being unhealthy, tired, and ill-tempered (Crockett & 
Hummert, 1987; Slotterback & Saamio, 1996). More importantly, older adults are viewed 
negatively by many different age groups, not just the young (Kite, Deaux. & Miele. 1991; 
Palmore, 1998).
Ageism toward Younger Adults
Stereotypes and prejudices toward younger adults are also prevalent. Today, for 
example, young adults are labeled as members of "Generation X" just as the previous 
generation was label "Baby Boomers". The current stereotype of "Generation Xers” is that 
they are lazy, unmotivated, socially disconnected, and apathetic (Yates & Youniss, 1999).
Although such generational stereotypes may have been created as a means to view 
and distinguish young adults from other generations, such distinctions often are not real. 
For example, Eskilson and Wiley (1999) measured the values and goals as well as 
perceived barriers associated with life satisfaction among college students aged 18 to 25 
years. They found that the values and aspirations o f this group were very similar to those 
o f preceding generations and that these young adults were more optimistic than they have 
been depicted.
Also, such stereotypes are often inaccurate. In an international study, Yates and 
Youniss (1999) found that today's youth are not apathetic or unmotivated. Rather, they
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found that younger adults are involved in society via community service and political 
activism and that they are working toward social change. Furthermore, the negative 
Generation X stereotype of younger adults is heavily depicted in the media, more so than 
previous generational stereotypes have been (Williams, Coupland, Folwell, & Sparks,
1997). Thus, young adults today, often, find that they have to work to convince others 
that this stereotype is not true of them (Williams et al., 1997). It does appear, however, 
that communication between members of different generations may help reduce negative 
beliefs associated with this stereotype (Conlin, 1996).
It appears that ageism has no age barriers. Younger and older adults alike are the 
victims of ageism. Likewise, sexism can negatively affect both males and females.
Sexism
It has been argued that sexism, negative attitudes toward or stereotypes o f members 
of the opposite sex, serves to maintain the power structure in society (Glick & Fiske,
1996). Glick and Fiske (1996; 1997) theorize that two distinct types of sexism toward 
women exist. Benevolent sexism consists of positive attitudes toward women in traditional 
roles (e.g., homemakers); whereas, Hostile sexism is comprised of negative attitudes 
toward women in non-traditional roles (e.g., career women). It appears that sexism is 
associated with maintaining or preserving sex stereotypes.
Sex stereotypes are based on our perceptions that there are differences between men 
and women other than the evident physiological/ biological ones. In subscribing to a sex 
stereotype, we believe that members of one sex are all alike. Deaux and Lewis (1984) 
suggested that we may use a person’s sex as a heuristic for his/her behavior, personality 
traits, attributes, or roles and make assumptions about a person based solely on his/her sex. 
The common sex stereotypes view women as nice and expressive, e.g., nurturing, 
emotional, and warm, and men as competent and instrumental, e.g., productive, energetic, 
and strong (Fiske, 1998). Sex stereotypes are widely held. Williams and Best (1982)
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have found stereotypes similar in form to those described above in both adults and children 
from all the inhabited continents.
Although sex stereotypes are widely held, they are often inaccurate or false. Eagly 
(1987) has demonstrated that sex stereotypes suggesting sex differences in intelligence, 
leadership, or emotionality have not been supported. It appears that such differences are 
perceived rather than actual. It may be our perceptions o f  members of a given sex, e.g.. 
their roles, that influence or perpetuate such stereotypes. Condry and Condry (1976) 
highlighted the differential ways in which babies are treated based upon such assumptions. 
The researchers asked participants to rate an infant's emotional response to stimuli. Half of 
the participants were told that the infant was a boy and the other half that the baby was a 
girl. When the infant was a boy, participants thought he was angry, but when it was a girl, 
they thought she was afraid. This study shows that the initiation of sex stereotypes begins 
at an early age.
Hoffman and Hurst (1990) have also demonstrated how social roles can affect how 
we describe individuals. They had participants read about two fictitious societies from a 
distant planet. One group, the Orinthians, assumed child care roles while the Ackmian 
group worked outside of the house. When asked to describe the psychological 
characteristics o f each group, participants described traits that were appropriate for their 
roles, e.g. Orinthians were described as nurturing and Ackmians as competitive. 
Interestingly after participants had created these stereotypes, they applied them to 
individuals o f -  given group, even when they were given discrepant information. For 
example, participants described an employed Orinthian as less assertive than an Ackmian 
involved in child care. Thus, it appears that the different social roles of men and women 
may be responsible for shaping sex stereotypes.
Unfortunately some of the traits assigned to women are less desirable than those 
assigned to men. The stereotypes, especially the more negative ones, may have detrimental
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effects for women. For example, the sex stereotype of passivity in women may not be 
conducive for hiring and promoting women in an aggressive career.
General Purpose
The overall purpose of my research is to enhance our general understanding of 
ageism, sexism, attitude strength, attitude structure, and the salience o f various predictors 
in determining attitudes among and toward in-group and out-group members on the 
variables of age and sex. This will be accomplished by measuring and examining specific 
aspects o f attitude strength as well as the importance of personality, developmental, and 
structural variables in the prediction of participants' attitudes toward various target groups. 
No prior studies have examined these variables for the targeted groups by employing an in­
group and out-group research paradigm with both younger and older participants.
I conducted four studies. The first two studies (Pilot Study and Study 1) helped me 
to investigate various attitude statements, predictor variables, and target groups. In Study 
2 , 1 examined the structure and predictors o f in-group and out-group ageist and sexist 
attitudes. In Studies 2 and 3 , 1 tested in-group bias and out-group homogeneity among 
various categories o f in-group members and different types of ageist and sexist attitudinal 
items.
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n. PILOT STUDY:
Attitudes toward older people are predicted bv knowledge, identity, and empathy
The number of people over 65 years o f age in our population is increasing. It has 
been predicted that between the years 1997 and 2030, the number o f people over 65 will 
double (Rosenthal, 1997). While the increasing number of older adults may be a new 
trend, prejudice and discrimination against older adults are not. As Achenbaum (1978, p. 
2) has alluded, "Old age is an age-old phenomenon". Negative stereotypes about aging 
have been shown to have detrimental effects. Effects such as reduced performance on 
various capacities, including memory, have been demonstrated. Levy and Langer (1994) 
found cultural differences when stereotypes o f older adults and memory were examined. 
O lder adults in the United States performed worse on a memory task than did older adults 
in China. Levy and Langer suggested that these findings might be explained by the 
difference in stereotypes toward older adults in these two cultures. In general, Americans 
have a negative stereotype of older adults, whereas the Chinese have a positive stereotype. 
Ageist stereotypes may, thus, be self-confirming if older adults’ beliefs (e.g., that their 
memory should be failing) affect their performance. Given the increasing numbers of older 
adults, the problems associated with negative stereotypes will only become more 
problematic and, therefore, make the study of attitudes toward older adults an important 
one.
To better understand negative attitudes toward older adults, I sought to identify 
significant predictors o f attitudes toward older adults. I proposed that participants' current 
mood state might affect their attitudinal ratings o f older adults. Mood has been shown to 
affect behavior and thought. Studies have shown that happiness and sadness can affect 
cognitions (e.g., Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992.) Furthermore, Mayer et 
al. (1992) have demonstrated a phenomenon known as mood congruency. Mood
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congruency exists when there is agreement between mood and thoughts, i.e., a person in a 
happy mood will probably experience thoughts such as "what a wonderful warm day" 
more frequently than "what a crummy cloudy day" for a partly cloudy day. Mood 
congruency has been shown to exist with naturally occurring mood as well as in induced 
mood states (Mayer, Allen, Beauregard, 1995).
I also proposed that developmental stage would affect attitudes. According to 
Erikson (1959, 1963, 1968), human life can be divided into eight life stages. Each stage 
corresponds to an age group and has specific conflicts associated with it. To obtain or 
maintain a healthy personality, a person must successfully resolve the conflict at a given 
stage. Based on Erikson's theory, I would predict differences in attitudes toward older 
adults based upon participants’ stage of development. It may be that those who have failed 
to resolve a conflict may have more negative attitudes toward others than those who have 
successfully resolved conflicts.
Related to the notion of successful conflict resolution, I proposed that self-esteem 
would be a predictor of attitudes. Self-esteem is the extent to which one likes or approves 
of oneself. High self-esteem has been found to be related to personality correlates such as 
happiness (Freedman, 1987) as well as behavioral measures including persistence 
(McFarlin, Baumeister, & Blasovich, 1984). Research has linked low self-esteem to 
loneliness, depression, social anxiety, and alienation (Johnson, 1973; Leary, 1983; Peplau 
& Perlman, 1982; Shaver & Brennan, 1990). The relationship now appears, however, to 
be more intricate than a positive correlation between self-esteem and beneficial correlates. 
Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996) have found that highly favorable views of the self or 
threatened egotism have been found to be related to violence. It appears that if one's model 
of the self is threatened, even if it is high, there may be negative ramifications.
I further proposed that a person’s ability to be empathic or responsive to another 
person’s experiences would influence his/her attitudes toward older adults. Davis (1980) 
devised a measure o f empathy including four subscales: perspective taking, empathic
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concern, personal distress, and fantasy. I believed that the first three subscales would be 
related to attitudes toward older adults, i.e., responses to older adults would be based on 
people’s ability to take on another’s perspective, their ability to feel what others were 
feeling, and their own feelings o f anxiety.
Finally I believed that people's attitudes toward older adults would be related to the 
attitude strength variable of knowledge. Knowledge is described as the amount of 
information one has about the object (Krosnick et al., 1993). Knowledge was selected as a 
dimension of attitude strength because studies have shown that there is a relationship 
between how much an individual knows about an object and how likely he/she will be 
influenced by a persuasive message (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). It appears that the less 
knowledge a person has, the easier it is to change his/her attitudes.
I, thus, hoped to discover variables that influence stereotypic and ageist attitudes by 
exploring the predictors of attitudes toward older adults (65 years of age and older). I 
hypothesized that variables related to attitude strength measures (such as knowledge), 
personality constructs (including empathy, psychosocial development stage, and self­
esteem), age. and mood would predict participants’ attitudes toward older adults.
Method
Participants
Participants were 43 male and 56 female (1 participant did not report sex) 
undergraduate students recruited from the University of New Hampshire subject pool. 
They had a mean age of 18.86 years (SD = 1.36).
Measures
Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS)
The Brief Mood Introspection Scale (see Appendix A) is a 17-item Likert scale 
assessing four separate moods: happiness, sadness, anger, and fear as well as an overall 
positivity/negativity dimension o f mood (Mayer et al., 1995).
37
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Facts on Aging Quiz
The Facts on Aging Quiz (see Appendix B) is a 25-item questionnaire that assesses 
a person’s knowledge about older adults (Palmore, 1977). Each statement is presented as a 
true or false item, such as "The majority of older people feel miserable most o f the time.” 
and each is factually-based and has been empirically verified. The scale has been found to 
be generally reliable over various samples (Miller & Dodder, 1980).
Self-Esteem Scale
Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (see Appendix C) is a 10-item scale that 
measures global self-esteem. For each item respondents directly report their feelings.
There are both positive and negative items including: "I feel that I am a person of worth, at 
least on equal basis with others", and "At times I think I am no good at all". Items are 
scored by a four point response scale including the following responses: strongly disagree, 
disagree, agree, and strongly agree Such a format results in scores ranging from 10 to 40 
with higher scores indicating higher self-esteem. Both the internal consistency (alpha =
.88) and test-retest reliability (alpha = .82) of the Self-Esteem Scale are quite good 
(Fleming & Courtney, 1984). The scale also has been shown to be valid.
Erikson's Psychosocial Stage Inventory (EPSI)
The Erikson’s Psychosocial Stage Inventory (see Appendix D) has been used as a 
measure of the first six life stages as depicted by Erikson's (1959. 1963, 1968) 
Psychosocial Theory (Rosenthal, Gurney, & Moore. 1981). Each of the six 12-item 
subscales contain Likert scale question with half o f the items describing a successful 
resolution of the given crisis and the other half depicting an unsuccessful resolution. In the 
current study, only the identity (stage 5) and intimacy (stage 6) scales were used. The 
identity scale assesses the degree to which an individual has successful resolved the role 
identity versus role-confusion conflict and the extent to which s/he has a genuine sense of 
who s/he is. An example o f a scale item includes, "I know what kind of person I am .” 
Rosenthal et al. (1981) found the identity scale to be reliable with an alpha equal to .71
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based on a sample o f  622. The intimacy scale measures the degree to which an individual 
feels that she/he is able to maintain close relationships with other people or how isolated 
she/he feel from others. The reliability of the intimacy scale was .63 (Rosenthal, et al.,
1981).
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRD
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (see Appendix E) is a 28-item self-report 
measure with four 7-item subscales (Davis, 1980). The IRI employs a multidimensional 
approach to assess four distinct aspects of empathy: perspective taking, fantasy, empathic 
concern, and personal distress. Perspective taking is the degree to which an individual can 
adopt another person’s point of view, and includes items such as. "I try to look at 
everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision." The fantasy subscale 
assesses the ease with which an individual can immerse him/herself into fictitious 
characters in the media such as books, movies, and plays. A sample item from the fantasy 
scale is "After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as thought I were one of the characters." 
The empathic concern subscale measures the degree to which a person displays warmth, 
concern, and compassion for other people. This subscale includes the item. "When I see 
someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them." The personal 
distress subscale assesses an individual's self-directed feelings of unease and discomfort 
and includes the item, "In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease." The 
four subscales have good reliabilities. The internal reliabilities of the four subscales ranged 
from .71 to .77 and the test-retest reliabilities were in the range of .62 to .71 (Davis,
1980).
Procedure
Participants completed a packet containing demographic questions such as age and 
sex. They then completed the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (Mayer et al., 1995), the 
Facts on Aging Quiz (Palmore, 1977), Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale (1965), the Identity 
and Intimacy subscales of the Erikson Psychosocial Stage Inventory (Rosenthal et al..
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1981), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis; 1980, 1983), and a 28-item questionnaire 
generated by the researcher to measure attitudes toward older adults (see Appendix F).
Once they completed the packet, they were thanked for their participation and received a 
debriefing statement and course credit for their participation.
Results
Participants’ responses to the 28 attitude statements were subjected to a principal- 
components varimax rotation factor analysis. Two factors emerged from this analysis (see 
Table 1). The Negative/Positive Aspects of Older People Factor contained 19 items that 
loaded at .40 or above and served as a measure of the negativity associated with aspects of 
people 65 years and older. This factor included items such as "Older people are sweet” (- 
.65) and "Older people are a burden to their children" (.65). The six item Different but 
Competent Older People Factor was a measure of the degree to which participants thought 
that older people were happy and competent but different from themselves. This second 
factor included items such as "Older people are in the happiest period of their lives" (.55) 
and ”1 have nothing to talk about with older people" (.47). Further analyses were 
conducted with the two factors of Negative/Positive Aspects of Older People and Different 
but Competent Older People.
To test the hypothesis that the variables of interest would predict factor scores, i.e.. 
positive or negative attitudes toward older adults, two forward selection statistical 
regression analyses were conducted. In both of the regression analyses, the nine predictors 
were knowledge o f the aging process, self-esteem, identity status, intimacy, perspective 
taking, empathic concern, overall mood, personal distress, and the age at which a woman 
is "old". Two separate regressions were conducted using SPSS REGRESSION to test the 
two dependent variables of the Negative/Positive Aspects o f Older People Factor and the 
Different but Competent Older People Factor (see Table 2). For the prediction of 
Negative/Positive Aspects of Older People Factor, I found that R for regression was 
significantly different from zero, F (3, 99) = 12.30, g  < .001 at the end o f three steps.
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Table 1
Factors. Loading, and Reliabilities of Principal-Components Factor Analysis
Factors and items loading above .40 Loadings Reliability of 
Factor
"N egative /P ositive  A spects o f  O ld e r  P eop le" F a c to r
Older people are good storytellers. 





Older people are a burden to their children. .65
I am uncomfortable around older people. .63
People grow wiser as they age. -.61
Older people have a reduced ability to change. .60
One of the most interesting and entertaining qualities of older 
people is their accounts of past experiences.
-.58
I have nothing in common with older people. .57
I have nothing to talk about with older people .57
Older people are absent minded. .55
Older people have a reduced ability to learn. .54
Older people make me think about death. .52
Older people are all the same. .51
Women become less attractive as they age. .50
Older people worry about unimportant things. .49
Most older people are constantly complaining about the 
behavior of the younger generation.
.46
Older people should have more power in business and 
politics.
-.45
Older people should act their age. .40
Older people feel sorry for themselves. .40
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Table I (cont.)
Factors and items loading above .40 Loadings Reliability of 
Factor
'’D iffe ren t b u t C o m p e ten t"  F ac to r
Older people are in the happiest period o f their lives. .55
standardized 
alpha = .52
Older people have a chance to do all the things they wanted to. .53
Most older people are competent. .50
I have nothing to talk about with older people. .47
Older people make me think about death. .43
Few older people are disabled. .41
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Forward Repression of Attitude Predictor Variables on Negative/Positive Aspects of Older People Attitude Factor
Step Variable Beta In Multiple R R squared F(eqn) Significance of F
1 Identity -.40 .40 .16 17.78 < .001
2 Knowledge -.29 .49 .24 14.52 < .001
3 Empathic Concern -.23 .54 .29 12.31 < .001
Forward Repression of Attitude Predictor Variables on Different but Competent Factor
Step Variable Beta In Multiple R R squared F(eqn) Significance of F
1 Personal Distress .20 .20 .04 4.03 = .048
After step I , with identity in the equation, R2 = . 16, F  (1, 99) = 17.18, p < .001. Step 2. 
with knowledge added to the prediction of the factor scores by identity, lead to a significant 
increase in R2; R2= .24, F (2 ,99) = 14.52, g  < .001. Also the addition of empathic 
concern at step 3 lead to a further increase, R2 = .29, F (3, 99) = 12.31, g  < .001. All 
totaled, 29% of the variability in participants' scores on the Negative/Positive Aspects of 
Older People Factor was predicted by knowing scores on identity, knowledge, and 
empathic concern. It appears, at least in college students, that negative evaluations of older 
adults may stem from a lack of knowledge about the aging process as demonstrated by low 
scores on the Facts on Aging Quiz (Palmore, 1977). College students may also have a 
more negative view of older adults if they are not confident of their own self-concept as 
demonstrated by a low score on the identity measure (Rosenthal, et al., 1981), or if they 
lack concern and sympathy for others as depicted by a low score on the measure of 
empathic concern (Davis; 1980, 1983).
The second regression analysis conducted tested the prediction of the Different but 
Competent Older People Factor. For the prediction of this Factor, I found that R for 
regression was significantly different from zero. After step 1, with personal distress in the 
equation, R2 = .04, F£l, 99) = 4.03, g  < .05. All totaled, 4% of the variability in 
participants' scores on the Different but Competent Older People Factor was predicted by 
knowing participants' personal distress scores. It appears that the greater an individual's 
personal distress rating, or the degree to which they have self-directed feelings of unease 
and discomfort, the more likely they are to view older adults as different from them but not 
necessarily incompetent.
Discussion
Overall, it appears that participants' knowledge, their psychosocial development 
stage, and empathy are predictive of attitudes toward older adults. Interestingly, there were 
no effects of naturally occurring mood on participants’ attitudes toward older adults. 
Overall, these results combined with another study (Chabot, 1998) suggest that naturally
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occurring mood, unlike mood induction, might not be a significant predictor o f attitudes 
toward a target group of people or toward behavior.
In general, the results o f this study demonstrate progress toward understanding the 
complex nature of attitudes toward older adults. These results should be viewed as 
exploratory in nature. In particular, the generalizability of my findings are limited due to 
sample size. I examined responses from 100 participants and included 28 attitudinal items 
in my factor analysis. A larger number o f more diverse participants should be included in 
further assessments to increase generalizability. Also, to further clarify our understanding 
of the basis of negative attitudes, more variables should be examined.
An important variable of interest to study would be participants’ age. It is likely 
that attitudes toward older adults would vary according to a person's age and that the 
predictors of attitudes toward older adults may vary by a person's age. Examining the 
impact of age on people's attitudes toward older adults is important for two main reasons. 
One reason would be to test the concept o f social categorization. According to Allport 
(1954), social categorization or the creation of groups is often the first step toward the 
development of prejudices, or negative attitudes toward other groups. By employing social 
categorization, we divide the social world into two distinct categories "us" and "them". We 
view the "us" group in positive, favorable terms, while we view "them" in negative, 
unfavorable ways. Given that we are all aging and coming closer to being an "older adult", 
it seems intuitive that our view ("us") of this category o f older adults should change as we 
age and become more like "them". A second reason for examining the effects of 
participants' age on their attitudes is to test Erikson's (1959, 1963, 1968) life-span 
development theory. The current study has offered support for a cross-sectional 
investigation because we found identity (Erikson's fifth stage) to be a significant predictor 
of college students’ attitudes. If Erikson's theory is accurate, we should expect differences 
in attitudes toward older adults based upon participants’ stage o f development. Finally, 
psychologists are often criticized for experimenting with only college-aged participants. A
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cross-sectional study (as is conducted in Study 2) would address our questions of interest 
with a more diverse and representative sample, therefore, enhancing the generalizability and 
usefulness of the results.
Future studies should also address the target variables of age and sex. Neugarten 
(1974) and others have suggested that there are distinct groups of older adults: 65-74 
(young-old), 75-84 (old-old), and 85+ (very old). It seems reasonable to predict that 
peoples’ attitudes toward older adults differ depending on the age of the older adult. 
Furthermore, Rosenthal (1990) has suggested that women may be viewed even more 
negatively than men because of the interaction of ageism and sexism. I found that when 
participants were asked to write down the age at which a man is "old" followed directly by 
the question asking the age at which a woman is "old" that there was a significant 
difference. Participants reported a lower age for women (59.43 years) than they did for a 
man (60.98 years), t (96) = 3.72, g < .001. It appears from such preliminary work that 
different attitudes may be associated with older males and older females. It would be 
interesting to manipulate the sex and the age of the target older adult and measure attitudes 
toward older adults to assess whether there are attitude differences between these groups.
The next study addresses some of the concern from this pilot study, mainly the 
target variables of age and sex. In Study 1, attitudes among college students are examined 
and both the age and sex of the target group are manipulated.
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in. STUDY I:
College students’ attitudes toward older adults are not affected bv target age or sex
Researchers have clearly demonstrated the existence of ageist attitudes toward older 
adults by finding substantial agreement with stereotypical and incorrect statements 
regarding older adults (Kogan, 1961; Tuckman & Lorge, 1952, 1953, 1958). In a 
sentence completion task, Golde and Kogan (1959) concluded that college students’ 
attitudes towards "older people" were more negative than were their attitudes toward "most 
people". Rosencranz and McNevin (1969) also found negative attitudes toward older 
adults among college students.
Given that the number of older adults in our society is increasing and will be on the 
rise for many years (Schick & Schick, 1994), it is now more crucial for researchers to 
study attitudes toward older adults. Because there will be many more older adults to 
interact with, it is increasingly important to view older adults as individuals and to have 
more positive attitudes toward them.
Assuming a life-span development perspective (Baltes, 1987), there is no one age 
that dominates development; development is a lifelong process and both gains and losses 
interact throughout the lifespan. Given this assumption, it is important to be able to make 
distinctions between older adults. Although older adults are often treated as a single group, 
(i.e., everyone over the age of 65), gerontological researchers have argued that this 
grouping is too limited and that everyone over the age of 65 is not as homogeneous as 
previously thought (Neugarten, 1996). There have been various reclassifications of older 
people into multiple groups. For this study, I will borrow from Neugarten (1974 ) and 
Taeuber (1992) and examine attitudes toward three different age groups o f aging adults;
The youngest members o f this larger group, aged 65 to 74 years are called the Young-Old,
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those aged 75 to 84 years will be referred to as the Aged, and adults 85 years and older are 
known as the Old-Old.
In this study, I hope to determine whether college students differentiate these three 
age groups from each other and from college-aged students (17-26 years o f age). Although 
Rosencranz and McNevin demonstrated that college students differentiated between adults 
aged 70-85,40-55, and 20-30 years, I wanted to determine if college students would view 
all adults over the age of 65 as a homogenous group. Furthermore, I wanted to extend the 
work of Rosencranz and McNevin by including the target variable of sex. I hypothesized 
that there would be main effects of target age and target sex for college students. 
Specifically, I believed that attitudes would become more negative as the target group's age 
increased (e.g., the Old-Old would be viewed most negatively). I also predicted that sexist 




Participants were 57 male and 123 female undergraduate students recruited from the 
University o f New Hampshire subject pool. They had a mean age o f 18.54 (SD = 1.17) 
years and 74.4% of them had never lived with an adult over the age of 65. Participants 
received course credit for their participation in the study.
Measures
Semantic Differential
The semantic differential employed by Rosencranz and McNevin (1969) is a 32- 
item list o f bipolar adjectives that consist of behavioral characteristics and attributes (see 
Appendix G). Participants rate a series of polar adjectives on a Likert scale from 1 
(associated with the more negative adjective) to 7 (associated with the more positive 
adjective) for a target group. Rosencranz and McNevin (1969) factor analyzed the 32 items 
and three major factors resulted (see Table 3 for items loading on each factor and current
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study reliabilities). They labeled the first factor the Instrumental-Ineffective dimension. A 
high score on this factor is indicative of people who can pursue goals in an active fashion 
and can adapt to their surroundings. The second factor was labeled the Autonomous- 
Dependent dimension. People who score high on this dimension are thought to be 
independent individuals capable of functioning in their environment without requiring too 
much assistance from others. The third factor identified by Rosencranz and McNevin was 
the Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability dimension. A higher factor score on this 
dimension suggests that people are viewed more positively in regard to a variety of socially 
important variables and are more likely to positively interact with others in society.
Procedure
Participants completed a packet containing demographic questions such as age and 
sex. Participants were randomly assigned to one o f eight conditions. In this 2 (target sex) 
X 4 (target age: 17-26 years, 65-74 years, 75-84 years, and 85 years and older) design 
they were asked to rate one of eight groups of adults. Each participant completed the 
Semantic Differential (Rosencranz & McNevin, 1969) for his/her assigned target group as 
well as demographic information. Once they completed the packet, they were debriefed 
and thanked for their participation. They received course credit for their participation.
Results
To test my hypotheses for main effects of target age and target sex as well as any 
interactions between those variables and participants' sex, I conducted a four (target age) 
by two (target sex) by two (participants' sex) between-subjects multivariate analysis of 
variance. The three dependent variables were participants' ratings on the Instrumental- 
Ineffective, Autonomous-Dependent, and Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability factors 
(see Table 4 for individual cell means).
Using SPSS MANOVA with Wilk’s lambda as the criterion, the three way 
interaction was not significant, nor were the target age by target sex or target sex by 
participant sex interactions. The target age by participants' sex interaction was significant.
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Table 4












M M N M s n . K
Male 17-26 Male 4.96 .54 6 4.46 .39 6 4.81 .44 6
Male 17-26 Female 5.07 .41 6 4.20 .35 6 4.86 .49 6
Male 65-74 Male 3.69 .93 8 4.65 .24 8 4.48 1.07 8
Male 65-74 Female 3.46 .38 8 4.36 .67 8 4.39 .58 8
Male 75-84 Male 3.60 .65 12 4.40 .81 12 4.02 1 .11 12
Male 75-84 Female 4.09 .61 6 4.91 .73 6 4.86 .72 6
Male 85+ Male 3.72 .63 4 4.08 .11 4 4.68 .09 4
Male 85+ Female 3.10 .81 7 4.05 .62 7 4.67 .61 7
Female 17-26 Male 5.04 .52 16 4.44 .63 16 4.55 .60 16
Female 17-26 Female 4.93 .46 16 4.31 .57 16 4.47 .53 16
Female 65-74 Male 4.05 .59 15 4.70 .62 15 4.69 .64 15
Female 65-74 Female 3.85 .43 15 4.38 .57 15 4.67 .57 15
Female 75-84 Male 3.68 .66 11 4.54 .52 II 4.41 .56 11
Female 75-84 Female 3.54 .40 16 4.01 .39 16 4.34 .52 16
Female 85+ Male 3.37 .83 19 3.98 .92 19 3.99 .95 19
Female 85+ Female 3.67 .51 15 4.43 .68 15 4.49 .73 15
Entire
Sample
3.98 .84 180 4.35 .65 180 4.47 .72 180
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F(9, 394) = 2.00, p  = .038, but none of the univariate tests for the three dependent 
variables were significant. Thus, none of these interactions were examined further.
There was no main effect of target sex or participants’ sex but there was a main 
effect o f target age, F (9, 394) = 18.22, p  < .001. Examination of the univariate F-tests 
indicated that target age significantly affected participants' ratings on only the Instrumental- 
Ineffective factor, F (3, 164) = 46.14, p < .001. Scheffe post-hoc analyses revealed that 
the only significantly different means were between the youngest group and all three of the 
older groups. Participants rated the youngest adult group (17-26 years) significantly more 
positively (M = 4.99, SD = .48 ) than any of the other three age group (M65-74 = 3.82, SD 
= .60, M.75-84 = 3.66, SD = .58 and, M85+ = 3.46, SD = .72). As predicted, each 
subsequent target age group was rated more negatively as the age increased but these 
differences were not statistically significant. In general, college students viewed older 
adults (65 years o f age and older) as less likely to be able to pursue goals in an active 
fashion or to adapt to their surroundings than adults their own age. There were no 
significant main effects for target age on the Autonomous-Dependent, or Personal 
Acceptability-Unacceptability dimensions. Participants did not rate any group as more 
independent or more socially acceptable.
Although I did not find any main effect for target sex on participants' rating o f the 
three attitudinal dimensions, I did find a significant difference for the age that participants 
reported men and women as being old. t( 170) = 4.04, p < .001. W omen were reported to 
be older at a significantly younger age (M  = 65.98, SD = 13.10 years) than men (M = 
67.98. SD = 11.77).
Discussion
I found partial support for my hypotheses that there would be main effects of target 
age and target sex for college students. Specifically, it appears that college students tend to 
view the Old-Old most negatively and younger adults most positively. They failed to 
differentiate the three groups o f older adults from each other in regard to their effectiveness
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in accomplishing tasks. While I did not find any differences in the rating o f male and 
female targets on the attitudinal measures, I detected a sex difference that women were 
viewed as being "old" at a younger age than were men. This suggests that there may be 
sexist and ageist attitudes toward older women but that the attitudinal measures that I used 
were not effective in detecting those differences. Future studies should include other 
measure to test for effects of target sex. In Study 3, new measures were created to test for 
effects of target sex and age
On a positive note, my results suggest that college students' attitudes toward older 
adults may have become generally more positive over the past 30 years. In 1969, 
Rosencranz and McNevin found that male college students rated men over the age of 70 
more negatively than my participants rated men over the age of 85 (MRosencranz & McNevin 
= 1.38 vs. Mmy sample = 3.43 on the Instrumental-Ineffective dimension, MRosencranz & 
McNevin = 2.72 vs. M m y sample = 4.00 on the Autonomous-Dependent dimension, and 
MRosencranz & McNevin = 3.00 vs. M m y sample = 4.11 on the Personal Acceptability- 
Unacceptability dimension). My findings may have implications for researchers interested 
in further enhancing attitudes toward older adults. It appears that more education may be 
necessary to inform the public, at least younger adults, of the heterogeneous nature of 
adults over the age of 65.
Based upon the findings from these two studies, I conducted two more studies that 
build upon the findings and limitations o f the two previously described. The next two 
studies further expand the first two studies by assessing ageist and sexist attitudes among 
in-group and out-group members.
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IV. STUDY 2:
The structure and predictors of ageist and sexist attitudes of in-group and out-group
members
Brewer (1994) suggested that understanding prejudice encompasses almost every 
area of social psychology from aggression to social attitudes and has offered information to 
help explain the phenomenon. She further described a lack of integration between the 
research and theory in social psychology in explaining prejudice. In this study, I combine 
aspects o f the various areas of social psychology including attitude measurement and 
structure, social cognition, and intergroup perception to better understand and to help 
generate an integrated depiction of prejudice. The research on attitudes toward older adults 
and the sexes, likewise, suggests that a more through approach is needed to clearly identify 
the intricacies of attitudes toward these target groups. Such an approach should examine 
correlates as well as other more mainstream predictors. An understanding o f such 
predictors and their interactions in the manifestations of negative attitudes is necessary for 
effective attitude change to occur and to better understand the behavior of these groups. 
Thus, in this study, I utilize both traditional and innovative measures and approaches from 
social, developmental, and personality psychology to assess prejudice and its structure and 
predictors.
Purpose and Hypotheses 
In this study, I hope to discover variables that influence ageist and sexist attitudes 
by exploring the predictors of attitudes toward older males and females and younger males 
and females o f in-group and out-group members. Based on the lack of differentiation of 
attitudes toward the three older target groups among college students from Study 1, I have 
selected to examine attitudes toward men and women 65 to 74 years of age as my older 
target age group for this study. Also, demographically the numbers of men and women in
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this age group are most similar and I should be most able to recruit male and female 
participants from this age group (Schick & Schick, 1994). Not only do I hope to illustrate 
the benefits of studying multiple dimensions of attitude strength, I also want to empirically 
test the two phenomena o f in-group bias and out-group homogeneity, test for differences in 
attitude bases among in-group and out-group members, and provide useful information 
regarding the prediction of ageist and sexist attitudes.
The general questions to be addressed in this study include: What are the predictors 
of attitudes toward older and younger males and females? Do attitude strength variables 
such as certainty, extremity, knowledge and experience differentiate participants' attitudes 
toward a target group? Are there structural differences in attitudes toward in-group and 
out-group members ? And is age or sex a more salient determinant of attitudes toward in­
group and out-group targets?
In this study, I test the following four specific hypotheses:
1. Predictability hypothesis: It is hypothesized that the predictors of attitudes toward in­
group and out-group members will be different. More specifically, attitude strength 
measures (such as knowledge, experience, attitude certainty and extremity, and affective- 
cognitive consistency) and personality constructs (self-esteem and social desirability) will 
be significant predictors of participants' attitudes but the relative importance of the above 
variables will vary according to in-group/out-group category. It is also believed that the 
salience of the above variables will vary according to age and sex. More specifically, I 
hypothesized that age would be more salient than sex (e.g., younger males will view 
younger women more positively than they will view older men).
2. In-group bias hypothesis: The positivity o f attitudes will vary by group membership. 
Participants' attitudes will be most positive toward in-group members and most negative 
toward out-group members (e.g., younger males will view older women most negatively 
and younger males most positively).
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3. Out-group homogeneity hypothesis: The variability among the attitudinal ratings o f out­
group members will be lower than that o f in-group members (e.g. younger males will rate 
younger males as more variable than they rate older women).
4. Structural differences hypothesis: The affective and cognitive bases o f attitudes of in­
group and out-group members will be different. Participants rating in-group members will 
have more affectively-based attitudes and participants rating out-group members will have 
more cognitively-based attitudes (e.g., younger males will have more affectively-based 
attitudes toward younger males than toward older women and they will have more 
cognitively-based attitudes toward older women than toward younger men).
Method
Participants
Three-hundred and sixty-four people participated in this study. Table 5 presents 
descriptive information for the participants. There were four distinct groups of participants 
classified by age and sex. One group o f participants were 86 younger males. The second 
group were 108 younger females. These first two groups were college students at the 
University o f New Hampshire; the majority of these students were first or second year 
college students enrolled in an introductory psychology class. The third group was 
comprised of 83 older men and the fourth group was 87 older females. Most of these older 
participants were grandparents or parents of younger participants. The remainder o f the 
older participants were distant relatives or friends of non-participating college students.
Roughly half of the participants (53%) were younger adults between 18 and 27 
years of age (M = 19.46, SD = 1.44). The other half o f the participants (47%) were older 
adults who were between the ages o f 61 and 79 years o f age (M = 70.28, SD = 4.04). The 
majority o f both groups were Caucasian and they tended to be Christians. The two groups 
o f participants (younger and older) differed in their marital status. None o f the younger 
participants were married or had ever been married whereas most o f the older participants 
were married (57%) or had been at some time (39%). Also the two groups appeared to
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Table 5
Frequencies for Participant Characteristics (Percentages in Parentheses)
Younger Older All:
Sex
Male 86 (44.3) 83 (49.1) 169 (46.4)
Female 108 (55.7) 87 (50.9) 195 (53.6)
Marital Status
Married 0(0) 96 (56.8) 96 (26.4)
Single 190 (97.9) 6 (3.6) 196 (53.8)
Divorced 0(0 ) 16 (9.5) 16 (4.4)
Engaged 4(2 .1) 0 (0 ) 4 (1 .1 )
Widowed 0(0) 49 (28.4) 49(13 .5)
Remarried 0 (0) 3 (.8)
Race
Caucasian 182 (93.8) 163 (96.4) 345 (94.8)
African-American 2(1.0) 0 (0 ) 2 (.5)
Asian 5 (2.6) 1 (-6) 6 (1 .6 )
Hispanic K-5) 0 (0 ) I (-3)
Other 3(1.5) 4  (2.4) 7 (1 .9 )
Political Affiliation
Democrat 47 (24.2) 61 (36.1) 108 (29.7)
Republican 30(15 .5) 55 (32.0) 85 (23.4)
Independent 89 (45.9) 49 (29.0) 138 (37.9)
Other 23 (11.9) 2(1 .2 ) 25 (6.9)
Religion
Protestant 44 (22.7) 74 (43.2) 118 (32.4)
Catholic 97 (50.0) 78 (46.2) 175 (48.1)
Jewish 5 (2.6) 6 (3.6) 11 (3.0)




Elementary School 0 (0) 9 (5.3) 9 (2.5)
Some High School 0 (0 ) 15 (8.9) 15(4.1)
High School 21 (10.8) 51 (30.2) 72(19.8)
Graduate
Some College 168 (86.8) 48 (28.4) 216 (59.3)
College Graduate 4(2 .1) 19 (11.2) 23 (6.3)
Some Graduate 0 (0) 4(1 .8 ) 4 (1 .1 )
School
Master's Degree 0 (0 ) 16 (9.5) 16 (4.4)
Doctoral Degree 0(0) 5 (3.0) 5 (1 .4 )







<10 1 (0.5) 11 (6.5) 12 (3.3)
10-25 12 (6.2) 39 (23.1) 51 (14.0)
25-50 38(19.6) 61 (35.5) 99 (27.2)
50-75 41 (41.1) 31 (18.3) 72(19 .8)
75-100 46 (23.7) 10 (5.9) 56(15 .4)
100-150 28 (14.4) 7 (4 .1 ) 35 (9.6)
150-200 15 (7.7) 0 (0 ) 15(4.1)
>200 4(2 .1 ) 0 (0 ) 4(1 .1 )
Relationship te
College Students
College Student 194(100) 0 (0 ) 194 (53.3)
Parent of a 0 (0 ) 17(10.1) 17 (4.7)
College
Student
Grandparent of a 0 (0) 121 (71.0) 121 (33.2)
College
Student
Other 0 (0) 32(18.9) 32 (8.8)
Target/In-Group
Rated
Same Sex and 48 (24.7) 38 (22.5) 86 (23.6)
Age
Same Age and 49 (25.3) 45 (26) 94 (25.8)
Opposite Sex
Different Age and 49 (25.3) 48 (28.4) 97 (26.9)
Same Sex
Different Age and 48 (24.7 ) 39 (23.1) 87 (23.9)
Opposite Sex
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favor slightly different political parties. The older participants were fairly evenly split 
among the three main affiliations; thirty-six percent were affiliated with the Democratic 
party, 32% with the Republican party, and 29% were Independents. The younger 
participants affiliated more with the independent party (46%) than with either the 
democratic (24%) or republican (16%) parties. At the time of the study, all of the younger 
participants were undergraduate students. Twenty-five percent o f the older participants had 
already received a college (or higher) degree. The younger participants also tended on 
average to have a slightly higher annual family income than did the older participants.
The number of participants rating the four target groups were evenly distributed; 
Twenty-four percent rated targets who were the same age and sex as themselves, 26% rated 
targets who were the same age but the opposite sex, 27% rated targets who were the same 
sex but a different age, and 24% rated targets who were neither the same age nor the same 
sex.
Measures
Many of the measures I used in this study have been previously described in the 
Method section of the Pilot study and Study 1. Where applicable, I have given a brief 
summary of scales that have been previously described and refer to the section in which the 
complete description appears.
Semantic Differential
The Semantic Differential (see Appendix G) is a  32-item bipolar adjective list that 
yields three factors: the Instrumental-Ineffective dimension, the Autonomous-Dependent 
dimension, and the Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability dimension (Rosencranz & 
McNevin, 1969). These three factors and their associated within-subjects' variabilities 
served as the dependent measures for this study. For each subscale, a mean score was 
created for each participant by adding individual scores for each item and dividing that 
number by the total number of items on the factor. A variability score was also calculated 
for each participant by computing the within-subjects’ variance o f all the items for a given
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factor. In this study, participants rated one o f four target groups: older males (65-74 years 
o f age), older females (65-74 years of age), younger males (17-26 years o f age), or 
younger females (17-26 years o f age). (See Method section for Study 1 for full 
description.)
The Multiresponse checklist
The Multiresponse checklist (see Appendix H) was employed to determine 
participants’ affective-cognitive consistency and attitude base (Crites, et al., 1994). The 
Multiresponse checklist is comprised o f three scales including affective, cognitive, and 
general evaluative attitude scales. Participants respond to eight pairs of affective, seven 
pairs of cognitive, and four pairs of general evaluative terms on a scale o f 0 (does not 
describe or apply), 1 (slightly describes), or 2 (definitely describes). Each pair of terms 
consists of a word that positively described the attitude object (in this case an older or 
younger male or female) and a word that negatively described the attitude object. 
Participants' scores are recoded as - I for negative words that slightly describe and -2 for 
negative words that definitely describes.
Participants' responses to the 16 affective. 14 cognitive, and eight evaluative terms 
are summed to determine a score for the affective, cognitive and evaluative scales. The 
affective scale measures how well the adjectives describe participants' feelings toward older 
or younger males and females. The cognitive scale defines the extent to which various 
traits describe the attitude object of older or younger males and females. The evaluative 
scale depicts their general evaluation o f older or younger males and females.
Crites et al. (1994) used the multiresponse checklist with 200 participants and tested 
six different attitude objects. In assessing the internal consistency for the three scales for 
six attitude objects, they obtained consistently high Cronbach Alphas with the following 
median scores: .88 on the cognitive scale, .90 on the affective scale and, .91 on the 
evaluative scale. These numbers indicate that the reliabilities of the three scales are 
comparable which has not been true o f comparisons of other affective and cognitive scales
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(Crites et al., 1994). Good convergent and discriminant validity for the Multiresponse 
checklist was also shown. When the six different attitude objects were subjected to an 
iterative principal axis factor analysis, a two factor solution resulted and for five of the six 
attitude objects, the affective scales all loaded on the same factor and the cognitive scales 
loaded onto a separate factor. This analysis offers further evidence for the useful of these 
scales because it implies that the affective and cognitive scales are indeed separate scales.
The Multiresponse checklist can also be used to classify participants' attitude base 
as primarily affective or cognitive (Crites et al., 1994). Scores on the general evaluative, 
affective, and cognitive subscales can be used to differentiate between cognitively and 
affectively based attitudes. To determine attitude basis, a mean score for each of the three 
scales (general evaluation, affective, and cognitive) is calculated. Affective discrepancy 
scores are then created by computing the absolute difference between participants’ mean 
score on the general evaluation and their affective mean score. Cognitive discrepancy 
scores are also created by computing the absolute difference between participants' mean 
score on the general evaluation and their cognitive mean score. High affective discrepancy 
scores signify that subjects' attitudes are affectively based and lower discrepancy scores 
indicate that subjects’ scores are not affectively based. Likewise, high cognitive 
discrepancy scores signify that subjects' attitudes are cognitively based and lower 
discrepancy scores indicate that subjects' scores are not cognitively based. Participants 
can, thus, be classified into four groups based upon median splits o f the affective and 
cognitive discrepancy scores. Participants' with high affective and low cognitive 
discrepancy scores have affectively based attitudes; whereas those with high cognitive 
discrepancy scores and low affective discrepancy scores have cognitively based attitudes 
(Crites, et al., 1994). Affective-cognitive consistency was calculated by computing the 
absolute difference between affective and cognitive mean scores.
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Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
To reduce or eliminate the effect of a socially desirable response bias as well as 
distortion associated with desirable behaviors (Phillips & Clancy, 1972), 1 utilized the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) (see Appendix I). 
Participants' scores on the scale may be used as a covariate and/or as suggested by Crowne 
and Marlowe (1964) the need for approval (as indicated by scores on the scale) may be 
assessed as a significant predictor o f attitudes. The Marlowe Crowne is a 33-item true/false 
scale that assesses participants behavior, including statements such as, "I'm always willing 
to admit it when I make a mistake” and "I never resent being asked to return a favor”. The 
behaviors assessed are generally uncommon and desirable or common and undesirable 
everyday events. Higher scores on the scale indicate higher need for approval. The scale 
has been found to be quite reliable among various samples, with a test-retest correlation of 
.88 and an internal consistency ranging from .73 to .88, as well as valid as demonstrated 
by moderate correlations with other measures o f social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 
1964).
Experience
A three-item general measure of direct experience (based on Drake, 1957) was 
utilized (see Appendix J). Direct experience was measured by asking participants three 
questions about their interactions with a given target group. For each question, participants 
selected a response from 1 (less experience) to 3 (more experience) to quantify the amount 
type and quality of experience they had with the target group. The first item assessed 
whether or not participants were currently or had ever lived with a member of the target 
group. The second item quantified the frequency of contact that each participant currently 
had with a given target group from seldom to frequent. The third item measured the 
intimacy of contact, from impersonal to personal, that participants have with a given target 
group. A composite experience measure was generated by summing participants scores to 
the three items.
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Revised Facts on Aping Quiz 2
The Revised Facts on Aging Quiz (see Appendix K) is a 25-item true/false 
questionnaire designed to assess participants' overall knowledge o f older adults (Palmore, 
1998). It is a revised form of the Facts on Aging Quiz 2 (Palmore, 1981) which was 
created as an alternate form of the Facts on Aging Quiz (Palmore, 1977). Each item on the 
quiz is presented as a statement, such as "Older persons have more injuries in the home 
than younger persons." Each item is factually-based and has been empirical verified.
Items deal with physical, psychological, social and economic aspects of older adults. 
Participants scores on the Revised Facts on Aging Quiz will serve as a measure of 
participants' knowledge of older adults and hereafter will be referred to as knowledge of 
older adults (KOA).
There has been some concern that both the Facts on Aging Quiz and the Facts on 
Aging Quiz 2 have low reliabilities (Klemmack, 1978; Lusk, Williams, & Hsuing, 1990) 
but Palmore (1978; 1981; 1988) argued that the quizzes are appropriate for measuring 
levels of information. He claims that the lower than desirable alpha coefficients are not 
problematic as the quiz sufficiently indicates a  standard of performance, i.e., an ability to 
detect true statement about older adults. Even though inter-item correlations are low 
because the items assess multiple dimensions of knowledge regarding older adults (e.g., 
physical and social dimensions), the reliability between the two forms are satisfactory and 
range between .50 to .80. Thus, the percentage of overall correct answers is a good 
measure of overall knowledge.
Facts on Younger Adults Quiz
No pre-existing measure of knowledge about younger adults was found so I created 
a 25-item questionnaire to measure overall knowledge toward younger adults (see 
Appendix L). The overall goal in creating this measure was to parallel the form, structure, 
and content o f Palmore’s (1998) Revised Facts on Aging Quiz. Facts about physical, 
psychological, social and economic conditions of younger adults were obtained from
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aging, developmental and adolescent sources (Cauffman, 1996; Hyde 1996; Matlin, 1995; 
Palmore, 1998; Steinberg, 1999). Forty-seven items were initially generated. Statements 
for the final questionnaire were reviewed by an adolescent psychologist for content, 
wording, and importance (W. Palmquist, personal communication, January 14, 1999). 
Through an iterative process, the most applicable items were retained for the final 
questionnaire. Each of the 25 items was written as a statement to which participants were 
asked to answer whether the statement reflected correct or incorrect information about 
younger adults. Participants scores on the Facts on Younger Adults Quiz will serve as a 
measure of participants' knowledge of younger adults and hereafter will be referred to as 
knowledge of younger adults (KYA).
Facts on Males and Females Quiz
No pre-existing comparable or sufficient measure of knowledge regarding sex 
differences was found so I created a 25-item questionnaire to measure overall knowledge 
about males and females (see Appendix M). This measure was designed to resemble 
Paimore's (1998) Revised Facts on Aging Quiz. Factual physical, psychological, social 
and economic differences between males and females were obtained from women's study 
textbooks and research (Hyde, 1996; LaPlante & Allen, 1998; Matlin, 1993, 1996). Fifty 
statements were initially generated. Statements for the final questionnaire were reviewed 
by a psychology of women professor for content, wording, and importance (W. 
Palmquist, personal communication, January 14, 1999). Through an iterative process, the 
best items were retained for the final questionnaire. Each of the 25 items was written as a 
statement to which participants were asked to answer whether the statement reflected 
correct or incorrect information about men and women. Participants scores on the Facts 
on Males and Females Quiz will serve as a measure o f participants’ knowledge of sex 
differences and hereafter will be referred to as knowledge of sex differences (KSD).
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Self-Esteem Scale
Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem scale (see Appendix C) is a 10-item instrument 
used to measure global self-esteem (see Method section of Pilot Study).
Procedure
Younger participants reported in groups o f up to 10 people to a classroom to 
complete a questionnaire. They completed consent forms (see Appendix N) as well as 
demographic information (See Appendix O) and were reminded that their answers would 
be confidential and that their participation was voluntary. They were randomly assigned to 
complete the above measures for one o f four target groups (older males (65-74 years of 
age), older females (65-74 years of age), younger males (17-26 years of age), or younger 
females (17-26 years of age) as well as demographic information. Once they complete the 
packet, they were thanked for their participation and received a debriefing statement (see 
Appendix P). These participants received course credit and were offered the opportunity to 
receive additional credit to serve as research assistants and to recruit an older, (i.e., a 65-74 
year-old) family member or friend to participate in the study by mailing them a survey.
The older participants were recruited by a college student to participate in the study. 
They were mailed or hand-delivered an envelope containing a survey, a consent form, and 
a hand-signed note (see Appendix Q) from a younger participant or college student asking 
them to assist the student by completing and returning the survey to the researcher. 
Completed packets were returned via self-addressed stamped envelopes to the researcher. 
Upon receipt of their completed survey, older participants were mailed a debriefing 
statement (see Appendix P). A total o f 285 packets were mailed to older adults. One- 
hundred and ninety-five of them were completed and returned resulting in a 68% return 
rate.
Results
These results contains two primary sections. The first section includes a summary 
of the descriptive statistics of the independent variables, the dependent variables, the
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reliability for each scale used in this study, and the intercorrelations among the independent 
and dependent variables. The second section includes the major analyses and associated 
inferential statistics used to test the four major hypotheses of this study.
Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities 
Distributions of each of the variables were examined by histograms using SPSS 
FREQUENCIES to assess normality. In general, the variables appeared to be normally 
distributed and, therefore, no transformations were conducted on any of the variables. 
Independent Variables
Table 6 presents descriptive information for the variables that served as independent 
or predictor variables. The information provided for each of these variables includes the 
mean, standard deviation, and N for three samples including the sample of younger adults, 
the sample of older adults, as well as the overall sample (the combined scores for the 
younger and older participants).
A total of 14 scales comprised of multiple items were utilized as independent or 
predictor variables in this study. These 14 scales included social desirability (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1964), self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), Knowledge of Younger Adults (KYA), 
Knowledge of Older Adults (KOA) (Palmore, 1998), Knowledge of Sex Differences 
(KSD), Experience, Affective-Cognitive Consistency, Attitude Certainty for the 
Instrumental-Ineffective factor, Attitude Certainty for the Autonomous-Dependent factor. 
Attitude Certainty for the Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability factor. Attitude Extremity 
for the Instrumental-Ineffective factor. Attitude Extremity for the Autonomous-Dependent 
factor, Attitude Extremity for the Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability factor, and 
Participants’ Age. Cronbach alpha coefficients were calculated for each of these scales to 
assess their internal reliability. The standardized alpha for each scale is included in Table 6.
All but four of the independent variables were reliable with standardized alphas 
exceeding .70. The three knowledge tests were not reliable in the traditional sense as their 
internal reliabilities were quite low; they ranged from .13 to .31. These low reliabilities
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics and Scale Reliabilities o f Predictor Variables
Variable Participants M 2D ££ C ronbach’s
Alpha
(Standardized)
Social Desirability Younger 14.58 5.10 194
Older 21.36 6.09 169
All 17.75 6.52 363 .85
Self-Esteem Younger 3.30 .51 194
Older 3.48 .37 166
AD 3.39 .46 360 .86
Age Knowledge Younger 16.01 2.45 96
(KYA) Older 14.22 2.55 87
AD 15.16 2.65 183 .31
Age (Older) Younger 14.77 2.33 98
Knowledge Older 14.81 3.15 82
AD 14.78 2.72 180 .16
Sex Knowledge Younger 14.20 2.31 194
Older 13.33 2.95 169
AD 13.78 2.67 363 .13
Experience Younger 2.04 .63 194
Older 1.88 .58 170
AD 1.96 .61 364 .63
Affective-Cognitive Younger .21 .17 194
Consistency Older .21 .18 164
AD .21 .17 358 .88
Attitude Certainty for Younger 69.74 14.59 194
Instrumental- Older 69.15 21.02 156
Ineffective Factor AD 69.50 17.69 350 .89
Attitude Certainty for Younger 70.79 15.51 193
Autonomous- Older 67.77 20.12 156
Dependent Factor AD 69.46 17.73 349 .91
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Table 6 (cont.)
Variable Participants M SO a Cronbach's
Alpha
(Standardized)
Attitude Certainty for Younger 71.82 15.86 194




All 73.82 39.63 347 .95
Attitude Extremity Younger 1.07 .44 194
for Instrumental- Older 1.29 .70 165
Ineffective Factor All 1.17 .59 359 .86
Attitude Extremity Younger 1.02 .43 194
for Autonomous- Older 1.14 .58 165
Dependent Factor AH 1.07 .51 359 .83
Attitude Extremity Younger 1.10 .49 194
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are, however, not problematic for this study. The items on these three quizzes assessed 
physical, psychological, social, and economic facts for the various targets and, therefore, 
intercorrelation among individual items would not necessarily be strong. Such knowledge 
measures have been deemed appropriate for measuring levels of information; the percentage 
of correct answers is viewed as a good measure of overall knowledge (Palmore, 1978;
1981; 1988). The reliability of the experience variable (alpha = .63) is lower than one 
would desire. It is likely that the low reliability of this variable is due to the fact that the 
scale contains only three items.
Dependent Variables
Table 7 shows descriptive information for the variables that served as dependent or 
criterion variables. The information provided for these variables includes the mean, 
standard deviation, and N for the sample of younger adults, the sample of older adults, and 
the overall sample.
Eight scales comprised of multiple items were used as dependent or criterion 
variables in this study. The eight dependent measures were participants' scores on the 
Instrumental-Ineffective factor, the Autonomous-Dependent factor, the Personal 
Acceptability-Unacceptability factor (Rosencranz & McNevin), the variability of their 
scores on Instrumental-Ineffective factor, the Autonomous-Dependent factor, and the 
Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability factor, and their Affective and Cognitive Sum 
scores (Crites et al, 1994). Cronbach alpha coefficients were calculated for each of these 
scales to assess their internal reliability. The standardized alpha for each scale is included 
in Table 7.
All of the dependent variables were found to be reliable scales. The alphas for the 
three main dependent variables and their variabilities ranged from .83 to .93. The 
reliabilities of the other two dependent variables, the sum of the affective and cognitive 
subscales (Crites et al, 1994) were .76 and .78 respectively.
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics and Scale Reliabilities o f Dependent Variables 
(Percentages in Parentheses)
Variable Participants M M Cronbach's Alpha 
(Standardized)
Instrumental- Younger 4.19 .79 194
Ineffective Factor Older 4.28 1.25 165
All 4.23 1 . 0 2 359 . 8 6
Autonomous- Younger 4.34 .73 194
Dependent Factor Older 4.17 1.05 165
All 4.26 .89 359 .83
Personal Younger 4.53 .76 194
Acceptability- Older 4.33 1.34 163
Unacceptability All 4.44 1.06 357 .93
Factor
Variability of Younger 1.40 1 . 0 2 194
Instrumental- Older 1.24 1.17 163
Ineffective Factor AH 1.33 1.09 357 . 8 6
Variability of Younger 1.30 .90 194
Autonomous- Older 1.25 1.08 163
Dependent Factor AD 1.28 .99 357 .83
Variability of Younger 1.26 .81 194
Personal Older 1 . 0 0 .81 163




















AH 5.18 3.98 359 .78
70
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Intercorrelations among the Variables
Table 8  shows the intercorrelations among the predictor variables for all 
participants. There is no correlation coefficient for the variables of KYA and KOA because 
participants completed only one of these scales depending on the target group that they 
rated. Those who rated younger targets completed the Facts on Younger Adults Quiz 
whereas those who rated older targets completed the Revised Facts on Aging Quiz 2. It 
should also be noted that all of these variables are based on self-ratings and, therefore, any 
associations among them could be due to shared variance method. Some of the 
intercorrelations are still noteworthy. There were significant associations between 
experience and attitude certainty; participants who had more experience with the target 
tended to be more sure of their attitudes toward the target group. Likewise, there were 
strong associations between attitude extremity and attitude certainty. Participants who were 
more certain o f their attitudes also tended to have more extreme attitudes. There were 
relations between KYA and experience and attitude extremity. Those with more knowledge 
were more likely to have more experience with the target group and less extreme attitudes. 
There were also some age associations. Younger adults tended to score higher on the 
knowledge tests, have more experience with the target group, and have less extreme 
attitudes than the older adults but their self-esteem scores were lower.
Table 9 shows the correlations between the predictor and the dependent variables 
for all the participants. It was assumed that social desirability would be correlated with the 
dependent variables. Such associations were only found for the Affective Sum and 
Cognitive Sum variables. Experience was correlated with only the Instrumental-Ineffective 
factor and the variability of the Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability Factor. Participants 
who had more experience with a given target group rated them as more effective and as 
more similar on a variety of socially important variables than did participants with less 
experience. There were also associations between attitude certainty and attitudinal ratings.
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Table 8
Intercorrelations among Predictor Variables for All Participants
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1 . Social Desirability
2. Self-Esteem .34***
3. Age (Young) Knowledge -.33*** -.17*
4. Age (Old) 
Knowledge
- . 0 1 - . 0 1
-----
5. Sex Knowledge - . 1 1 * -.08 - . 0 1 .34***
6 . Experience - . 1 1 * . 0 2 .18* .04 - . 0 2
7. Affective-Cognitive Consistency .07 .06 -.16* .09 .07
8 . Attitude Certainty for 
Instrumental-Ineffective Factor
. 0 2 .08 -.07 .13 . 1 2 *
9. Attitude Certainty for 
Autonomous-Dependent Factor
. 0 1 .07 .08 .13 .07
10. Attitude Certainty for Personal 
Acceptability-Unacceptability 
Factor
.17** . 1 0 - . 0 1 . 0 0 -.05
11. Attitude Extremity for 
Instrumental-Ineffective Factor
2 4 *** . 1 1 * * 26*** - . 1 0 - . 0 2
12. Attitude Extremity for 
Autonomous-Dependent Factor
23*** . 1 1 * -.19** -.04 - . 0 2
13. Attitude Extremity for Personal 
Acceptability-Unacceptability 
Factor
17* * * . 1 2 * -.19* -.17 - . 0 2
14. Participants’ Age 52*** .2 0 *** -.34*** . 0 1 -.16**
15. Participants’ Sex - . 1 2 * .05 . 0 2 .04 .06
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Table 8 (cont.)
Variable 6 7 8 9 1 0
1. Social Desirability
2. Self-Esteem
3. Age (Young) Knowledge
4. Age (Old) Knowledge
5. Sex Knowledge
6 . Experience
7. Affective-Cognitive Consistency .03
8 . Attitude Certainty for 
Instrumental- 
Ineffective Factor
. 19*** . 0 0
9. Attitude Certainty for 
Autonomous-Dependent Factor
.2 2 *** . 0 0 .87***
10. Attitude Certainty for Personal 
Acceptability-Unacceptability 
Factor
.06 -.03 .30*** .36***
11. Attitude Extremity for 
Instrumental-Ineffective Factor
.06 .05 .29*** 19* * * .16**
12. Attitude Extremity for 
Autonomous-Dependent Factor
-.04 .09 .26*** .32*** 26***
13. Attitude Extremity for Personal 
Acceptability-Unacceptability 
Factor
-.07 . 0 1 9 9 *** 23* * * 2*7* * *
14. Participants' Age -.13* - . 0 2 - . 0 2 -.08 .06
15. Participants' Sex -.08 -.03 .06 .00 .08
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Table 8 (cont)
Variable 1 1 1 2 13 14 15
1. Social Desirability
2. Self-Esteem
3. Age (Young) Knowledge




8 . Attitude Certainty for 
Instrumental- 
Ineffective Factor
9. Attitude Certainty for 
Autonomous-Dependent Factor
10. Attitude Certainty for Personal 
Acceptability-Unacceptability 
Factor
11. Attitude Extremity for 
Instrumental-Ineffective Factor
12. Attitude Extremity for 
Autonomous-Dependent Factor
.65***
13. Attitude Extremity for Personal 
Acceptability-Unacceptability 
Factor
.6 8 *** .67***
14. Participants' Age 19*** . 1 2 * 24***
15. Participants' Sex - . 1 2 * - . 1 0 -.14** .05
*£< .05 . **£<.01. ***£<.001.
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Table 9













Social Desirability .03 . 0 2 .03 .16**
Self-Esteem .05 . 1 0 .09 .19***
Age (Young) Knowledge .09 . 1 0 .05 -.07
Age (Old) Knowledge -.07 . 0 0 -.04 . 0 2
Sex Knowledge - . 1 0 -.05 -.03 - . 1 1 *
Experience .22*** . 0 0 .06 .09
Affective-Cognitive
Consistency
-.08 . 0 2 -.07 -.15**
Attitude Certainty for 
Instrumental- 
Ineffective Factor
.18*** .15** .16** .08
Attitude Certainty for 
Autonomous-Dependent 
Factor
.16** .2 1 *** .18*** .08
Attitude Certainty for 
Personal Acceptance- 
Unacceptance Factor
. 0 2 .14** .18*** .07
Attitude Extremity for 
Instrumental- 
Ineffective Factor
.05 .05 .04 . 1 0 *
Attitude Extremity for 
Autonomous-Dependent 
Factor
.03 .17** . 1 1 * . 1 2 *
Attitude Extremity for 
Personal Acceptance- 
Unacceptance Factor
- . 0 2 . 1 1 * .15** .14**
Participants’ Age .04 -.09 -.09 - . 0 2
Participants' Sex -.03 -.03 . 0 0 -.13*
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Social Desirability .2 1 *** .03 .07 - . 6 6
Self-Esteem 00 * * « - . 0 1 - . 0 2 -.09
Age (Young) Knowledge -.14 -.06 -.15* . 0 1
Age (Old) Knowledge . 1 0 - . 0 1 .04 - . 1 0
Sex Knowledge - . 0 1 -.03 .05 . 1 0
Experience . 0 2 -.07 .-07 -.16**
Affective-Cognitive
Consistency
.26*** .14** . 1 1 * . 1 0
Attitude Certainty for 
Instrumental- 
Ineffective Factor
. 1 1 * .03 .04 .06
Attitude Certainty for 
Autonomous-Dependent 
Factor
. 1 0 .06 . 1 2 * .08
Attitude Certainty for 
Personal Acceptance- 
Unacceptance Factor
.07 .18*** .28*** .26***




Attitude Extremity for 
Autonomous-Dependent 
Factor
.18*** 40*** .55*** .23***
Attitude Extremity for 
Personal Acceptance- 
Unacceptance Factor
.17*** .35*** .35*** .30***
Participants' Age .04 -.07 -.03 -.16**
Participants’ Sex - . 0 2 . 0 1 .07 . 0 1
* C < .05. ** p  <  .01. *** p  < .001.
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Participants who were more sure of their attitudes tended to rate the target group more 
favorably.
Analyses Testing Primary Hypotheses 
For all of the following analyses, participants were classified into one of four in­
group categories based on their age and their sex and the age and sex of the target group 
they rated. Participants who rated targets who were the same age and same sex as 
themselves were classified as members o f the Age/Sex In-group category, (i.e., in-group 
members on both variables of age and sex). Participants who rated targets who were the 
same age but the opposite sex were classified as members o f the Age In-group category, 
(i.e., in-group members on the variables of age but not sex). Participants who rated targets 
who were a different age but the same sex were classified as members of the Sex In-group 
category, (i.e., in-group members on the variable of sex but not age). Participants who 
rated targets who were neither the same age nor the same sex as themselves were classified 
as members o f the No In-group category, (i.e., in-group members on neither variable of 
age nor sex). The number of participants in each o f the four in-group categories was fairly 
even (see Table 5). To test the first hypothesis, the predictability hypothesis, separate 
analyses by in-group category were conducted. For the three latter hypotheses, in-group 
category served as an independent variable.
Predictability hypothesis
The predictability hypothesis, stating that predictors o f attitudes toward in-group 
and out-group members should be different, included two subhypotheses. First, I 
hypothesized that attitude strength measures (including knowledge, experience, attitude 
certainty and extremity, and affective-cognitive consistency), personality constructs (self­
esteem and social desirability) and participants' age and sex would be significant predictors 
o f participants' attitudes toward various in-group targets. Second, I hypothesized that the 
relative importance o f the predictor variables would vary according to participants’ in-group 
category.
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To test the first part o f the predictability hypothesis, I conducted standard multiple 
regression analyses. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses had been planned but none 
of the correlations between the only potential covariate, social desirability and the 
dependent variables were significant (see Table 9).
As a preliminary assessment, I tested the assumptions associated with regression 
analyses. For each of the regression analyses I conducted, I had between 80 and 97 cases 
assessing the influence of nine predictors. This ratio of cases to independent variables is 
well above Tabachnick and Fidell's (1989) recommended minimum of Five cases for each 
independent variable. Scatterplots of residuals against each of the predicted dependent 
variables for each regression analyses were examined. The overall shape of all the 
scatterplots appeared to be rectangular suggesting that the assumptions of normality, 
linearity, and homoscedasticity were met. Also multicoilinearity and singularity did not 
appear to be of concern as all of the predictor variables were successfully entered into the 
regression equations.
A total o f 12 analyses were conducted to test the first subhypothesis. Three 
separate regressions using SPSS REGRESSION to predict the three attitudinal factors of 
Instrumental-Ineffective, (i.e., how actively targets can pursue goals and adapt to their 
surroundings), Autonomous-Dependent, ( i.e., how independently targets can function in 
their environment), and Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability, (i.e., how positively 
targets are regarded on a variety of socially important variables and how likely they are to 
positively interact with others in society) were conducted for each of the four in-group 
categories (Age/Sex In-group, Age In-group, Sex In-group, No In-Group). In each 
regression analysis, participants’ scores on the nine critical predictors o f knowledge (of 
both age and sex facts), experience, attitude certainty, attitude extremity, affective-cognitive 
consistency, self-esteem, participants’ age and participants’ sex were entered together into 
the equation.
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Prediction of the Instrumental-Ineffective Factor. Four regression analyses were 
conducted to assess the prediction of how Instrumental-Ineffective each in-group category 
rated their target group. Table 10 includes the unstandardized regression coefficients (B) 
and intercept, the standardized regression coefficients (B), and R, R2, and adjusted R after 
entry o f all the predictor variables for each in-group category. All four regression 
equations were significant, indicating strong relations between the predictor variables and 
attitudinal ratings.
The first regression analysis predicted how Instrumental-Ineffective the Age/Sex In­
group category participants rated members of their in-group. R for regression was 
significantly different from zero, R = .54, F(9, 70) = 3.240, g  = .0024. The two predictor 
variables of attitude certainty (sr2  = .068) and participants' age (sr2  = .075) made unique 
contributions to the prediction of how Instrumental-Ineffective participants rated targets 
who were of the same age and sex. Participants who were more sure of their attitudes and 
younger rated targets who were the same age and sex as themselves as more instrumental. 
The combination of all the nine variables contributed another .151 in shared variability. All 
totaled, 29% of the variability in attitudinal ratings from Sex/Age In-group participants was 
predicted by scores on the nine predictor variables.
The second regression analysis predicted how Instrumental-Ineffective the Age In­
group category participants rated members of their in-group. R for regression was 
significantly different from zero, R = .51, F(9, 79) = 3.009, g  = .0039. The four predictor 
variables of self-esteem (sr2  = .084), experience (sr2  = .062), attitude certainty (sr2  =
.065), and participants' age (sr2  = .069) contributed significantly to the prediction of how 
Instrumental-Ineffective participants rated targets who were of the same age but the 
opposite sex. Participants who had higher self-esteem, more experience, greater attitude 
certainty, and were younger rated targets more positively. All totaled, 26% of the
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Predictor B B B B B B B B
Variables
Self-esteem -.081 -.050 .620** .321** .190 .065 -.165 -.075
K Y A & K O A -.040 -.128 -.026 -.086 .003 .006 .040 . 1 0 1
Sex Knowledge - .013 -.041 - . 0 2 1 -.069 -.109* -.232 -.050 -.115
Experience .232 .163 .421* .276* -.560 -.231 -.191 -.092
Affective- -.117 -.026 -.546 -.109 .036 .005 -.794 -.117
cognitive
Consistency
Attitude Certainty .016* .289* .015* .297* .013 .187 .007 .130
Attitude .315 .187 -.170 - . 1 1 2 -.225 -.124 -.641** -.336**
Extremity



















R 2  = .26 
adjusted R 2  = .17 
R  = .51**
R 2  = .27 
adjusted R 2  = .19 
R  = .52*
R2





* j) < 05. ** p < .01.
variability in attitudinal ratings from Age In-group participants was predicted by scores on 
the nine predictor variables.
The third regression analysis predicted how Instrumental-Ineffective the Sex In­
group category participants rated members o f  their in-group. R for regression was 
significantly different from zero, R = .52, F(9, 78) = 3.268, j) = .0020. The two predictor 
variables of KSD (sr2  = .049) and participants' age (sr2  = .054) contributed significantly 
to the prediction of how Instrumental-Ineffective participants rated targets who were of a 
different age but the same sex as themselves. Participants who were older and had less 
knowledge rated the targets as more instrumental. The combination of all the nine variables 
contributed another. 167 in shared variability. All totaled, 27% of the variability in 
attitudinal ratings from Sex In-group participants was predicted by scores on the nine 
predictor variables.
The fourth regression analysis predicted how Instrumental-Ineffective the No In­
group category participants rated members o f their in-group. R for regression was 
significantly different from zero, FL= .45, F(9, 75) = 2.152, g  = .0351. The two predictor 
variables of attitude extremity (sr2  = 084) and participants' age (sr2  = .086) contributed 
significantly to the prediction of how Instrumental-Ineffective participants rated targets who 
were of a different age and the opposite sex as themselves. Participants with less extreme 
attitudes who were younger viewed the targets as most effective in their environment. The 
combination of all the nine variables contributed another .04 in shared variability. All 
totaled, 21% ~f the variability in attitudinal ratings from No In-group participants was 
predicted by scores on the nine predictor variables.
Prediction of the Autonomous-Dependent Factor. Four regression analyses were 
conducted to assess the prediction of how Autonomous-Dependent each in-group category 
rated their target group. Table 11 includes the unstandardized regression coefficients (B) 
and intercept, the standardized regression coefficients (B), and R, R2, and adjusted R_ after 
entry of all the predictor variables for each in-group category. Three o f the regression
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Predictor B B B B B B B B
Variables
Self-esteem .018 . 0 1 1 .534** .291** .108 .044 .176 .092
KYA & KOA -.065 - .214 .024 .086 - .017 - .040 .096* .279*
Sex Knowledge .026 .086 - .026 - .092 - .043 - .108 - .038 - . 1 0 0
Experience .030 . 0 2 2 .421** .291** - .302 - .148 .044 .24
Affective- .151 .034 - .597 - .126 .751 .135 - .556 - .093
cognitive
Consistency
Attitude Certainty .007 .123 .006 .115 .013 .227 .009 .213
Attitude .597** .368** .098 .058 - .104 - .054 .114 .063
Extremity
Participant Age - .166 - . 1 0 0 - .081 - .049 - .471* - .236* - .303 - .167
Participant Sex - .008 - .005 .083 .050 - .185 - .092 .268 .149
Intercept 3.771** 1.283 4.828** 2.014
R 2  = .20 R 2  = .20 R2 = . 2 0 R2 = . 2 2
adjusted R 2  = .10 adjusted R 2  = .11 adjusted R 2  = . 1 1 adjusted R 2  = . 1 2
R = .4 5 R  = .45* R = .45* R = .47*
* 12 < .05. ** p  < .01.
equations were significant, indicating strong relations between the predictor variables and 
attitudinal ratings.
The first regression analysis in this series predicted how Autonomous-Dependent 
the Age/Sex In-group category participants rated members of their in-group. R for 
regression was not significantly different from zero, R = 45., F(9,70) = 1.939, g  = .0602.
The second regression analysis predicted how Autonomous-Dependent the age in­
group category participants rated members o f their in-group. R for regression was 
significantly different from zero, R = .45, F(9, 79) = 2.209, g  = .0298. Self-esteem (sr2  = 
.068) and experience (sr2  = .067) contributed significantly to the prediction of how 
Autonomous-Dependent participants rated targets who were of the same age but the 
opposite sex. Participants who had higher self-esteem and more experience judged the 
targets to be more autonomous. The combination of all the nine variables contributed 
another .065 shared variability. All totaled, 20% of the variability in attitudinal ratings 
from Age In-group participants was predicted by scores on the nine predictor variables.
The third regression analysis predicted how Autonomous-Dependent the Sex In­
group category participants rated members o f their in-group. R for regression was 
significantly different from zero, R = .45, F (9 ,78) = 2.191, g  = .0314. Only the predictor 
variable of participants’ age (sr2  = .046) made a unique contribution to the equation. 
Younger participants tended to view same sex targets as more independent than did older 
participants. The combination o f all the nine variables contributed another .154 in shared 
variability. All totaled, 20% of the variability in attitudinal ratings from Sex In-group 
participants was predicted by scores on the nine predictor variables.
The fourth regression analysis predicted how Autonomous-Dependent the No In­
group category participants rated members o f  their in-group. R for regression was 
significantly different from zero, R = .47, F(9, 74) = 2.279, g  = .0258. KYA and KOA 
scores (sr2  = .073) contributed significantly to the prediction of how Autonomous- 
Dependent participants rated targets who were of a different age and the opposite sex as
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themselves. More knowledge about the target group was indicative of higher attitudinal 
ratings. The combination of all the nine variables contributed another. 147 in shared 
variability. All totaled, 22% of the variability in attitudinal ratings from No In-group 
participants was predicted by scores on the nine predictor variables.
Prediction of the Personal Acceptabilitv-Unacceptahilitv Factor. Four regression 
analyses were conducted to assess the prediction o f how Autonomous-Dependent each in­
group category rated their target group. Table 12 includes the unstandardized regression 
coefficients (B) and intercept, the standardized regression coefficients (B), and R, R2, and 
adjusted R_ after entry of all the predictor variables for each in-group category. Two of the 
four regression equations were significant.
The first regression analysis in this series predicted the Personal Acceptability- 
Unacceptability of targets who were the same age and sex as the participants who rated 
members of their in-group. R for regression was not significantly different from zero, R = 
.43, F(9,70) = 1.748, j> = .0942.
The second regression analysis predicted the Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability 
of targets who were the same age but the opposite sex as the participants who rated them.
R for regression was significantly different from zero, R = .56, F(9, 79) = 4.109, p = 
.0002. Self-esteem (sr2  = 065), affective-cognitive consistency (sr2  = .044), and attitude 
extremity (sr2  = .046) contributed significantly to the prediction of how Personally 
Acceptable-Unacceptable participants rated targets. Participants with more self-esteem, less 
affective-cognitive consistency, and more extreme attitudes rated targets who were the same 
age but the opposite sex as having more sociably desirable qualities. The combination of 
all the nine variables contributed another .165 shared variability. All totaled, 32% of the 
variability in attitudinal ratings from Age In-group participants was predicted by scores on 
the nine predictor variables.
The third regression analysis predicted the Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability 
of targets who were not the same age but were the same sex as the participants who rated
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Predictor B 0 B B B B B B
Variables
Self-esteem -.1 9 2  - .1 0 4 .621** .284** .249 .087 - .138 - .059
KYA & KOA - .073 - .206 - .004 - .012 - .009 - .019 .039 .095
Sex Knowledge .024 .068 .024 .070 - .054 - .117 - .055 - . 1 2 1
Experience .263 .164 .237 .137 - .702* - .295* .301 .138
Affective- - .078 - .015 -1.332** -.235** - .186 - .029 -1.106 - .153
cognitive
Consistency
Attitude Certainty .002 .167 .005 .095 .014 .228 .017* .321*
Attitude .462* .269* .406* .258* - .087 - .049 - .353 - .186
Extremity
Participant Age - .604 - .313 - .349 - .175 - .544* - .234* .137 .062
Participant Sex - .016 .009 .388 .196 - . 1 0 2 -. 044 .283 .130
Intercept 5.097** 1.149 5.580** 3.505*
R2  = .18 R 2  = .32 R 2  = .20 R 2  = . 15
adjusted R 2  = .08 adjusted R 2  = .24 adjusted R 2  = . 11 adjusted R 2  = .05
R = .4 5 R =.56** R  = .47* R = .3 9
* p < .05. ** p < .01.
them. R for regression was significantly different from zero, R = .47, F(9, 78) = 2.409, g. 
= .0182. Experience (sr2  = .061) and participants’ age (sr2  = .044) made unique 
contributions to the prediction of participants' attitudes. Younger participants with less 
experience viewed targets who were of a different age but the same sex as themselves as 
more acceptable. The combination of all the nine variables contributed another. 115 in 
shared variability. All totaled, 22% of the variability in attitudinal ratings from Sex In­
group participants was predicted by scores on the nine predictor variables.
The fourth regression analysis predicted the Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability 
of targets who were neither the same age nor the same sex as the participants who rated 
them. R for regression was not significantly different from zero, R = .39. F(9, 73) =
I.458 p  = .1799.
To test the second part of the predictability hypothesis, that the importance of the 
predictor variables would vary by in-group category, I conducted significance tests 
comparing between-groups regression coefficients. Significance tests were conducted for 
every significant predictor that was found in the above regression analyses (see Tables 10,
II ,  12). For each dependent variable. I conducted significance tests to assess the null 
hypothesis that two regression coefficients from independent samples were equal to each 
other (see Cohen & Cohen, 1983, pp. 109-111). Regression coefficients that predicted the 
same dependent variable (i.e., attitudinal ratings on the Instrumental-Ineffectiveness Factor, 
the Autonomous-Dependent Factor, or the Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability Factor) 
were compared via z-tests. Each significant in-group category predictor was compared to 
the same predictor for the other three in-group categories. A total of six pairwise 
comparisons were made for each significant predictor.
Significance tests for predictors of the Instrumental-Ineffective Factor. For the 
prediction of the dependent variable o f Instrumental-Ineffectiveness six predictors (self­
esteem, knowledge of sex differences, experience, attitude certainty, attitude extremity, and 
participants' age) were significant (see Table 10); therefore, a total o f  36 comparisons were
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conducted. Thirteen of the 36 comparisons were significant at an alpha level less than .05. 
Significant differences of regression coefficients were found between the in-group 
categories for the predictor variables of self-esteem, experience, attitude extremity, and 
participants’ age (see Table 13). These 13 in-group differences in coefficients indicate that 
the predictors of attitudinal ratings varied by participants' in-group category.
On the variable of self-esteem, there were two differences. These differences were 
between the Age In-Group and the Sex/Age and No In-groups. These differences indicate 
that attitude ratings on the Instrumental-Ineffective factor are more significantly related to 
self-esteem for Age In-group members than either Sex/Age In-group or No In-group 
members.
There were three pairs o f coefficients that differed for the predictor experience.
Two of the differences were between the Age In-group and the Sex and the No In-groups 
and the third difference was between the Age/Sex In-group and the Sex In-group. These 
differences indicate that experience is more significantly related to the prediction of 
instrumentality for the Age In-group than it is for the Sex or No In-groups and more 
notable for the Age/Sex In-group than for the Sex In-group
Four significant differences were noted for attitude extremity. Three of these 
differences were between the Sex/Age In-group and the other three in-group categories and 
the fourth was between the Age In-group and the No In-group. Attitude extremity is more 
significantly related to instrumentality ratings for No In-group members than for Sex/Age 
or Age In-group members and attitude extremity is more influential for Sex/Age In-group 
members than for Age or Sex In-group members.
Four significant differences were also found for participants' age. Even though 
participants' age was a significant predictor o f scores on the Instrumental-Ineffective factor 
for each of the four in-group categories, there were differences in the importance of this 
predictor among the in-groups. Four in-group pair comparison differences were found. 
The differences were between the Sex/Age In-group and the Sex and the No In-groups.
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group vs. Age 
In-group
Age/Sex In­
group vs. Sex 
In-group
Age/Sex In­











Self-esteem 2.54** .79 .27 1 . 2 1 2.41** .93
Sex
Knowledge
.17 1.62 .62 1.55 .51 .89
Experience . 6 8 2.15* 1.29 2.95** 2.14* .99
Attitude
Certainty
. 1 2 .30 1.06 . 2 0 .94 .60
Attitude
Extremity
1.95* 1.81* 3.28*** .19 1 .6 6 * 1.26
Participant
Age
.79 3.63*** 3.93*** 3.50*** 3.89*** . 1 0
p  < .05. ** p  < .01. ***p< .001.
The other two differences were between the Age In-group and the Sex and the No In­
groups. For the Age/Sex In-group, Instrumentality-Ineffective scores were significantly 
more related to participants' age than they were for either the Sex In-group or the No In­
group. But for the Age In-group, Instrumentality-Ineffective scores were significantly less 
related to participants' age than they were for either the Sex In-group or the No In-group.
Significance tests for predictors of the Autonomous-Dependent Factor. In the 
prediction o f the dependent variable of Autonomous-Dependence five predictor variables 
(self-esteem, knowledge of age differences, experience, attitude extremity, and 
participants' age) were significant (see Table 11), thus, a total of 30 comparisons were 
conducted. Nine of the 30 comparisons were significant at the alpha level of less than .05 
(see Table 14 for z-tests). All five of the predictor variables were found to have at least one 
significant difference among the regression coefficients. These nine in-group differences in 
coefficients indicate that the predictors of attitudinal ratings vary by participants' in-group 
category.
Examining ‘he knowledge of age difference variables (KYA & KOA) there were 
three comparisons that were different from each other. The regression coefficient for the 
No In-Group category was different from both the Age/Sex and Sex In-group coefficients. 
The Age/Sex coefficient was also different from the Age In-Group coefficients. 
Participants' scores on the age facts quiz was a stronger predictor of how independent 
participants rated targets who were out-group members on both age and sex than it was for 
participants who rated targets who were similar in sex or both sex and age. Likewise, this 
knowledge measure was more important in the prediction o f autonomy for participants who 
were the same age and sex as their targets than it was for targets who were similar in only 
age.
There were also three significant differences on the attitude extremity variable. The 
regression coefficient o f the Age/Sex In-Group was different from all three o f the other
89



















group vs. Age 
In-group
Age/Sex In­
group vs. Sex 
In-group
Age/Sex In­











Self-esteem 1 .8 6 * .29 .55 1.30 1 . 2 0 . 2 0
Age
Knowledge
1.85* .83 3.16*** .74 1.49 1.96*
Experience 1.37 .97 .04 2.40** 1.42 1.06
Attitude
Extremity
1.80* 2.34* 1.77* .64 .06 .70
Participant
Age
.74 .85 .39 1.95* 1.40 .56
j> < .05. ** p <  .01. ***j>< .001.
groups. Attitude Extremity appears to be most important in the prediction of 
autonomy/dependence ratings for targets who are most similar to participants.
On the self-esteem, experience, and participant age variables there was one 
significant difference each. In the prediction of scores on the Autonomous-Dependent 
factor, self-esteem is more prominent for members of the Age In-Group than for the 
Age/Sex In-Group, experience is more important for the Age In-Group than for the Sex In- 
Group, and participants' age is more weighty for Sex In-group members than for Age In- 
Group members.
Significance tests for predictors of the Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability 
Factor. For the prediction of the dependent variable of Personal Acceptability- 
Unacceptability six predictors (self-esteem, experience, affective-cognitive consistency, 
attitude certainty, attitude extremity, and participants' age) were significant (see Table 12): a 
total of 36 comparisons were conducted. Fifteen of these comparisons were significant at 
an alpha level less than .05 (see Table 15 for z-tests). The five predictor variables o f self­
esteem, experience, attitude certainty, attitude extremity, and participants' age were found 
to have significant differences among the regression coefficients. These 15 in-group 
differences in coefficients indicate that the predictors of attitudinal ratings vary by 
participants' in-group category.
For both the variables o f attitude extremity and participants' age, there were four 
pairs of regression coefficients that were significant. Attitude extremity was important in 
the prediction of Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability for both the Age/Sex and the Age 
In-group categories more so than for either the Sex In-group or No In-Group Categories. 
Participants’ age was shown to be more important in the prediction of attitudinal ratings for 
the Age/Sex and Sex In-groups than for both the Age or No In-group members.
On the experience variable there were three significant pair differences. Experience 
was more indicative of how socially acceptable Sex In-Group members rated targets than it 
was for any of the three other groups.
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Z-scores for Tests of Significance of Regression Coefficients for Significant Predictors of Personal Acceptable- 




group vs. Age 
In-group
Age/Sex In­
group vs. Sex 
In-group
Age/Sex In­











Self-esteem 2.58** 1 . 2 0 .15 1 . 0 0 2 . 1 1 * .96




1.44 . 1 2 .97 1.29 . 2 2 . 8 6
Attitude
Certainty
.47 1.65* 2.06* .98 1.30 .30
Attitude
Extremity
. 2 0 1.71* 2.59* 1.65* 2.60* .79
Participant
Age
2.45** .14 1.72* 2.74** .63 1.82*
p  < .05. ** p  < .01. ***p< .001.
There were also two significant differences on both self-esteem and attitude 
certainty. Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability ratings were more significantly related to 
self-esteem for the Age In-Group than for the Age/Sex or No In-Group members. Also 
Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability ratings were less significantly related to attitude 
certainty for Age/Sex In-Group members than either Sex or No In-Group members. 
In-group bias hypothesis
To determine if an in-group bias existed among participants rating various in-group 
targets, a one-way between-subjects multivariate analysis of variance was conducted to 
assess three dependent variables o f Instrumental-Ineffectiveness, Autonomous-Dependent, 
and Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability. The single independent variable was the in­
group category to which participants were assigned (Age/Sex In-group, Age In-group, Sex 
In-group, or No In-group). I had planned to use social desirability as a covariate but it was 
not significantly correlated with any o f the dependent variables.
Using SPSS MANOVA with Wilks' lambda as the criterion (Tabachnick & Fidell. 
1996), the attitudinal ratings were significantly affected by in-group category, F (9, 854). = 
2.37, p  = .012. These results suggest a small association between in-group category and 
the combined dependent measures h2  = .06.
Examination of the univariate F-tests illustrated that in-group category significantly 
affected attitude scores on the Instrumental-Ineffectiveness factor F (3, 353) = 4.89. p  = 
.002, but not on the Autonomous-Dependent factor, F (3, 353) = .93, p  = .43. or the 
Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability factor F (3,353) = 1.55 p  = .20. Post hoc analyses 
using Student-Newman-Keuls test indicated that participants who were in-group members 
on age and/or sex, (i.e., Age/Sex, Age, and Sex In-group members) had significantly 
more positive attitudinal ratings than did those who were out-group members on both 
variables, (i.e., no in-group members) (see Table 16). Participants who were in-group 
members on both age and sex rated the target group as most positive on the Instrumental-
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Means and Standard Deviations of the Instrumental-Ineffective. Autonomous-Dependent, and Personal Acceptable-Unacceptable Factors 
bv In-group Category
In-group Category Instrumental-Ineffective factor Autonomous-Dependent Personal Acceplability-
Factor Unacceptability Factor
M SD M SO N M SD N
Age/Sex 4.43a . 8 6 84 4.31 .81 84 4.51 .95 84
Age 4.37a .87 93 4.22 .83 93 4.48 .99 93
Sex 4.25a 1 . 2 1 95 4.36 .99 95 4.52 1.18 95
No 3.90b 1 . 0 0 85 4.15 .91 85 4.22 1 . 1 0 85
Overall Mean 4.24 1 . 0 1 357 4.26 .89 357 4.44 1.06 357
Note. Different subscripts indicate significantly different means.
Ineffective factor (M = 4.43, SD = .8 6 ), followed closely by those who were in-group 
members on age only (M = 4.37, SD = .87) and those who were in-group members on sex 
only (M = 4.25, SD = 1.21) Those who were not in-group members on either variable 
rated the targets most negatively (M = 3.90, SD = 1.00).
In general, these results suggest that there is an in-group bias among participants 
asked to rate targets similar or dissimilar in age or sex. Although this finding was 
significant for only one of the three dependent variables, there was a tendency that 
participants rated targets who were least like them, not the same age or sex as themselves, 
(i.e., the No In-group category) consistently lower than targets who were similar on the 
other two dependent variables (see Table 16). Thus, as expected the positivity of attitudes 
varied by in-group category. Participants' attitudes were most positive toward in-group 
members and most negative toward out-group members.
Out-group homogeneity hypothesis
To assess support for my third hypothesis, that out-group homogeneity would 
exist, I conducted a one-way between-subjects multivariate analysis o f variance to assess 
the within-subjects' variance of the three dependent variables of Instrumental- 
Ineffectiveness, Autonomous-Dependent, and Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability. In­
group classification was the independent variable. I had planned to use social desirability 
as a  covariate but it was not significantly correlated with any of the dependent variables.
Using SPSS MANOVA with Wilks' lambda as the criterion, the overall variance of 
participants’ attitudinal ratings was not significantly affected by in-group category,_F (9. 
854), =  1.43, p  = . 172. Exploratory examination o f the univariate F-tests illustrated that 
in-group category significantly affected the variability of attitude scores on the Personal 
Acceptability-Unacceptability factor F (3, 353) = 3.58, p  = .014, but not on the 
Instrumental-Ineffectiveness factor, F (3, 353) =  1.70, p  = . 17, or the Autonomous- 
Dependent factor, F (3, 353) = 1.61, p  = .  19. Post hoc analyses using Student-Newman- 
Keuls test indicated that participants who were in-group members on both age and sex,
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(i.e., Age/Sex In-group) or only age, (i.e.. Age In-group) had significantly less variability 
in their attitudinal ratings than did participants who were not in-group members on either 
variable, (i.e.. No In-group members) (see Table 17). Participants who were in-group 
members on age but not sex rated the target group as least variable on the Personal 
Acceptability-Unacceptability factor (M = 1.01 SD = .74), followed closely by those who 
were in-group members on age and sex (M = 1 -02, SD = .72) and those who were in­
group members on sex only (M = 118, SD = .87) Those who were not in-group members 
on either variable rated the targets least variable (M = 1-36, SD = .89). This finding of 
more variability among out-group members than in-group members was also noted for the 
other two dependent variables.
Overall, because I failed to reject the null hypothesis that there was no difference in 
variability by in-group classifications, I cannot conclude that out-group homogeneity exists 
among participants asked to rate targets similar or dissimilar to themselves in age or sex. 
My results suggest the opposite o f what I predicted; participants rated targets least similar to 
themselves as more variable. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the variability of 
attitudinal ratings are affected by in-group category. The variability among of the attitudinal 
ratings o f out-group members was not significantly lower than that o f in-group members. 
Structural differences hypothesis
To test my final hypothesis, the structural differences hypothesis, I conducted a 
one-way between-subjects multivariate analyses o f covariance. I had predicted that the 
affective and cognitive bases of attitudes of in-group and out-group members would be 
different. In particular, I expected that participants rating in-group members would have 
more affectively based attitudes, i.e., higher Affective Sum scores, and participants rating 
out-group members would have more cognitively based attitudes, i.e., higher Cognitive 
Sum scores. Participants' in-group classification (Age/Sex In-group, Age In-group, Sex 
In-group, or No In-group) was the independent variable and their Affective Sum and 
Cognitive Sum scores were the dependent measures for this analysis.
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Means and Standard Deviations of the Variability of the Instrumental-Ineffective. Autonomous-Dependent, and 
Persona) Acceptable-Unacceptable Factors by In-group Category
In-group Category Instrum ent. Ineffective factor Autonomous-Dependent Personal Acceptability-
Factor Unacceptability Factor
M SD N M SD N M SD N
Age/Sex 1.18 1.07 84 1.25 1.03 84 1 .0 2 a .72 84
Age 1 . 2 2 1 . 0 1 93 1.13 .94 93 1 .0 1 a .74 93
Sex 1.40 1.23 95 1.30 1 . 0 1 85 1.18 .87 95
No 1.50 1.03 85 1.45 .96 85 1.36b .89 85
Overall Mean 1.33 1.09 357 1.28 .99 357 1.14 .82 357
Note. Different subscripts indicate significantly different means.
SPSS MANOVA was used for the analysis. Social desirability was entered first to 
control for its effect on the Affective and Cognitive Sum scores. With Wilk's lambda as 
the criterion, the combined dependent variables were significantly related to the covariate, F 
(2, 353) = 8.92, g < .001. There was a small association between the dependent variables 
and social desirability, h2  = .05.
To determine the power of social desirability to adjust the dependent variables, 
multiple regression analyses were conducted for each dependent variable with social 
desirability as a predictor. Social desirability provided a significant adjustment to the 
Affective Sum scores; the B value o f . 17 for social desirability was significantly different 
from zero, t (354) = 3.31, g = .001. Social desirability also provided a significant 
adjustment to Cognitive Sum scores; the B value of .21 for social desirability was 
significantly different from zero, t (354) = 4.08, g  < .001.
After adjusting for differences on the covariate and using Wilks’ lambda as the 
criterion, participants’ attitude structure was significantly affected by in-group category. F 
(6 , 706), = 2.38, g  = .028. These results suggest a small association between in-group 
category and the combined dependent measures h2  = .04.
Examination of the univariate F-tests illustrated that in-group category significantly 
affected participants' Affective Sum scores F (3, 357) = 3.57, g = .014. but not their 
Cognitive Sum scores, F (3, 355) = 1.73, g  = .161. Post hoc analyses using Student- 
Newman-Keuls test indicated that participants who were in-group members on both 
variables of age and/or sex, (i.e., Age/Sex In-group members) had significantly lower 
Affective Sum scores than did participants who were in-group members on either one of 
the variables o f age and/or sex. (i.e.. Age In-group and Sex In-group members) (see Table 
18). Participants who were in-group members on both age and sex had the lowest 
Affective Sum scores (M  = 3.10, SD = 4.10), whereas participants who were in-group 
members on age only had the highest scores (M  = 5.05, £D  = 5.06) followed closely by
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Table 18
Means and Standard Deviations of the Sum of Affective and Cognitive Subscales bv 
In-group Category
In-group status Sum of Affective subscale Sum of Cognitive subscale
M m M M SD IS
1 : age & sex 3.10a 4.10 84 4.57 4.00 84
2 : age 5.05b 5.06 93 5.08 4.11 93
3: sex 4.80b 4.66 95 5.79 3.88 95
4: neither 4.14 4.36 87 5.20 3.90 87
Overall Mean 4.31 4.62 359 5.18 3.98 359
Note. Different subscripts indicate significantly different means.
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those who were in-group members on sex only (M = 4.80, SD = 4.66) Those who were 
not in-group members on either variable had more moderate scores (M = 4.14, SD = 4.36).
The predicted associations between attitude base and in-group category were not 
found. There did not appear to be any relation between cognitive attitude base and 
attitudinal ratings. The relation between affective attitude base and attitudinal ratings was 
different than expected. Contrary to my expectations, participants who were the same sex 
and same age tended to have lower affective sum scores than did participants who were not 
the same sex and/or the same age as the targets they rated.
Discussion
In this study, I sought to answer several major questions. The first question 
examined the predictors and their salience in the prediction of attitudes toward in-group and 
out-group members. The second major question examined differences due to in-group 
category including in-group homogeneity and out-group heterogeneity as well as structural 
differences in attitudes toward in-group and out-group members. Four hypotheses were 
tested in this study to answer these questions.
Predictability hypothesis
Strong support was gained for the predictability hypothesis; both subhypotheses 
were verified. The five attitude strength measures, the personality construct o f self-esteem, 
and the participant variable of age were significant predictors of participants’ attitudes 
toward various in-group targets. Also the relative importance of the predictor variables 
varied according to participants' in-group category.
The results of the twelve standard multiple regression analyses indicated that all five 
of the attitude strength variables, including knowledge (KYA, KOA, and KSD), 
experience, attitude certainty, attitude extremity, and affective-cognitive consistency were 
significant predictors of at least one of the dependent measures. The five strength variables 
differed in their prediction o f attitudinal ratings on the three dependent variables. Of these 
strength variables, attitude extremity was found to be the strongest predictor o f attitudes. It
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was a significant predictor for four of the regression analyses and was a significant 
predictor, at least once, for each of the three dependent variables of Instrumental- 
Ineffectiveness, Autonomous-Dependence, and Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability. 
Attitude certainty and experience were also found to be strong predictors as they were 
significant in three equations each. Attitude certainty was important in the prediction of 
participants' ratings on the Instrumental-Ineffective factor whereas experience was 
associated with scores on all three factors. The other predictors including KSD, KYA and 
KOA, and affective-cognitive consistency were weaker predictors appearing in only one 
equation each. KSD scores predicted participants’ attitudes on the Instrumental-Ineffective 
factor. KYA and KOA predicted factor scores on Autonomous-Dependence. Affective- 
cognitive consistency predicted scores on the Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability factor.
These results parallel previous work in which I found attitude extremity and attitude 
certainty to be better attitudinal predictors than other attitude strength variables (Chabot, 
1996). Another similarity to this previous study (an assessment of participants' attitudes 
toward blood donation) and the present one, is that the strength variables were differentially 
associated with different dependent variables. Even though attitude extremity was the best 
predictor in both studies, it was not a significant predictor for every dependent variable nor 
were any of the other predictors in either study.
It is reassuring to provide further evidence that attitude extremity is an important 
predictor of attitudes. As previously mentioned, attitude extremity is one of the oldest and 
most widely used measures of attitude strength. Attitude extremity is also important to 
measure because it has been associated with both attitude change and behavior (Abelson. 
1995). Attitude extremity is generally understood to be associated with how easily 
persuaded a person will be. If a person is more certain, then his/her attitude is thought to 
be more stable and more resistant to change. Attitude extremity has also been linked to 
behavior. Jaccard, Radecki, Wilson, & Dittus (1995) found that extreme positive attitudes 
were more likely to be consistent with behavior than were less extreme attitudes when
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switching thresholds were exceeded. In their study, they found that participants would be 
more likely to switch banks if they had very positive attitudes toward the bank and if they 
were offered enough incentive, (e.g., higher interest than their current bank). Thus, 
extreme attitudes have been associated with strong belief structures that may be translated 
into behavior but resistant to persuasive attempts. It, therefore, seems beneficial before 
attempting to persuade someone to determine how likely it is that s/he will be persuaded by 
assessing the extremity o f his/her attitudes.
I, also, found that knowledge did not appear to be a very good predictor of 
participants’ attitudes. The strength variable o f knowledge was a significant predictor for 
only one factor in both the present and previous (Chabot. 1996) studies. It seems that 
knowledge should have been a better predictor of attitudes. Krosnick et al. (1993) found 
that knowledge was moderately and significantly correlated with attitude certainty and 
attitude extremity. In this study, only KYA was correlated to these predictors. It is 
possible that the knowledge questionnaires administered to participants to assess 
knowledge were not the best indicators of their knowledge. Other researchers have 
measured knowledge by having participants list what they know (Wood, 1982) as well as 
self-reports of their knowledge (Kanwar, Grund, & Olson, 1990). Using participants' 
self-reports of knowledge, although less verifiable, may be more related to stronger 
attitudes.
Unlike the previous study (Chabot, 1996), the present study offered good support 
that experience is a  significant predictor of attitudes. Future studies might be able to 
provide even more evidence that experience is an important correlate o f attitudes. Recall 
that the measure o f experience in the present study was a composite of three items. The 
measure of experience in the previous study (Chabot, 1996) was a single item (i.e., have 
you ever donated blood). Thus, it is possible that a measure comprised of even more items 
would be more reliable and likely to demonstrate a stronger relation between experience and 
attitudes.
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Interestingly, affective-cognitive consistency was not a reliable predictor. The 
reason for its lack of significance may be due to measure that was employed. I employed 
Crites et al.’s (1994) multi-response checklist to measure affective-cognitive consistency. 
Other researchers had participants generate lists o f feelings and thoughts toward the attitude 
object under investigation (Krosnick et al., 1993). I used the Crites et al. measure because 
I believed that employing a consistent measure o f affect and cognition would be a more 
suitable measure o f the construct but this may not be the case.
In the present study, participants’ age and self-esteem were also found to be good 
predictors o f participants' attitudes. Overall participants' age was the best predictor of 
attitudes; it was found to be a significant predictor in six cases (self-esteem was significant 
in three). Thus, it appears that participants' attitudes differ by age but not consistently.
For the most part, younger participants rated the targets more positively than older 
participants did but this was not always the case. As expected, participants' age emerged to 
be more important as a predictor of attitudes than did participants' sex. Attitudes seem 
unaffected by participants’ sex. Males and females did not rate targets differently but 
younger and older participants did.
There was also good support for the second subhypothesis. Comparisons of the 
correlation coefficients for the predictor variables confirmed that the importance of the 
predictor variables varied by in-group category. Thirty-seven out of 102 comparisons 
between correlation coefficients were significant, (i.e., thirty-six percent of the 
comparisons were different). This number is well beyond the five percent (or five test 
results) that would be expected by chance.
The correlation coefficients of the Age/Sex In-group category were found to be 
most different; twenty-one comparisons out o f 51 were significantly different. There were 
almost as many differences (2 0 ) among the correlation coefficients between the predictors 
for the Age In-group target ratings as there were for the Age/Sex In-group but fewer 
differences among the predictors of the Sex In-group and No In-group categories. Even
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though these comparisons provided many significant differences, more clarity is necessary 
to understand these findings at a more specific or microscopic level. As a general and 
preliminary conclusion, however, it appears that the predictors for attitudinal ratings of 
targets who are either 1) the same age and same sex or 2) the same age are most distinct. It 
is evident that more focused examinations should be conducted to better illuminate the 
relation among attitudinal predictors and in-group status in the prediction of prejudice.
In-group bias hypothesis
There was partial support for the in-group bias hypothesis. The positivity of 
attitudes varied by group membership. In general, participants' attitudes were more 
positive toward in-group members and most negative toward out-group members. 
Participants who were in-group members on both age and sex consistently rated targets 
more positively than did participants who were out-group members, (i.e., not similar in age 
or sex to the target they rated). Participants who were in-group members on either age or 
sex (i.e.. Age In-group or Sex In-group categories) also tended to rate targets more 
positively than did out-group members. Even though the attitude ratings were in the 
expected directions, the only significant finding was on the Instrumental-Ineffective factor.
This lack of a finding on the other two factors of Autonomous-Dependence and 
Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability may be due to the type of items that make up these 
two factors. The items on these two factors tend to be associated with personality and 
disposition rather than with physical characteristics or behavioral generalities. Slotterback 
(1996; personal communication, April 15, 1999) has suggested that attitudes toward target 
groups may vary by the type of attitude statements that are assessed. She expects (1999) 
and found (1996) more visible differences in assessing physical characteristics than in the 
assessment of personality attributes such as those in Rosencranz & McNevin's (1969) 
factors. Furthermore, while other studies have assessed single dimensions of in­
group/out-group categorization and found clear in-group biases on such variables as race 
(Devine 1995), artist preference (Oakes and Turner, 1980), and others (Brewer. 1979), it
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is possible that the interaction o f the variables of age and sex distort or reduce the overall 
bias. As determined in the above regression analyses (the predictability hypothesis) 
participants' age is a strong predictor of attitudes but participants’ sex is not. It may be that 
the in-group bias is more true for age than sex.
Out-group homogeneity hypothesis
No support was established for the out-group homogeneity hypothesis. The 
variability of the attitudinal ratings of out-group members was not significantly lower than 
the ratings of in-group members. Surprisingly, the mean variability o f out-group 
members’ ratings was larger than any of the other groups. The ratings from participants 
who were in-group members on both age and sex tended to be the lowest of all. These 
scores indicate that when participants rate targets who are similar in age and sex, they view 
them as being more alike than do participants rating targets who are not similar on age or 
sex. This lack o f a finding could be due to the age of the participants. Upon examining the 
descriptive statistics (Table 7), I found that older participants had consistently less 
variability among their scores than did younger participants. It is, however, unclear 
whether these differences are due to differences in age or due to cohort or other effects.
Out-group homogeneity has been hypothesized to be due to a lack of exposure to 
members of the out-group (Linville, et al, 1989). However, in the present study 
experience was found to be negatively correlated with the variability of the ratings on the 
Personal Acceptability-Unacceptability factor suggesting that participants with less 
experience tended to view targets as more variable than did participants with more 
experience.
Two other possible explanations for my unexpected findings may be related to the 
interactions among the target groups and the wording of the attitude questionnaire. Out­
group homogeneity is more likely to occur among competing groups than non-competing 
groups (Judd & Park, 1988). It could be that the groups I studied are not in direct 
competition with each other because of the large differences in age. They may not be
105
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
interested in acquiring the same resources and/or interact very often. Also out-group 
homogeneity is more likely to be noted when participants are asked to judge a  few group 
members (Mullen & Hu, 1989). In the present study, participants were asked to answer 
questions as they pertained to all members of the target group rather than a small number of 
group members. It would be beneficial for future researchers to further examine these 
discrepancies.
Structural differences hypothesis.
There was no direct support for the structural differences hypothesis. Affective and 
cognitive bases of attitudes of in-group and out-group members were not significantly 
different. There was, however, some evidence suggesting that participants rating in-group 
members had less affectively based attitudes as measured by affective discrepancy scores 
than did out-group members. These findings were not as expected and there were no 
comparable findings regarding cognitive discrepancy scores.
It is interesting to note that sex differences have been found between men and 
women. Not only have differences been shown in general ratings toward attitude objects 
but differences in the bases of their attitudes have also been illustrated. Kraft (1995) found 
differences when assessing the bases of males’ and females’ attitudes toward birth control. 
It is plausible that sex differences in attitudes toward people of varying ages and sexes may 
also exist. Because the study of attitude structure is a new area of attitude research, it may 
be more important to tease apart structural differences based upon one participant variable, 
(e.g., sex) than to try to understand the effects o f multiple variables (i.e., both sex and age) 
and their interaction on attitude structure. At any rate, it is clear that there is a lack of 
research assessing attitudinal bases (Crites et al., 1994; Simon & Carey; 1998). Attitude 
researchers should continue to examine attitude bases to further enhance our understanding 
of attitude structure and formation.
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V. STUDY 3:
In-group bias and out-group homogeneity of physical, cognitive, and personal-expressive 
attributes among younger adult in-group and out-group members
This study was conducted as an attempt to gain further support for the in-group bias 
and out-group homogeneity hypotheses from Study 2. In Study 2 , 1 found evidence for in­
group bias when older and younger men and women rated targets who were similar and/or 
dissimilar on the variables of age and sex. In-group members tended to rate targets who 
were similar in age and sex more positively than targets who were the opposite sex and/or 
approximately 50 years older or younger than themselves. Support for this tendency o f an 
in-group bias, however, was only significant for one of three dependent variables (i.e.. 
Instrumentality-Ineffectiveness) tested in Study 2.
For the current study (Study 2), I created an attitudinal scale that included some 
new physical, cognitive, and personal-expressive attributes. The new scale was produced 
with the hope that it would provide stronger support for the in-group bias and expand these 
findings to include two different classes of stereotypic attitudes including physical and 
cognitive attributes. Kite et al. (1991) argued that most attitude researchers study only 
traits (i.e., personal-expressive attributes) and rarely assess other types of attributes when 
they measure attitudes. They found that response patterns differed when they assessed 
younger adults' attitudes toward older and younger targets using scales comprised of traits, 
behaviors, and roles. Participants’ ratings were lowest when physical characteristics were 
assessed and there was more variability in the rating of younger (35 years of age) and older 
(65 years of age) targets when attitude scales were comprised o f role behaviors and 
physical characteristics rather than traits. Likewise, this new scale was created in response 
to Slotterback's (personal communication, April 15, 1999; Slotterback & Saamio, 1996) 
suggestion that attitudes toward targets may vary by the type o f attitude statements that are
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assessed. Slotterback and Saamio (1996) measured physical, cognitive, and personal- 
expressive attributes. They found more variability in participants' responses when they 
rated targets on various physical characteristics than when they rated targets on personality 
traits. Participants were also more likely to judge older targets more negatively on physical 
characteristics than on personality traits.
In Study 2 , 1 did not find out-group homogeneity. Participants who were not the 
same age or sex as their targets did not report less variability as expected but rather they 
viewed out-group members as being more variable than did participants who rated in-group 
members. My results seem to indicate in-group homogeneity.
Interestingly, in Study 2, older participants had consistently less variability among 
their scores than did younger participants. To assess whether this lack of a finding might 
be due to the age difference of the participants in Study 2 , 1 included only younger adults as 
participants in this third study. Additional reasons for selecting only younger adults as 
participants were convenience, expense, and time. Younger adults were easier to recruit 
than older adults. It was less time consuming and less expensive because data from 
younger participants could be collected within multiple one hour sessions and no mailing 
costs were incurred in the recruitment of younger participants. Also, younger adults 
received compensation, (i.e., course credit) for their participation; I felt more at ease asking 
them to complete a more lengthy survey than I did older participants. The return rate for 
completed packets probably would have been much lower if I had asked older participants 
to complete a longer survey.
Purpose and Hypotheses 
In this final study, I sought to provide stronger evidence for the in-group bias and 
out-group homogeneity among younger adults. I also wished to assess whether different 
measures o f attitudes (i.e., physical, cognitive and personal-expressive) resulted in 
different attitudinal ratings.
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In this study, I tested the following three hypotheses:
1. In-group bias hypothesis: The positivity of attitudes will vary by group membership. 
Participants’ attitudes will be most positive toward same-aged in-group members and most 
negative toward older out-group members.
2. Out-group homogeneity hypothesis. The variability o f the attitudinal ratings o f older 
out-group members will be less than that o f younger in-group members.
3. Attribute type hypothesis. Participants’ attitudinal ratings will vary by the type of 
attributes they complete as a measure of their attitudes. Participants’ judgments based on 
personal-expressive attributes are expected to be more positive and less variable than 
judgments based on physical attributes.
Method
Participants
One-hundred and ninety-four people ( 8 6  men and 108 women) with a mean age of 
19.46 years (£D = 1.44) participated in this study. In this study, there were two distinct 
groups of participants classified by sex: younger men and younger women. Roughly equal 
numbers o f participants rated each of the four target groups; Forty-eight participants rated 
targets who were the same age and sex as themselves, 49 rated targets who were the same 
age but the opposite sex, 49 rated targets who were the same sex but a different age, and 48 
rated targets who were neither the same age nor the same sex. The participants for this 




Additional dependent measures were created for the younger adults in this study.
To create these measures, I revised attitude statements from the Pilot Study and I also 
collected stereotypical statements from 29 older and younger adults.
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I retained but reformatted items from the Negative/Positive Aspects o f Older People 
factor and the Different but Competent factor from the Pilot Study. For example, the 
original statement - "Older people are sweet." was reformatted as the bipolar adjective 
"Nasty-Sweet".
To generate additional items, I polled 18 college students (six men and 12 women 
with a mean age of 20.72 years, SD = 3.16) and 11 senior citizens (four men and seven 
women with a mean age o f 70.20 years, SD = 8.24) The college students were recruited 
from psychology classes at the University of New Hampshire; they received course credit 
for their participation but they were not allowed to serve as participants in Studies 2 or 3. 
The senior citizens were recruited from the Plymouth, New Hampshire Senior Citizen's 
Center. Participants were asked to list as many positive and negative stereotypes for 1) 
men, 2) women, 3) young adults, and 4) older adults as they could within a 30 minute time 
period. The most frequently occurring stereotypes (i.e., those that were listed by three or 
more individuals) that were not repetitive of Rosencranz and McNevin's (1969) semantic 
differential items were used as items for the final measures. These items were classified as 
one o f three types o f attributes: physical, cognitive, or personal-expressive by two 
independent raters using Slotterback and Saamio's (1996) definitions. Inter-rater 
agreement was 93%. These procedures resulted in the new measure called the Attributes 
Scale that contains three subscales: Physical, Cognitive, and Personal-Expressive 
Attributes.
Attributes Scale. The Attributes Scale (see Table 19) is a 65-item bipolar adjective 
list o f attributes that apply to people o f all ages (Cronbach’s alpha = .95). It is the same 
format as the semantic differential employed by Rosencranz and McNevin (1969) and 
includes 30 of their original items. Their two items, Strong/Weak and Healthy/Unhealthy, 
were removed from the Attributes Scale because there may be actual difference on these 
items due to age and/or sex differences. Participants rate the polar adjectives, according to 
a Likert scale from 1 (associated with the more negative adjective) to 7 (associated with the
110
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 19
The Attributes Scale: Items and Reliabilities for the Physical Attributes. Cognitive 
Attributes, and Personal-Expressive Attributes Subscales
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more positive adjective) that best describes a targeted age and sex of adults. The Attributes 
Scale contains three subscales.
The Physical Attributes subscale contains 17 items that describe physical 
appearance, physical states, or movement, such as "Powerful-Frail" and "Graceful- 
Clumsy”. This subscale has a reliability coefficient of .79.
The second subscale. Cognitive Attributes, has 10 items that describe mental 
capabilities and information processing. The subscales includes items such as "Competent- 
Incompetent" and "Wise-Unwise" and is reliable with a Cronbach's alpha of .90.
The Personal-Expressive Attributes subscale consists of 38 personality traits. It 
measure attributes including "Caring-Uncaring" and "Responsible-Irresponsible" and has a 
reliability of .92.
The resultant Physical, Cognitive, and Personal-Expressive Attributes subscales 
and their associated within-subjects’ variabilities served as the dependent measures for the 
study. For each subscale, a mean score was created for each participant by adding 
individual scores for each item and dividing that number by the total number of items on the 
subscale. A variability score was also calculated for each participant by computing the 
within-subjects’ variance of all the items in a given subscale. In this study, participants 
rated one of four target groups: older males (65-74 years of age), older females (65-74 
years o f age), younger males (17-26 years of age), or younger females (17-26 years of 
age).
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Study 2, except that only younger adults were 
included. After completing the measures for Study 2, participants completed the Attributes 
Scale (see Appendix R) for one of four target groups (older males (65-74 years of age), 
older females (65-74 years o f age), younger males (17-26 years o f age), or younger 
females (17-26 years of age). All participants completed the survey in one hour or less and 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
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Results
To test the first two hypotheses, the in-group bias and out-group homogeneity 
hypotheses, in-group category served as an independent variable. Participants were 
classified into one of four in-group categories based on their age and their sex and the age 
and sex o f the target group they rated. If participants rated targets who were the same age 
and same sex as themselves, then they were classified as members of the Age/Sex In-group 
category, (i.e., in-group members on both variables of age and sex). If participants rated 
targets who were the same age but the opposite sex, then they were classified as members 
o f the Age In-group category, (i.e., in-group members on the variables of age but not sex). 
If participants rated targets who were a different age but the same sex, then they were 
classified as members o f the Sex In-group category, (i.e., in-group members on the 
variable of sex but not age). If participants rated targets who were neither the same age 
nor the same sex as themselves, then they were classified as members of the No In-group 
category, (i.e., in-group members on neither variable o f age nor sex). (It should be noted 
that the classification of in-group and out-group members in this study differs from that of 
Study 2. Participants in the current study were younger adults whereas participants in 
Study 2 were both younger and older adults. Thus, in this study, all the participants were 
out-group members for the variable of age when they rated older targets and they were ail 
in-group members when they rated younger targets.)
In-group bias hypothesis 
To determine if an in-group bias existed among participants rating various targets. I 
conducted a one-way between-subjects multivariate analyses o f covariance. I expected that 
participants rating same-aged targets (i.e. younger adults) would have more positive 
attitudes than would participants rating older targets. Participants' in-group classification 
(Age/Sex In-group, Age In-group, Sex In-group, or No In-group) was the independent 
variable and their scores on the Physical, Cognitive, and Personal-Expressive Attributes 
subscales were the dependent variables.
113
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
SPSS MANOVA was used for the analysis. Social desirability was entered first as 
a covariate to control for its effect on the three subscale scores. With Wilk’s lambda as the 
criterion, the combined dependent variables were significantly related to the covariate, F (3, 
187) = 14.47, g  < .001. There was a moderate association between the dependent 
variables and social desirability, h2  = . 19.
To determine the power of social desirability to adjust the dependent variables, 
multiple regression analyses were conducted for each of the three subscales with social 
desirability as a predictor. Social desirability provided a significant adjustment to all of the 
subscales. The B values for social desirability were .31 for the Physical Attributes 
subscale, .37 for the Cognitive Attributes subscale, and .42 for the Personal-Expressive 
Attributes subscale. The B_values of all three subscales were significantly less than zero as 
demonstrated by t-tests with associated p values less than .001. After adjusting for 
differences on the covariate and using Wilks' lambda as the criterion, participants' 
attitudinal ratings were significantly affected by in-group category, F (9,455), = 13.69, p 
< .001. These results suggest a large association between in-group category and the 
combined dependent measures h2  = .44.
Examination of the univariate F-tests illustrated that in-group category significantly 
affected participants' Physical Attributes scores (F (3, 190) = 9.63, p  < .001) and 
Cognitive Attributes scores (F (3 , 190) = 7.95, p <  .001) but not their Personal-Expressive 
Attributes scores. Post hoc analyses using Student-Newman-Keuls test (see Table 20) 
indicated that participants who rated older targets who were the opposite sex (M = 4.14,
SD = .64) assigned significantly lower Physical Attributes scores to their targets than did 
participants who the same age (M= 4.66, SD = .70), sex (M= 4.43, SD = .57), or both age 
and sex as the targets (M = 4.66, SD =  .61).
Student-Newman-Keuls test also indicated that participants who were in-group 
members on the basis o f sex (i.e.. Sex In-group members) assigned more positive 
Cognitive Attributes scores toward their targets than did those who were in-group members
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Means and Standard Deviations of the Physical Attributes. Cognitive Attributes, and Personal Attributes 
S u b s e t s  by In-group Category
In-group Category Physical Attributes Subscale Cognitive Attributes Subscale Personal-Expressive
Attributes Subscale
M SD N M SD N M SD N
Age/Sex 4.66a .61 48 4.53a . 6 6 48 4.56 .56 48
Age 4.66a .70 49 4.52a .84 49 4.59 .72 49
Sex 4.43a .57 49 5.03b . 6 8 49 4.65 .57 49
No 4.14b .52 48 4.78 .77 48 4.34 .69 48
Overall Mean 4.47 .64 194 4.72 .77 194 4.54 .64 194
Note. Different subscripts indicate significantly different means.
on the basis of age, (i.e., Age/Sex and Age In-group members). Participants rating same 
sex older targets gave the highest Cognitive Attributes ratings (M = 5.03, §D  = .52) 
followed by participants rating opposite sex older targets (M = 4.78, SD = .77). 
Participants rating younger opposite sex targets assigned the lowest ratings (M = 4.51. SD 
= .84) followed closely by those who rated younger same sex targets (M = 4.53, SD = 
.66 ).
These results suggests that there is an in-group bias among younger participants 
when they are asked to rate targets on physical attributes. The bias, however, does not 
seem to exist when participants rate targets on personality qualities. Furthermore, the age 
of the target seems to affect ratings involving cognitive scores. In general, older targets 
were viewed as having stronger cognitive attributes than younger targets but same sex 
targets were rated more positively than opposite sex targets.
Out-group homogeneity hypothesis
To assess support for my second hypothesis, that out-group homogeneity would 
exist, I conducted a one-way between-subjects multivariate analysis of variance. I 
expected more variability in the attitudes of participants rating same-aged targets than 
participants rating older targets. In-group classification was the independent variable and 
the variabilities of the Physical, Cognitive, and Personal-Expressive Attributes subscales 
served as dependent variables. I had planned to use social desirability as a covariate but it 
was not significantly correlated with any of the dependent variables (see Table 21).
Using SPSS MANOVA with Wilks' lambda as the criterion, the overall variance of 
participants' attitudinal ratings was significantly affected by in-group category. F (9,458), 
= 6.73, p  < .001. Examination of the univariate F-tests illustrated that in-group category 
significantly affected the variability of attitude scores on the Physical, F (3, 190) = 4.20, p 
= .007, and the Personal-Expressive Attributes subscales, F (3, 190) = 10.47, p <  .001, 
but not on the Cognitive Attributes Scale. Post hoc analyses using Student-Newman-Keuls 
test (see Table 22) indicated that participants who were the same age and sex as the targets
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Table 21
Correlations between Social Desirability and Study 3 Dependent Variables for 
All Participants
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Means and Standard Deviations of the Variability of the Physical Attributes. Cognitive Attributes, and Personal 
Attributes Subscales by In-group Category
In-group Category Physical Attributes Subscale Cognitive Attributes Subscale Personal-Expressive
Attributes Subscale
M SD N M SD H M SD N
Age/Sex 1.15a .72 48 1 . 2 0 .93 48 1.13a .60 48
Age 1.72b .96 49 1.43 1.19 49 1.30a .68 49
Sex 1.56b 1 . 0 0 49 1.35 .94 49 1.79b .89 49
No 1.78b 1.09 48 1.57 1.12 48 1.86b .87 48
Overall Mean 1.55 .98 194 1.39 1.05 194 1.52 .82 194
Note. Different subscripts indicate significantly different means.
(i.e., Age/Sex In-group) had significantly less variability in their Physical Attributes ratings 
than did participants who were not in-group members on one and/or the other variable,
(i.e.. Age, Sex, and No In-group members). Participants who were the same age and sex 
as the targets rated the target group as less variable on the Physical Attributes subscale (M = 
1.15 SD = .72) than did members of the Age In-group (M = I -72, SD = .96), the Sex In­
group (M = 1.56, SD = 1.00), or the No In-group (M = 1.78, SD = 1.09). Post hoc 
analyses also indicated that participants who were Age/Sex (M = 1.13, SD = .60) or Age 
(M = 1 -30, SD = .68) In-group members had less variability in their Personal-Expressive 
Attribute scores than did Sex (M = 1 -79, SD = .89) or No (M = 1 -86, SD = .87) In-group 
members. A tendency of more variability among older targets than younger targets was 
also noted for the Cognitive Attributes subscale.
These results suggest the opposite o f what I predicted; younger participants rated 
targets least similar to themselves as more variable. These results suggests that out-group 
homogeneity does not exist when participants are asked to rate targets on the variables of 
age and sex but rather that out-group homogeneity seems to exist. There was more 
variability o f attitudinal ratings among out-group members than there was among in-group 
members. Furthermore, the type of attributes used to assess attitudes did not seem to 
matter. Out-group heterogeneity was found when physical characteristics and personality 
traits were measured.
Attribute type hypothesis
In order to determine whether the type o f attributes that were assessed affected 
participant's attitudinal ratings, I conducted paired t-tests to test two predictions. My first 
prediction was that participants'judgments based on Personal-Expressive attributes would 
be more positive than judgments based on Physical attributes. Second, I expected that 
participants' attitudes would be more variable when they rated participants’ Physical 
characteristics and less variable when they assessed Personal-Expressive characteristics.
119
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I found that attitudinal ratings of Personal -Expressive Attributes (M = 4.53, SD = 
.64) were significantly more positive than were ratings of Physical Attributes (M = 4.47, 
SD = .64), t( 193) = -2.18, p  = .03. There was, however, no difference in the variabilities 
of these two types of items, t( 193) = .71, p =.48. It, therefore, seems that attitudinal 
ratings but not variability may be affected by the types of attributes that are assessed.
Discussion
This study was conducted with several goals. First, I hoped to provide more 
evidence of the in-group bias with the Attributes Scale. Second, I sought to clarify the 
existence of out-group homogeneity. Finally, I wanted to determine if the types of 
attributes that were measured affected participants' attitudinal ratings. Three hypotheses 
were tested in this study to address these goals. (Because of the possible confound 
between group membership and the younger age of the raters, these results are subject to 
more limitations than if older adults had also served as participants.)
In-group bias hypothesis
I found more support for the in-group bias and also clarified some of the conditions 
associated with the phenomenon. I found that the positivity of attitudes varied by group 
membership and that the positivity of participants' ratings also depended on the types of 
attributes that were assessed.
Participants' attitudes were more positive toward in-group members and more 
negative toward out-group members when they rated physical attributes of out-group 
members. Participants who were in-group members on age and/or sex rated targets more 
positively than did participants who were out-group members, (i.e., not similar in age and 
sex to the target they rated) when they assessed physical characteristics such as 
attractiveness, neatness, and grace.
It might be argued that this finding is due to the age of the target. Slotterback and 
Saamio (1996) found that younger adults rated older adults significantly lower on physical 
attributes than they did younger adults. However, in my study, participants gave
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significantly lower ratings to older adults who were the opposite sex as themselves but not 
to same sex older adults. Thus, even if the tendency for lower physical ratings o f older 
adults explains the lower overall ratings for older targets it does not explain the difference 
in ratings of same sex and opposite sex targets.
My findings are also noteworthy because o f the design of my study. Larger 
differences in attitudes toward older adults are generally found in within-subjects types of 
designs versus between-subjects design (Kite & Johnson, 1998; Kogan, 1979). My study 
was a between-subjects design; any noted difference in perceptions o f older adults versus 
younger adults are more likely to be genuine and not due to demand characteristics o f a 
within-subjects design (Kite & Johnson, 1988).
When participants rated targets on cognitive attributes, the age of the target appeared 
to affect attitudinal ratings. Participants consistently rated older participants higher on 
cognitive attributes than they did younger participants. There did, however, appear to be an 
in-group bias for sex. Participants rating same sex targets assigned higher ratings than did 
participants rating opposite sex targets. This finding o f a tendency to rate older adults as 
possessing good intellectual capabilities should not be unexpected as Slotterback and 
Saamio (1996) found that younger adults generally had positive attitude ratings for the 
cognitive capabilities of older adults. It would be interesting, however, to determine if 
older adults would rate themselves higher than younger adults on these cognitive attributes 
as well.
I did not nnd support for an in-group bias when participants rated targets on 
Personal-Expressive Attributes. There were no significant differences in attitude ratings for 
any o f the groups. This lack o f a difference in attitudes based on personality traits 
coincides with previous research. In a meta-analysis o f attitudes toward older and younger 
adults. Kite and Johnson (1988) found significantly smaller differences in the evaluation of 
older and younger adults when personality traits versus physical competencies were 
assessed. Kite et al., (1991) also found that younger adults did not strongly differentiate
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older targets from younger targets on personality dimensions but they did on physical 
dimensions. Similarly Slotterback and Saamio (1996) found, in a within-subjects design, 
that younger adults did not rate older adults significantly differently than younger adults on 
Personal-Expressive attributes. Thus, it appears that the in-group bias does not occur in 
attitudes based on traits but it does when physical attributes are measured. Perhaps in­
group members tend to stereotype out-group members more on visible physical 
characteristics than on less visible personality traits.
Out-group homogeneity hypothesis
Again no support was established for the out-group homogeneity hypothesis; there 
was support for in-group homogeneity instead. The variability of the attitudinal ratings of 
out-group members was significantly greater than the ratings of in-group members. These 
scores indicate that when participants rate targets who are similar in age and sex, they view 
them as being more alike than do participants rating targets who are not similar on age or 
sex.
One possible explanation for the noted in-group homogeneity may be due to the 
accuracy of participants'judgments. It may be that people are more accurate in their 
assessment of in-group members and, therefore, there is less variability in their scores. In 
general, in-group members tend to be more familiar with and similar to in-group members 
and, therefore, they may be more accurate and less likely to vary in their responses. A 
similar finding has been reported in the identification of faces based on race and nationality. 
Participants who were in-group members on race and nationality made fewer errors in 
identifying members o f the in-group than they did in the identification of members of an 
out-group (Doty, 1998; O'Toole, Peterson, & Deffenbacher, 1996).
Also, the greater variability noted among out-group members might be related to the 
extremity bias. It has been suggested that in-group members' responses often tend to be 
viewed as more neutral when compared to judgments regarding out-group members 
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Linville. 1982). If out-group members varied their responses
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in the positive and negative direction more often than in-group members did, then the result 
would be more variability in their attitudes.
Attribute type hypothesis
There was partial support for the attribute type hypothesis. As expected, I found 
that participants' judgments based on personal-expressive attributes were more positive 
than judgments based on physical attributes. However, I found no differences in the 
variabilities of the associated ratings of these two types of attributes. Participants' attitudes 
were not more variable when they rated participants' physical characteristics and less 
variable when they assessed personal-expressive characteristics. Attitudinal ratings but not 
variability may be affected by the types of attributes that are assessed. The lack of 
difference in the variability of these two subscales may be due to the large number of items 
on each of the scales.
It is important to note that the type of attributes that are assessed may differentially 
affect results. Researchers should pay careful attention to the types of items that are 
included in their attitude scales. These results also suggest, as other researchers have 
noted, that attitudes are multidimensional (Kite et al., 1991; Kite & Johnson. 1988; 
Slotterback & Saamio, 1996). Future researchers examining in-group/out-group 
distinctions should consider employing multiple components of attitudes in their studies.
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VI. GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present set of studies was designed to clarify our understanding of ageism and 
sexism within the attitude and stereotype literature. In these studies, I assessed the 
prevalence of ageist and sexist attitudes, identified important predictors of these attitudes, 
determined some of the conditions leading to in-group and out-group distinctions, and 
explored structural differences in attitudes among in-group and out-group members.
Findings and Implications 
The Prevalence of Ageist and Sexist Attitudes 
The results of my studies seem to indicate that the prevalence o f ageist and sexist 
attitudes are on the decline. Comparing my results in Study 1 with those of Rosencranz 
and McNevin's 1969 study, I found that the prevalence o f ageist attitudes among younger 
participants has decreased over the past thirty years. In 1969, Rosencranz and McNevin 
found that younger male participants rated older males negatively. In their study, the mean 
scores for older men were well below neutrality (4.00) on all three factors suggesting that 
these older adults were viewed as ineffective, dependent, and socially undesirable. In 
Study 1, using the same measures, I found that both younger men and women rated older 
men and women closer to or above neutrality on these factors. On a seven point Likert 
scale, the increased ratings of older adults in the past 30 years ranged from a one to a two 
point increase.
These higher ratings o f older adults were mirrored in Study 3, where I found that 
younger adults, consistently rated older adults on the positive side (i.e., above 4.00) of 
neutrality on physical, cognitive, and personal-expressive attributes. Recently, other 
researchers have found more positive ratings of older adults and suggested that older adults 
are not uniformly devalued as was once thought and that they are viewed as being 
multidimensional (Kite et al., 1991; Slotterback, 1996; Slotterback, & Saamio, 1996;
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Tuckman & Lorge, 1953). Researchers conducting a meta-analysis concluded that there is 
less difference in attitudes toward older and younger adults in more recently published 
studies than in past studies (Kite & Johnson, 1988).
I have found a similar decrease in sexist attitudes among my participants. In 1978, 
Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff and Ruderman found that women were subject to out-group 
categorization. Women were consistently evaluated less favorably, allotted fewer rewards, 
and characterized as having fewer desirable characteristics than men. Twenty years later, 
my results imply that out-group categorization based on sex has decreased. In Study I , I 
did not find any sex differences in participants’ ratings o f instrumentality, independence, or 
social acceptability of younger or older adults. Also, on a positive note. Kite et al., (1991) 
did not find a double standard of aging between women and men. In their study, older 
women were not rated less positively than older men. I am, thus, pleased to add more 
support to the literature that suggests ageist and sexist attitudes are decreasing. Hopefully 
these results imply a general trend o f a reduction in prejudices based on age and sex.
Predictors of Attitudes toward In-group and Out-group Members
In Study 2 , 1 identified significant predictors of attitudes toward in-group and out­
group members and I also found that the predictors differed by in-group category. Attitude 
strength measures, including knowledge, experience, attitude certainty and extremity, and 
affective-cognitive consistency were found to be predictive of participants' attitudes. 
Attitude extremity, attitude certainty, and experience were the most influential of the 
strength variables. The importance of these variables (and others) varied in their importance 
by in-group category. Although participants who were more certain of their attitudes 
tended to assign more positive ratings of the targets regardless of their in-group category, 
this was not the case for attitude extremity or experience. For participants who were the 
same age as their targets, more extreme attitudes and experience were associated with more 
positive attitudes, but for participants who were younger or older than their targets, more 
extreme attitudes and experience tended to be predictive of negative attitudes. It appears
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that membership as an in-group or out-group member affects how effective, autonomous, 
or socially acceptable people view others.
These findings are important because people who are more sure of their extreme 
attitudes are less likely to seek out new information that may change their attitudes (Gross, 
Holtz, & Miller, 1995) and there is a stronger association between attitudes and behavior 
(Abelson, 1995). This is not problematic if their attitudes are positive but it is if they are 
negative. Because people with more attitude extremity and certainty tend to be more 
resistant to attitude change and in this study more experience (i.e., living with a similar 
target and having more personal contact with them) was not indicative of more positive 
attitudes toward out-group members based on age, the implication is that more research 
examining positive predictors of attitudes for out-group members is necessary. It is 
possible that intercooperative experiences such as common goals (Miller & Brewer, 1986; 
Sherif et al., 1961) and other types of interactions not assessed in this study may be 
influential in changing attitudes toward older or younger targets.
Another important finding was that participants' age but not sex was important in 
the prediction of attitudes toward in-group and out-group members. Males and females did 
not rate targets differently but younger and older participants did. Younger participants 
tended to rate targets more positively than did older participants on all the dependent 
variables with one exception. When rating the instrumentality of targets who were a 
different age older participants tended to view younger targets more positively than younger 
participants rated older targets. To determine if this one difference could be due to actual 
rather than perceived differences or stereotypes, I reconducted the regression analyses for 
the Instrumental/Ineffective factor without the healthy/unhealthy and strong/weak items 
because, in general, older adults are less healthy and not as strong as younger adults. 
However, when both o f these variables were removed from the Instrumental-Ineffective 
factor, the results were the same. It, thus, appears that researchers need to pay careful 
attention to the age of their participants because younger adults tend to be more positive in
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their ratings than do older adults, except when assessing instrumentality. It also seems that 
researchers may not need to be overly concerned about the sex of their participants when 
they are measuring attitudes as no sex differences were found.
In-group Bias
In Study 1 and Study 2 , 1 examined the phenomenon of in-group bias for the 
variables of age and sex. I found that in-group bias does exist for both of these variables 
but that age appears to be a more salient group determinant. In general, across dependent 
variables, participants rated targets who were similar in age to themselves, regardless of 
sex, more positively and similarly than they rated targets who were the same sex but a 
different age than themselves. For example, younger men tended to rate younger men 
(Age/Sex In-group members) more positively than younger women (Age In-group 
members), but they rated younger women more positively than older men (Sex In-group 
members), and they rated older women (No In-group members) most negatively.
I also found a tendency for an in-group bias based on sex. This finding, however, 
was not as strong as it was for age. These results suggest that attitude researchers need to 
pay attention to the age and sex of the targets in their studies. It is clear that there is an 
additive effect o f age of targets and participants and an interaction between age and sex. 
When the two are matched, the responses are most positive but when there is a 
mismatching, attitudes are less positive, especially if the participant and target are different 
ages.
Another variable that seems to affect in-group bias is the type o f attribute that is 
measured. In Study 3 ,1 found that in-group bias is more likely to occur when attitudes are 
based on immediately visible physical attributes rather than on invisible personal-expressive 
attributes.
It is also interesting to note that older adults tended to have overall lower ratings of 
the targets than did younger adults. This is noteworthy because, it seems reasonable to 
think that older adults who were currently members of the older adult group and had at one
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time been members of the younger adult group would have more positive ratings. Instead, 
it looks as if older adults tend to view both groups more negatively than do younger adults. 
This may be due to the fact that younger adults had more experience with all the target 
groups; also, perhaps older adults do not draw parallels to current younger adults and 
themselves as younger adults.
Out-group Homogeneity
1 did not find out-group homogeneity in these studies. Regardless of attribute type, 
participants tended to rate the traits of out-group members (on both age and sex) with more 
variability than they did in-group members. These results indicate that in-group 
homogeneity may be more common when participants rate targets who are similar in age 
and sex across a variety of items.
My use of an unobtrusive non-reactive measure of homogeneity may be associated 
with the lack of out-group homogeneity. Traditionally, researchers have been more 
inclined to examine perceived homogeneity among participants. My measure of 
homogeneity was different than this traditional measure. In Studies 2 and 3 , 1 
operationalized homogeneity as the within-subjects’ variance among multiple items that 
described a target group. There may be more variability in participants' responses to items 
describing a target group than there is in their perceived variability of a target group. 
Linville et al.. (1986) found that 20% of published studies do not support out-group 
homogeneity. Studies in which participants were asked a direct measure o f intragroup 
similarity, such as "how similar or dissimilar" or "alike” are given targets to each other, 
have tended to result in out-group homogeneity (see Park & Rothbart, 1982; Quattrone & 
Jones, 1980). However, less direct measures, such as the variance of participants’ ratings 
on various attributes (see Linville et al., 1986), do not always indicate out-group 
homogeneity. A within-subjects design may also be more likely to result in out-group 
homogeneity because of the inherent demand characteristics or implicit reference groups 
that exist (Kite & Johnson, 1988). In my study, participants did not compare a given target
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group to another group but were asked to assess a wide range of attributes for one target 
group. Another possible explanation for a lack of finding of out-group homogeneity in 
Study 2 may be that older participants viewed younger adults as more differentiated than 
traditional out-group members would because older adults were once members o f the out • 
group (Linville et al., 1986).
Attitude Structure
The most disappointing finding was the lack of a difference in attitude structure 
between in-group and out-group members. I did not find the expected difference in 
affective or cognitive bases among in-group categories. Contrary to my expectations, 
participants who were the same sex and same age tended to have lower affective sum 
scores than did participants who were not the same sex and/or the same age as the targets 
they rated. Also, cognitive sum scores were not related to in-group category. 1 had 
expected that my results would parallel Simons and Carey's (1998) findings of a relation 
between attitude basis and experience. They found that attitudes toward drug use were 
related to experience; participants with more experience had more affectively based attitudes 
than those with less experience. Perhaps the experience of being an in-group member is 
not as influential as I had thought.
This was a preliminary attempt to ascertain whether there are structural difference in 
in-group and out-group members' attitudes. It is clear that more research is necessary. It 
is especially important to determine if structural differences in attitudes exist among in­
group and out-gr"up members if attitude change is desired. Researchers have 
demonstrated that attitude change is more likely to result if there is a match between 
people’s attitude base and the persuasive message that is attempted (Chabot, 1996; 
Edwards, 1990; Edwards, & von Hippie, 1995).
Contributions to the Stereotype and Attitude Literatures
In these studies, I tested some assumptions in the attitude and stereotype literatures. 
My results suggest that there may be a general reduction in age and sex stereotypes. I also
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found that in-group bias and out-group homogeneity are not associated with stereotypes 
under all conditions. In fact, in-group homogeneity emerged as a consistent finding in the 
testing o f age and sex stereotypes. These findings may support the Common Ingroup 
Identity Model which suggests that a reduction in intergroup biases is associated with 
cognitive and motivational processes (Anastasio, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997). 
Acceptance o f counterstereotypic information from interactions with out-group members 
may reduce intergroup stereotypes and subsequent biases.
As an important contribution to the attitude literature, I found that multiple 
dimensions o f attitude strength are useful and productive in measuring attitudes. It is 
common for attitude researchers to only include the measure of attitude extremity. Such 
studies do not fully encompass the construct of attitude strength. Even though attitude 
extremity has been shown to be a good predictor of attitudes, the approach of utilizing only 
one dimension seems rather short sighted. In general. Study 2 highlighted the benefits to 
be gained from employing more than one measure of attitude strength. In this study, not 
only were the measures of attitude strength found to vary as predictors but support was 
found for Krosnick et al's (1993) notion that attitude strength is comprised o f multiple 
factors. Support was also gained for Radan (1985) who suggested that researchers should 
utilize multiple dimensions of attitude strength in research as the dimensions are relatively 
independent of each other. The use of five dimensions of attitude strength as predictors 
accounted for a respectable amount of the variance associated with in-group and out-group 
attitudes.
Limitations of the Studies
Along with discussing the implications o f these studies it is also important to 
mention the limitations. Participants in this study were college students at the University of 
New Hampshire and their older relatives and friends. Thus, the results may only be 
generalizable to populations similar to this group of people in age and other demographics 
such as education and marital/family status. Most all of the younger participants were
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single college students, and most of the older participants had been married and had 
children and grandchildren who attended college. Perhaps less educated participants and 
those without families would have different attitudes. It is also possible that people from 
different regions of the country have different attitudes toward the target groups. Also, 
recall that I limited the number of items that the older adults completed to maintain a high 
response rate; they did not complete as many items as did the younger adults. Thus, while 
I made some progress in understanding in-group and out-group attitudes among older 
adults, future research should focus on gathering more information from non-traditional 
populations such as older adults.
Another limitation of the current study was that 75% of the younger participants 
agreed to try to recruit an older participant (usually a family member) and the older 
participants were all recruited by a younger adult. It is a potential confound that all of the 
older adults who participated aided a younger adult because it suggests that these older 
participants had positive contact with and attitudes toward at least one younger adult, (i.e., 
the younger adult who recruited them). It is also possible that the positive ratings of older 
adults could be because the majority of younger participants felt comfortable enough with at 
one older adults to urge them to participate in this study.
The interpretations of my findings may also be limited by cohort effects. In Study
2 , 1 utilized a cross-sectional design to examine attitudes of older and younger adults. 
Because these two groups of participants were different ages and from different 
generations, the possibility o f cohort effects exists. In drawing conclusions from cross- 
sectional studies, it is difficult to know for sure if the results are due to change over time or 
to effects other than time. i.e. cultural changes. Baltes (1968) and Schaie (1967) stated that 
cross-sectional designs confound cohort effects, selective sampling, selective survival (the 
fact that not all members of a given cohort survive into adulthood, yielding a sample that is 
no longer representative of its original cohort), and terminal drop (the decline in 
functioning that precedes death by 3-5 years) with chronological age. In general, older
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participants' attitudes may be different toward the various target groups than are the 
attitudes o f younger adults (and different from other age groups that I did not examine) 
because of the differences that stem from the contrasting social or cultural conditions of the 
periods in which they matured.
It should also be noted that the attitudes toward younger and older men and women 
were not exhaustive. The items used in this study were generated from Rosencranz and 
McNevin (1969) and from undergraduates at the University of New Hampshire and older 
adults from New Hampshire. It is fair to suggest that these items may be limited by the 
lack the of diversity among these individuals. There may be other important attributes that 
were not tested in this study.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not state that this study was conducted to assess 
differences in attitudes and not behaviors toward in-group and out-group members. Social 
psychologist have, of course, been interested in the relation between attitudes and behavior 
for a long time and have demonstrated relations between the two (Ajzen & Fishbein. 1980; 
Eagly & Chaiken ,1993; Krauss, 1995; LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969). However, based on 
the present studies, I cannot, draw any conclusions as to how people would actually 
behave toward in-group and out-group members.
Suggestions for Future Research
Future studies should examine more diverse samples including more older adults, 
middle-age adults who are not in-group members on age, (i.e., they are not younger adults 
and not older adults but they have been younger adults and will soon be older adults), and 
participants from different locations. Such studies would enhance the generalizability of 
this study and hopefully highlight the existing range of attitudes toward older and younger 
men and women.
Given the lack o f out-group homogeneity found in these studies, studies utilizing 
different measures o f homogeneity such as group differentiation predictions or other more 
direct measures of homogeneity should be used to determine if there is truly is an
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undifferentiated representation of out-group members based on age and sex (Linville et al., 
1986). Future studies might also assess other types of items such as role and role 
behaviors as dependent variables (Kite et al., 1991). Because roles and role behaviors are 
visible manifestations it is possible that more variability would be detected and more insight 
into differences in the predictors and structure of attitudes toward in-groups and out­
groups. It would also be informative to search for other significant predictors of inter­
group attitudes. Studies examining the other five dimensions of attitude strength (i.e., 
intensity, importance, interest in relevant information, accessibility, and latitudes of 
rejection and noncommittment) may provide useful information regarding the prediction of 
attitudes toward in-group and out-group members (Krosnick et al., 1993). Also, Kogan 
(1979) has suggested that attitudes may be related to impression management. More 
specifically, impression management may be a possible moderator of attitudes. He 
advocates using the Self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974) to measure its effect on attitudes, 
especially attitudes that may have a socially desirable component. According to Snyder 
(1974) self-monitoring is the degree to which we monitor and regulate our behavior to fit 
the situation. Apparently high self-monitors, unlike low self-monitors, are more driven to 
make an appropriate impression than a true one. Measuring self-monitoring would be 
especially important if one wanted to predict future behavior.
Studies measuring behavior toward in-group and out-group members and the 
relation between attitudes and behavior should be conducted. An important and ongoing 
issue in social psychology has been the relation between attitudes and behavior (Ajzen & 
Fishbein. 1980; Krauss, 1995; LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969). If attitudes are not very 
predictive o f behavior, they may be of little value (Wicker, 1969). However, if a 
significant relationship is found between attitudes and behavior toward intergroups, 
interventions for education should be created and tested. Based upon my findings from the 
Pilot study and Study 2 ,1 suggest that such interventions focus on increasing empathy and 
positive interactions with the target group. Given the demographic information of the
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increasing number of older adults in our population, this area of attitudinal research is 
clearly important. It is only by further examination o f attitudes toward people who are 
different than us, especially on the variables of age. that we can begin to change our 
stereotypic patterns of behavior with them.
Conclusion
The results of these studies have expanded our understanding o f ageist and sexist 
attitudes among in-group and out-group members. Greater understanding of ageism and 
sexism is especially important, given the ever increasing numbers of older adults in our 
population who will be primarily female (Schick & Schick, 1994)
In conclusion, these studies have demonstrated that attitudes are multidimensional 
and therefore multiple approaches should be taken in assessing attitudes. Also, participant 
variables such as age, target variables of age and sex, and the type of attribute that are 
assessed can influence participants' responses. These general findings should be 
theoretically important to attitude researchers as well as significant to practitioners interested 
in reducing ageism and/or sexism. These findings should provide future researchers with 
information to design and implement more effective attitude change programs to reduce 
prejudice toward these target groups.
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APPENDIX A: BRIEF MOOD INTROSPECTION SCALE (Mayer et al„ 1995)
Instructions: Circle the response on the scale below that indicate how well each adjective or 
phrase describes your present mood.
Definitely Do not Feel Feel Somewhat Definitely Feel
1. Lively X X X ... ... .X X ....... X ...X V ....... ..V ....... ...vv.... ....vvv
2. Happy X X X ... ... .X X ....... X ...X V ....... . .V ........ ...vv.... ....vvv
3. Sad X X X ... ... .X X ....... X ...X V ....... . .V ........ ...vv.... ......vvv
4. Tired X X X ... ... .X X ....... X ...X V ....... . .V ........ ...vv.... ......vvv
5. Caring X X X ... . ..X X ....... X ...X V ....... ..V ........ ...vv.... ....vvv
6 . Content X X X .... . ..X X ....... X ...X V ....... . .V ........ ,..vv.... ....vvv
7. Gloomy X X X .... ...X X ....... X ...X V ....... ..V ........ ..vv.... ..... vvv
8 . Jittery X X X .... . ..X X ....... X ...X V ....... ..V ......... ..vv....,..... vvv
9. Drowsy X X X .... ...X X ....... X ...X V ....... ..V ......... ..vv........vvv
10. Grouchy X X X .... . ..X X ....... X ...X V ....... . .V ......... ..vv......... vvv
11. Peppy X X X .... . ..X X ....... X ...X V ....... ..V ......... ..vv ...........vvv
12. Nervous X X X .... . ..X X ....... ..X .........X V ....... ..V ......... ..vv........vvv
13. Calm X X X .... . ..X X ....... X ..X V ....... ..V ......... ..vv........vvv
14. Loving X X X .... . ..X X ....... ..X ...... ..X V ....... ..V ......... ..vv ..........vvv
15. Fed up X X X .... . ..X X ........ X ..X V ....... ..V ......... ..vv.... ....vvv
16. Active XXX.... ...XX..... ..X.... ..X V ....... ..V...... ..vv.... ....vvv
Overall, my mood is:
Very Very
Unpleasant Pleasant
-10 -9 - 8  -7 - 6  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10
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APPENDIX B: FACTS ON AGING QUIZ (Palmore, 1977)
Please answer each of the following questions by specifying whether the statement is True 
(T) or False (F). Make your best guess.
1. T o r F
2 . T o r F
3. T o r F
4. T o r F
5. T o r F
6 . T o r F
7. T o r F
8 . T o r F
9. T o r F
1 0 . T o r F
1 1 . T o r F
1 2 . T o r F
13. T o r F
14. T o r F
15. T o r F
16. T o r F
17. T o r F
18. T o r F
19. T o r F
2 0 . T o r F
2 1 . T o r F
2 2 . T o r F
23. T o r F
24. T o r F
25. T o r F
The majority o f old people (past age 65) are senile, (i.e., 
effective memory, disoriented, or demented).
All Five senses tend to decline in old age.
Most old people have no interest in, or capacity for, sexual 
relations.
Lung capacity tens to decline in old age.
The majority o f older people fell miserable most o f the time.
Physical strength tends to decline in old age.
At least one-tenth of the aged are living in longstay institutions 
(i.e., nursing homes, mental hospitals, homes for the 
aged, etc.).
Aged drivers have fewer accidents per person than drivers 
under age 65.
Most older workers cannot work as effectively as younger 
workers.
About 80% of the aged are healthy enough to carry out their 
normal activities.
Most older people are set in their ways an unable to change.
Old people usually take longer to learn something new.
It is almost impossible for most old people to learn new things.
The reaction time of most old tends to be slower than reaction 
time of younger people.
In general, most old people are pretty much alike.
The majority of old people are seldom bored.
The majority o f old people are socially isolated and lonely.
Older workers have fewer accidents than younger workers.
Over 15% of the population are now age 65 or over.
Most medical practitioners tend to give low priority to the 
aged.
The majority o f old people have incomes below the poverty 
level (as defined by the Federal Government).
The majority o f old people are working or would like to have 
some kind o f work to do (including housework and 
volunteer work).
Older people tend to become more religious as they age.
The majority o f old age are seldom irritated or angry.
The health and socioeconomic status of older people
(compared to younger people) in the year 2 0 0 0  will 
probably be about the same as now.
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APPENDIX C: SELF-ESTEEM (Rosenberg, 1965)
For each of the statements, using the following scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 
(strongly agree). Select a number that best describes your agreement with the statement.
1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Agree
4 = Strongly Agree
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others
1 2  3 4
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
1 2  3 4
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
1 2  3 4
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
1 2  3 4
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
1 2  3 4
6 . I take a positive attitude toward myself.
1 2  3 4
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
1 2  3 4
8 . I wish I could have more respect for myself.
1 2  3 4
9. I certainly feel useless at times.
1 2 3 4
10. At times I think I am no good at all.
1 2  3 4
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APPENDIX D: ERIKSON’S PSYCHOSOCIAL STAGE INVENTORY (Rosenthal et al„
1981)
Please select the number, from I to 5, that best represents how each of the following 
statements describes you.
1 = Strongly disagree
2  = moderately disagree
3 = neutral
4 = moderately agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. I change my opinion of myself a lot.
1 2 3 4 5
2. I’ve got a clear idea of what I want to be.
1 2 3 4 5
3. I feel mixed up.
1 2 3 4 5
4. The important things in life are clear to me.
1 2 3 4 5
5. I’ve got it together.
1 2 3 4 5
6 . I know what kind of person I am.
1 2 3 4 5
7. I can’t decide what I want to do with my life.
1 2 3 4 5
8 . I have a strong sense of what it means to be male/female.
1 2 3 4 5
9. I like myself and am proud of what I stand for.
1 2 3 4 5
10. I don’t really know what I’m on about.
1 2 3 4 5
11. I find I have to keep up a front when I’m with people.
1 2 3 4 5
12. I don’t really feel involved.
1 2  3 4 5
13. I get embarrassed when someone begins to tell me personal things.
1 2 3 4 5
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APPENDIX D (cont.)
14. I ’m ready to get involved with a special person.
1 2  3 4 5
15. I'm warm and friendly.
1 2  3 4 5
16. It's important to me to be completely open with my friends.
1 2  3 4 5
17. I keep what I really think and feel to myself.
1 2  3 4 5
18. I think it's crazy to get too involved with people.
1 2  3 4 5
19. I care deeply for others.
1 2 3 4 5
20. I’m basically a loner.
1 2 3 4 5
21. I have a close physical and emotional relationship with another person.
1 2 3 4 5
22. I prefer not to show too much of mvself to others.
1 2 3 '  4 5
23. Being alone with other people makes me feel uncomfortable.
1 2 3 4 5
24. I find it easy to make close friends.
1 2 3 4 5
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APPENDIX E: THE INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX (Davis, 1980)
INSTRUCT IONS: The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a 
variety o f situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the 
appropriate number on the scale at the top of the page: 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 , or 5. When you have 
decided on you r answer, circle the letter on the answer scale next to the item number. 
READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as 
you can. Thank you.
Does Not Describe Me Well <— I -2-3-4-5—> Describes Me Very Well
1 .1  2 3 4 5 I daydream and fantasize with some regularity, about things
that might happen to me.
2. 1 2 3 4  5 1 often have tender, concerned feelings for people less
fortunate than me.
3 .1  2 3 4  5 1 sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other
guy's" point of view.
4. 1 2 3 4  5 Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they
are having problems.
5. 1 2 3 4  5 1 really get involved with the feelings o f characters in a
novel.
6 . 1 2 3 4  5 In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill at ease.
7. I 2 3 4  5 I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play and I
don't get completely caught up in it.
8 . I 2 3 4  5 I try to look at everybody's side o f a  disagreement before I
make a decision.
9. I 2 3 4  5 When I see someone is being taken advantage of, I feel kind
of protective toward them.
10. 1 2 3 4 5 I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very
emotional situation.
1 1 . 1  2 3 4 5 1 sometimes try to understand my friends better by
imagining how things looked form their perspective.
12. 1 2 3 4 5 Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is
rare for me.
13. 1 2 3 4 5 When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.
14. 1 2 3 4 5 Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great
deal.
15. 1 2 3 4 5 If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much
time listening to other people’s arguments.
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2 0 . 2
2 1 . 2







one of the characters.
 3 4 5 Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.
4 5 When I see someone being treated unfairly, I so 
don’t feel very much pity for them.
look at them both.
 3 4 5 1 would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
4 5 When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put mysel 
the place of the leading character.
 3 4 5 1 tend to lose control during emergencies.
4 5 When I am upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself 
his/her shoes" for a while.
how I would feel if the events in the story were 
happening to me.
2 3 4 5 When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, 
I go to pieces.
2 3 4 5 Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would 
feel if I were in their place.
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APPENDIX F: ATTITUDES STATEMENTS USED IN PILOT STUDY
For each of the following statements please specify your agreement by circling the number 
that best describes your agreement. Remember that the term older adult(s) refers to people 
who are 65 years of age and older.
1 = Definitely Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Moderately Disagree
4 = Neutral
5 = Moderately Agree
6  = Agree
7 = Definitely Agree
1 . 1 have nothing to talk about with older people.
1 2  3 4 5 6  7
2. Older people make me think about death.
1 2  3 4 5 6  7
3. I have nothing in common with older people.
1 2  3 4 5 6  7
4. I am uncomfortable around older people.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
5. Older people have a chance to do all the things they wanted to.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
6 . Older people worry about unimportant things.
6  7
7. Older people feel sorry for themselves.
1 2  3 4 5 6  7
8 . Older people have a low suicide rate.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
9. Older people are all the same.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
10. Older people should act their age.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
11. Most older people are competent.
1 2  3 4 5 6  7
12. Few older people are disabled.
1 2  3 4 5 6  7
13. Older people have a reduced ability to Ieam.
1 2  3 4 5 6  7
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APPENDIX F (cont.)
14. Older people have a reduced ability to change.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
15. Older people would like to be young again.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
16. Older people are absent minded.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
17. Older people are sweet.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
18. Older people are good storytellers.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
19. People grow wiser as they age.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
20. Older people should have more power in business and politics.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
21. One of the most interesting and entertaining qualities of older people is their accounts 
o f past experiences.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
22. Most older people tend to keep to themselves and give advice only when asked.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
23. Most older people are constantly complaining about the behavior o f the younger 
generation.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
24. Most older people need no more love and reassurance than anyone else.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
25. Few older people are accident-prone.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
26. Older people are a burden to their children.
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
27. Older people usually live with their children.
1 2  3 4 5 6  7
28. Older people are in the happiest period of their lives.
1 2  3 4 5 6  7
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APPENDIX G: SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL (Rosencranz & McNevin, 1969)
Below are a list of polar adjectives. You are asked to circle a number which, in your 
judgm ent, best describes the ta rg e t g roup (i.e., men who are 17 to 26 years o f age). 
Make each item a separate and independent judgm ent Do not worry or puzzle over 
individual items. Do not try to remember how you have marked earlier items even though 
they may have been similar. It is your first impression or immediate feeling about each 
item that is wanted.
Also please write down how certain you are of each judgment from 0% not at all 






























































7  % Certain
Consistent
7  % Certain
Independent
7  % Certain
Rich
7  % Certain
Generous
7  % Certain
Productive
7  % Certain
Busy
7  % Certain
Secure






7  % Certain
% Certain
Handsome
7  % Certain
Cooperative
7  % Certain
Optimistic
7  % Certain
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7 _ % Certain
Expectant




































7  % Certain
Aggressive
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APPENDIX H: THE MULTIRESPONSE CHECKLIST (Crites et al„ 1994)
Please indicate whether each o f the words below describes your global evaluation o f the 
ta rg e t group (i.e., men who are 17 to 26 years o f age.) Circle a number from 0 (does 

















































Please indicate whether each o f the words below describes your feelings toward the 
ta rg e t group (i.e., men who are 17 to 26 years of age).. Circle a number from 0 (does 








































1 0 . angry
0
does not describe
1 1 . acceptance
0
does not describe
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APPENDIX H (cont.)
Please indicate whether each of the words below describes the traits or characteristics of 
the target group (i.e., men who are 17 to 26 years of age). Circle a number from 0 
(does not describe) to 2  (definitely describes).
1 . useful 
0
does not describe somewhat describes definitely describes
2 . useless 
0















somewhat describes definitely describes









somewhat describes definitely describes
8 . harmful 
0





somewhat describes definitely describes




somewhat describes definitely describes




somewhat describes definitely describes




somewhat describes definitely describes
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does not describe somewhat describes definitely describes
14. unhealthy
0 1 2
does not describe somewhat describes definitely describes
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APPENDIX I: SOCIAL DESIRABILITY (Marlowe & Crowne, 1960)
Part III: Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. 
Read each item and decide whether the statement is true o f false as it pertains to vou.
Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications o f all the candidates.
I never hesitate to go out o f my way to help someone in trouble.
It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
I have never intensely disliked anyone.
On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.
I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way.
I am always careful about my manner o f dress.
My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.
If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen, I would 
probably do it.
On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too 
little of my ability.
I like to gossip at times.
There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority 
even though I knew they were right.
. No matter who I 'm  talking to, I’m always a good listener.
I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.
There have been occasions when I took advantage o f someone.
I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
I always try to practice what I preach.
I don’t find it particularly difficult to get along with loud-mouthed, 
obnoxious people.
I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
When I don’t know something I don’t at all mind admitting it.
I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.
There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.
I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my 
wrongdoings.
I never resent being asked to return a favor.
I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from 
mine.
I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.
There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of 
others.
I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
I have never felt that I was punished without cause.
I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they got what they 
deserved.
I have never deliberately said something to hurt someone’s feelings.
T or F 1 .
T or F 2 .
T or F 3.
T or F 4.
T or F 5. i
T or F 6 .
T or F 7.
T or F 8 . .
T or F 9.
T or F 1 0 .
T or F 1 1 .
T or F 1 2 .
T or F 13.
T or F 14.
T or F 15.
T or F 16.
T or F 17.
T or F 18.
T or F 19.
T or F 2 0 .
T or F 2 1 .
T or F 2 2 .
T or F 23.
T or F 24.
T or F 25.
T or F 26.
T or F 27.
T or F 28.
T or F 29.
T or F 30.
T or F 31.
T or F 32.
T or F 33.
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APPENDIX J: EXPERIENCE MEASURES
For the next three questions, please answer the question based on your experience 
with a given group of people. Do not including yourself as one o f those people.
1. Which o f the following best describes your living arrangements with the ta rge t 
g roup  (e.g.., men who are 17 to 26 years o f age)
1. Currently, I am living in the same home with the ta rg e t g ro u p  (e.g., a 
17-26 year old man.)
2. In the past, I have lived in the same house with the ta rg e t g roup .
3. I have never lived in the same house with th e  ta rg e t group.
2. A t present, I
1. frequently com e in close contact with th e  ta rg e t g roup (e.g., men 
who are 17-26 years old)
2 . fairly frequently come in close contact with th e  ta rg e t group
3 . seldom or never come in close contact with th e  ta rg e t g roup
3. My contact with the  ta rg e t group (e.g., men who are 17-26 years o f age) is
1 . personal
2 . friendly or fairly personal
3. casual or impersonal
Note: In the actual questionnaires, a specific target group appeared where "the ta rg e t 
g roup  "appears in the questions.
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APPENDIX K: REVISED FACTS ON AGING QUIZ 2 (Palmore, 1998)
Please answer each o f the following questions by specifying whether the statement is True 
(T) or False (F). Make your best guess.
A person's height tend to decline in old age.
More older persons (65 or older) have chronic illnesses that limit their 
activity than do younger persons.
Older persons have more acute (short-term) illnesses than do younger 
persons.
Older persons have more injuries in the home than younger persons.
Older workers have less absenteeism than do younger workers.
Black’s life expectancy at age 65 is about the same as Whites.
Men’s life expectancy at age 65 is about the same as women’s.
Medicare pays over half of the medical expenses for the aged.
Social security benefits automatically increase with inflation.
Supplemental Security Income guarantees a minimum income for needy 
aged.
The aged do not get their proportionate share of the nation's income.
The aged have higher rates of criminal victimization than younger persons. 
The aged are more fearful of crime than are younger persons.
The aged are the most law abiding of all adult age groups.
There are about equal numbers of widows and widowers among the aged. 
More of the aged vote than any other age group.
There are proportionately more older persons in public office than in the 
total population.
The proportion o f African Americans among the aged is growing. 
Participation in voluntary organizations (churches and clubs) tends to 
decline even among the healthy aged.
The majority of old people live alone.
The aged have a lower rate of poverty than the rest of the population.
The rate o f poverty among aged African Americans is about three times as 
high as among aged Whites.
Older persons who reduce their activity tend to be happier than those who 
do not.
When the last child leaves home, the majority of parents have serious 
problems adjusting to their "empty nest."
The proportion o f widowed among the aged is decreasing.
1 . T o r F
2 . T o r F
3. T o r F
4. T o r F
5. T o r F
6 . T o r F
7. T o r F
8 . T o r F
9. T o r F
1 0 . T o r F
1 1 . T o r F
1 2 . T o r F
13. T o r F
14. T o r F
15. T o r F
16. T o r F
17. T o r F
18. T o r F
19. T o r F
2 0 . T o r F
2 1 . T o r F
2 2 . T o r F
23. T o r F
24. T o r F
25. T o r F
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APPENDIX L: FACTS ON YOUNGER ADULTS QUIZ
Please answer each of the following questions by specifying whether the statement is True 
(T) or False (F). Make your best guess.
There is little gain in height after the age of 18.
According to standardized tests, mental abilities continue to increase during 
early adulthood.
Less than half of all 20-to 24-year olds either live with their parents or are 
supported by their parents.
In the year 2000, approximately 1/3 o f the U.S. youth population will be 
minorities.
As of 1996, less than 10% of 18- to 21- year olds are unemployed, the 
other 90%+ are employed or in school.
By age 18, most people have a coherent sense of identity.
The average age at which people get married is 22 for women and 24 for 
men.
By age 19, over 75% of males and females have had sexual intercourse. 
Close to 10% of all males have been sexually victimized by the time they 
reach adulthood.
Among industrialized countries, the United States has the highest number of 
pregnancies among women aged 19 and younger.
By the age o f 18, one out of four teenagers has contracted a sexually 
transmitted disease.
Less than 10% of Hispanic Americans earn a college degree.
More than 15% of the U.S. population have not completed a high school 
degree by age 24.
The leading cause of death among American teenagers is AIDS.
According to research, 21 percent of sexually active teenage girls use no 
method of contraception.
Orgasmic response in women is faster and more consistent in the 40s than it 
is in the teens or 2 0 s.
A well-sampled study o f college women found that 28 percent has 
experienced an act that met the legal definition of rape.
Puberty involves changes in intelligence.
The National Research Council suggests that high rates o f young
unemployment, juvenile delinquency, and teenage alcoholism may 
all stem from the surge o f hormones during the pubertal transition. 
Today, approximately three-fourths of all young people continue their 
education beyond high school.
According to national surveys, sexual activity among adolescents is 
occurring at the same time as it has in past decades.
Individuals under the age of 24 account for 50% of all violent crimes in the 
United States.
Nearly 40% of all young adults have ever tried marijuana.
The rate of suicide among young adults has decreased in recent decades.
The accident rate of 16-to 24- years olds is higher than that o f drivers over 
the age o f 75.
1 . T o r F
2 . T o r F
3. T o r F
4. T o r F
5. T o r F
6 . T o r F
7. T o r F
8 . T o r F
9. T o r F
1 0 . T o r F
It. . T  or F
1 2 . T o r F
13. T o r F
14. T o r F
15. T o r F
16. T o r F
17. T o r F
18. T o r F
19. T o r F
2 0 . T o r F
2 1 . T o r F
2 2 . T o r F
23. T o r F
24. T o r F
25. T o r F
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APPENDIX M: FACTS ON MALES AND FEMALES QUIZ
Please answer each of the following questions by specifying whether the statement is True 
(T) or False (F). Make your best guess.
On the mathematical component o f the SAT males generally get higher 
scores than females.
Self-reports o f social competence are higher for adolescent females than 
adolescent males.
Higher prestige positions are held by a disproportionately greater number of 
males than females.
Men tend to fall in love more easily than women.
Women and men are both able to perform well in most occupations.
Men who are high in masculinity have higher self-esteem and more positive 
self-images and better adjustment than do women who are highly 
feminine.
Men are more likely to offer help than women in an emergency regardless 
of the situation.
Women’s activities prior to 1900 focused only on the family.
Prior to 1900, all prominent philosophers maintained that men were 
consistently superior to women.
More than 75% of the voice overs in advertising are that of males, i.e. males 
narrate over 75% of t.v. commercials.
Males are more aggressive than females.
Even among preschoolers, girls have lower expectations for their 
performance than boys do.
The great majority of hyperactive children are boys.
Women smile more than men do.
Observations in schools indicate that teacher pay more attention to girls. 
Research indicates that men deal better with the death of a spouse than do 
women.
Research indicates that females score higher on IQ tests than do males. 
Females do better than males on test o f perceptual speed.
In terms of school achievement measured by grades, girls get better grades 
than boys in all subjects.
Women workers earn about 90 cents for every dollar earned by men 
workers.
Testosterone is found in males, but not in females.
Females have higher death rates than males from cancer.
Depression is more common among women than men.
The ratio of men problem drinkers to women problem drinkers is 3:1.
Both men and women rate marriage and family as more satisfying than 
work.
1 . T o r F
2 . T o r F
3. T o r F
4. T o r F
5. T o r F
6 . T o r F
7. T or F
8 . T o r F
9. T o r F
1 0 . T o r F
1 1 . T o r F
1 2 . T o r F
13. T o r F
14. T or F
15. T o r F
16. T o r F
17. T o r F
18. T o r F
19. T o r F
2 0 . T o r F
2 1 . T o r F
2 2 . T o r F
23* T o r F
24. T o r F
25. T o r F
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APPENDIX N: CONSENT FORMS
Consent Form (for completing survey)
The present research is being conducted by Heather Frasier Chabot of the University of 
New Hampshire.
Purpose: The purpose of this research is to better understand the structure and predictors 
o f various attitudes.
Description: You will be asked to complete a questionnaire o f demographic questions, 
agreement to attitude statements, and other measures thought to be related to attitudes.
Risks. Benefits, and Termination o f Participation:
You are free to discontinue your participation in this research at any time and for 
any reason without penalty. No risks are involved in participating in this study beyond 
those which can be considered typical risks of daily living. Benefits to participation include 
assisting research in psychology and a better understanding and awareness o f stereotypes.
Confidentiality:
You are requested not to place your name on any of these materials, except this 
consent form which will be separate from your responses.
Final Consent Summary:
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, and that I can choose to end 
my participation at any time for any reason without penalty. The risks and benefits of the 
study have been explained to me and I understand them. I understand that if I have any 
questions pertaining to the research, my rights as a research subject, or any related injury, I 
have the right to call Heather Frasier Chabot (603 862-4047) and discuss diem in 
confidence.
I certify that I have read and fully understand the purpose to this research project.
I , _____________________________ Consent to participate in this research project
(Please print your full name)
I , _____________________________ Refuse to participate in this research project.
Signature of Subject Date
Address so that debriefing statement can be sent to you
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APPENDIX N (cont.)
Consent Form (for extra credit)
The present research is being conducted by Heather Frasier Chabot of the 
University o f New Hampshire.
Purpose: The purpose of this research is to better understand the structure and predictors 
of various attitudes among people of different ages.
Description: You will be asked to recruit an older malefwho is between 65-74 years of age) 
to participate in a short survey study similar. If you have made an honest, but 
unsuccessful, effort to recruit your family members, you may still be eligible to receive 
additional credit by returning the Recruitment Attempt Form.
Risks. Benefits, and Termination of Participation:
You are free to discontinue your participation in this research at any time and for 
any reason without penalty. No risks are involved in participating in this study beyond 
those which can be considered typical risks o f daily living. Benefits to participation include 
additional course credit ( I lab credit), assisting research in psychology, and better 
understanding and awareness of stereotypes.
Confidentiality:
You are requested not to place your name on any o f these materials, except this 
consent form which will be separate from your responses.
Final Consent Summary:
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, and that I can choose to end 
my participation at any time for any reason without penalty. The risks and benefits of the 
study have been explained to me and I understand them. I understand that if I have any 
questions pertaining to the research, my rights as a research subject, or any related injury, I 
have the right to call Heather Chabot at 603 862-4047 and be given the opportunity to 
discuss them in confidence.
I certify that I have read and fully understand the purpose to this research project.
I , _____________________________ Consent to participate in this research project.
(Please print full name)
I ,_____________________________ Refuse to participate in this research project.
Signature o f Subject Date
Social Security # (so that additional credit can be aw arded)____________
Phone Number (so that you may be contacted for credit)______________
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APPENDIX O: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION (STUDIES 2, 3)
Please complete the following information by circling the appropriate answer or by 
supplying the correct information about yourself for each question.
1. Sex: l.M ale  or 2. Female
2. Age: ________ years
3. Marital Status:
1. Married 3. Divorced 5. Widowed
2. Single 4. Engaged 6 . Remarried
4. Race:
1. Caucasian 3. Asian 5. Other __________
2. African-American 4. Hispanic
5. Political Affiliation:
1. Democrat 3. Independent
2. Republican 4. O th e r__________
6 . Religion:
1. Protestant 3. Jewish 5. Other
2. Catholic 4. None
7. Highest Education Level Attained:
1. Elementary school 4. Some College 7. Masters Degree
2. Some High School 5. College Graduate 8 . Doctoral Degree 3.
High School Graduate 6 . Some Graduate School
8  W hat is/was your father’s occupation? _____________________________
9. W hat is/was your mother's occupation?
10. Which of the following best describes your annual family income?
1. beiow S 10,000 4. $50-575,000 7. $150-5200,000
2. $10,-525,000 5. $75,-$ 100,00 8 . above $200,000
3. $25,-$50,000 6 . 5100-$ 150,00
1 2 . l a m a
1. college student, 3. grandparent of a college student
2. parent o f a college student 4. none of the above
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APPENDIX P: DEBRIEFING STATEMENT
The structure and predictors of ageist and sexist attitudes of in-group and out-group
members
Many important social issues have not been examined in the attitude research 
studies in social psychology. This study seeks to examine the structure and predictors of 
ageist and sexist attitudes of in-group and out-group members. The number of older 
people in our population is increasing at a high rate and, thus, it has become more 
important to assess the predictors o f our attitudes, especially negative and stereotypic 
attitudes. This study has implications for the specific topic of older people, especially older 
women. There are also more general implications for increasing our understanding of 
attitudes (i.e., determining the importance of personality, developmental and attitude 
strength variables in the prediction of attitudes). I hope in future studies to examine the 
effectiveness of various techniques to change/enhance ageist and sexist attitudes.
In order to examine ageist and sexist attitudes, I surveyed age and sex stereotypes 
among younger (17-26 years of age) and older (65-74 years of age) male and female adults 
to determine if there are structural differences in these attitudes for members o f in-groups 
(participants asked to assess their attitudes toward a group in which they are a member) 
versus out-groups (groups in which participants currently are not members or will not be 
for a long time). Participants were members o f four groups: younger males (17-26 years 
o f age), younger females (17-26 years o f age), older males (65-74 years of age), and older 
females (65-74 years of age). Participants completed demographic information, personality 
measures, developmental measures, a measure to determine their attitudinal base, 
knowledge, and attitudinal ratings of one of four target groups: younger males (17-26 
years o f  age), younger females (17-26 years o f age), older males (65-74 years of age), and 
older females (65-74 years of age). Participants were randomly assigned to complete 
attitudinal measures for one of the four target groups. For each target group, 20 
participants were in-group members based on both age and sex, 40 participants were in­
group members for either age or sex and out-group members on either age or sex, and 2 0  
participants were out-group members on both variables o f age and sex.
It is expected that there will be different attitudinal ratings for in-group and out­
group members. More specifically, :t is predicted that there wiii be an in-group bias (i.e., 
in-group members will rate in-group members more positively and out-group members 
more negatively). It is also hypothesized that out-group homogeneity will be noted (i.e., 
there will be a greater variance in attitudinal ratings for in-group members than out-group 
members). Furthermore, I expect that various personality, development, and demographic 
variables will be significant predictors of ageist and sexist attitudes. It is expected that the 
salience of these variables will differ by target group and by the in-group/out-group status 
o f the participants. Lastly, it is predicted that the attitude structure, mainly, the affective 
and cognitive bases of ageist and sexist attitudes will differ by out-group/in-group 
membership status of participants. The findings o f this study should supplement our 
knowledge of attitudes and attitude structure, inter group relations, and offer insight to the 
creation of more effective attitude change programs to combat ageism and sexism.
If you have any questions about your participation in this study please contact 
Heather Chabot at (603) 862-4047. Thank you for your participation.
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APPENDIX Q: RECRUITMENT LETTER
February, 1999
Dear (Older person’s name)
I am hoping that you can help me in my psychology class. I have learned that I can 
earn extra credit if I act as a research assistant and recruit family members or friends 
(grandparents, etc.) such as yourself to also participate in a study.
The study consists of completing a consent form agreeing that you are willing to 
participate in the study and then completing a questionnaire. The questionnaire takes only 
about a half hour to complete and your responses will be confidential. I have asked the 
researcher, Heather Chabot, a graduate student at UNH, to send you this packet in the 
hopes that you can take a little bit of time to help both of us. We know that your time is 
valuable to you and appreciate your assistance.
If you choose to participate, please (I) complete the questionnaire and consent form 
and (2 ) mail them back in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope within one week 
of receiving this packet. If you choose not to participate please send back the unused forms 
so that they can be reused. Upon your completion o f the study, you will be mailed a fuller 
description of the study called a debriefing statement.
Thanks for helping me!
(Signed with the students' name)
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APPENDIX R: NEW ITEMS FOR ATTRIBUTES SCALE
Below are a list of polar adjectives. You are asked to circle a number which, in your 
judgm ent, best describes the ta rge t g roup  (i.e., men who are 17 to 26 years o f agef, 
Make each item a separate and independent judgment. Do not worry or puzzle over 
individual items. Do not try to remember how you have marked earlier items even though 
they may have been similar. It is your first impression or immediate feeling about each 
item that is wanted.
Also please write down how certain you are o f each judgment from 0% not at all 




























































































































































APPENDIX R (cont.) 


































































7  % Certain
Non-sexist
7  % Certain
Unemotional 
7  % Certain
Motivated
7  % Certain
Nurturing




7  % Certain
Responsible
7  % Certain
Respectful












7  % Certain
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APPENDIX R (cont.)
32. Grouchy
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APPENDIX S: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL FOR PILOT STUDY
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APPENDIX T: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL FOR STUDY I
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APPENDIX U: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL FOR STUDIES 2 & 3
_________________ U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M E W  H A M P S H I R E
lNBT1TVnON«I.R(VKW 0Q4HS r0*1>« PadW nund* HUMM RoCM'CM SuMCTl 
PaortxixRevww Foom
Project oaeetdc H aath eg  F f a i e r  O ia b o t_______________________________ i f l a r _________________
Oeparonenc P sy ch o lo g y  n n m r
Project Tide: _ s t r u c c u a a  an d  p p a c t lc tn r s  o f  a g e i s t  a n d  se a d s c  Oata: 1 1 /9 /9 8
a c c ic u c a s  o i  x n -g ro u p  a n d  o u c-g g o u p  aeoton g s  
/leeri m e  Plaaaa MHO u aienanwi deny. an a>e <e»e»«e aWa a/ Wafcnn. AMunearnptoatf JbrmkrO&l f 07 Semca dUMbip:
EXEMPT REVIEW
PROTOCOLS APPROVED AS EXSrWTPBISUBSECTION:
  40.103(6X1) Reeeetol conducted H eeteBA e ^  educ r tonet eedlng uNng normel educrtooN proceoxee
^■reS!l01(b)C0 EducaOnnN teea. eurveya. trterrferee. obearradan at pubdcBanarricnlio rtalt
!X Educadenal tees, eurveye. Inwndew. obaen atlon at puMc beftavlor not aaampt under Subeecaan 2. 4d.iai(b)(3] above, I  pubdc ofldel o r! conMendalBy mandated by lederal otatutea
  40.101(6X4) Study at axtadng d ea
  40.101(b)(5) Sbidy at pitfdebanadw or eaivlce p rag m a
  40.tOT(b)CI) Tea* and tood atuWae
  PROTOCOL S  NOT APFROV® ___  PROTOCOL RECCA0A0CS3 FOR RJLL BOARD REVIEW
EXPEDITED REVIEW
PROTOCOL 8  APPROVS AS EXPEDITED PER SUBSECTION:- 
  4S.ilO(bXTXT) Codecdon ot Kafr, na<tBe*ilnnan-dNdBi*lns manner
  40.110(6X1 )CQ Cadeedonotaaamaleaaedona: eieeaLBalye.pttc0na(am eotdelv0ry).a«miode fluid
nacartlnB at data (ram aubjeca 18 yuan or older uarng non-tmaaive praeadurae raudnely employed h  
  4S.11CXBXTX3) dhaeai practtoa
  40.110(6X1X4) Codacaon ot Mood eamptae by varipuncbn
  40.110(6X1 XS) Codacdon at dareal pRqua «nd calcuAia
  40.110(6X1X11) Voice reoordbiga aa jnreadgatlcne at epiecti deteca
  40.110(6X1X7) Modanna eaeroee by heaffliy rWuraeera
  40.tiO(bXl)W SSjdy at axtadng data, doom ed*, raced*. or (SagnooDc epeamana
fleaaarah cn jnrjvrtri/ or grot? banoMor or cnaractariedca of IndvWuaia. audl aa atudMa ot parcepOon, 
  40.110(6X1X9) cagndlon. tiaary. crlaat darelopmant
  40.110^X1X10) Haaaandiandwgaardarnaaa tarenldianinneaogaaonaldrugaraew ceeaenaiacnienotreqwed
  PROTOCOLS NOT APPROVED_____________________  PROTOCOL REDOM OCS} POR PULL BOARD REVIEW
MODIFICATION (REVISION) REVIEW
Fvrmer«c3on recommended: (apecdy)
CONTINUING (TIME EXTENSION) REVIEW
(apecdy)
Signature at IRE Reeewar Date
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